ISSN 2244-1875

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY

Φιλοσοφια

VOLUME 1 (Philosophia) NUMBER 2

MAY 2014

THIS ISSUE

Philippine National Philosophical Research Society
[http://ejournals.ph/index.php?journal=PIJP]

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY

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Volume 15, No. 2 (*Philosophia*) May 2014

Φιλοσοφια (*Philosophia*) is abstracted in *The Philosopher' s Index* (http://www.philinfo.org), Bowling Green, Ohio; in *Thomson Reuters* (formerly ISI) *Web of Knowledge*, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; and in *Scopus*, Amsterdam, the Netherlands. It is also listed in *Ulrich's International Periodicals Directory* (http://www.urlrichsweb.com/UlrichWeb) and in Philosophy Documentation Center's *International Directory of Philosophy*. The Commission on Higher Education of the Philippines has certified the journal as Category A-1.

Articles published in this journal do not necessarily reflect the respective ideas of the members of the editorial board and the editorial consultants. Authors of published articles are solely responsible for the defense of their own ideas or theses.

Starting with the January 2007 issue of this journal, references by any article to the logical term *proposition*, except in contextual historical citations, will be replaced by the term *constative*. Please see R. Gripaldo's "Meaning, proposition, and speech acts" in *Issues in contemporary Western philosophy*, Islam-West Philosophical Dialogue (2003), edited by Ali Naqi Baqershahi and Roya Khoii and supervised by Seyyed Mohammed Khamenei. Papers read during the World Congress on Mulla Sadra in May 1999. Vol. 6. Tehran: Sadra Islamic Research Institute. Also in 2001. *Φιλοσοφια: International Journal of Philosophy* 30 (1). See his papers, "The rejection of the proposition," delivered in 2008 during the 22nd World Congress of Philosophy, Seoul and "Constatival logic: An essay in the philosophy of logic," published in 2010, *Φιλοσοφια* 39 (1) and in 2011, *Φιλοσοφια* 40 (1), respectively.

Φιλοσοφια URL: http://www.ejournals.ph/index.php?journal=PIJP

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Printed by Ample Printing Press
1726 Modesto St., Malate, Manila 1004, Philippines

ISSN 2244-1875 [formerly 0115-8988]

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EDITOR'S NOTES

This volume contains seven interesting papers from various areas in philosophy. We have one each in African philosophy, aesthetics, Greek philosophy, Filipino philosophy, humanistic-Marxism, philosophical conversation, and philosophy of religion. We also have a book review and a book note.

In "*Iremoje* funeral dirges: Yoruba contribution to existential death and immortality," Omotade Adegbinbin tries to show that the Yoruba belief in life after death is in consonance with Heidegger's conviction that death confers meaning to human existence rather than with Sartre's view that death makes life meaningless. The Yoruba position, as conveyed in the *Iremoje* funeral dirges, not only believes that the human personality survives death, but that it is associated with an honourable life on earth.

Lok Chong Hoe argues in "Can aesthetics incorporate radical protest activities?" as contained in the book, *Aesthetics and radical politics*, that it cannot. Among other reasons are that the protests were never intended by organizers as art activities, they do not have an aesthetic function, and those who witness the events do not see these protest activities as art performances. The author tries to tackle the issue as to who decides how activities become works of art, and why?

Peter P. L. Simpson discusses that Aristotle has written four books on ethics and contends in "Aristotle's four ethics" that, contrary to some versions, they are all written by Aristotle. They are the *Eudemian ethics*, the *Nicomachean ethics*, the *Magna moralia* (or *Great ethics*), and *On virtues and vices*. The traditional view is that the *Eudemian* and *Nicomachean* ethics are genuine while the *Magna moralia* is not genuine as it was allegedly written by someone else and *On virtues and vices* is likewise spurious since it was written some two centuries later. The author marshals his arguments by pointing out that Aristotle wrote them in different times for various audiences.

In "Quito, Ceniza, Timbreza, Gripaldo: DLSU professors' contributions to Filipino philosophy," Feorillo A. Demeterio III discussed four philosophers, who have retired as full professors of philosophy, from De La Salle University. He tries to concentrate on what he considers as Filipino philosophy that is fundamentally based on, or related to, the *Filipino subject matter* because these four professors wrote about other topics in such areas as continental philosophy, logic, metaphysics, Chinese philosophy, philosophical logic, and philosophy of language.

Rhoderick V. Nuncio contends in "A humanist-Marxist and labor-oriented paradigm of organizational change" on the possibility of intermingling Marxist ideas with organizational development. He proposes some steps on how this will work by juxtaposing Richard Beckhard's organization development strategies with the humanist-Marxist paradigm.

In "St. Thomas and Rorty: Is conversation possible?" Tomas Rosario Jr. believes and shows how it is possible. The Thomist Marie-Dominique Chenu, despite Thomas's being a foundationalist thinker, or one who is interested with underlying principles or ultimate standards of truth, tries to show that Thomas's method of rational inquiry is not divisive but collaborative, which attempts to reconcile opposing views by means of the intellectual

tool of distinction. This intellectual tool of distinction is likewise used by Rorty in dealing with criticisms against his apparently nihilistic neopragmatic thought.

Angelo Nicolaides argues in "Jürgen Habermas on the value of religion" that in view of Habermas being a defender of critical theory, theology will come to grips with the rapid innovation and technological developmen that threatens to dislodge religious and moral traditions. This paper attempts to critique Habermas's view that religion is "not philosophical in nature," but involves rather a "very unique and private matter of faith in a God."

Peter Collins's book review of C. Stephen Evans's *Kierkegaard : An introduction* shows us the thematic treatment of Sören Kierkegaard's concepts like inwardness, religious faith, subjectivity, what it means to exist, and the like. Despite the many books on Kierkegaard, the present book is not superfluous but a significant addition to the existing collection. It is quite interesting to note that God reveals Himself to persons through their individual subjectivity.

Finally, we have the book note of Wilfried M. A. Vanhoutte on Matthew Altman and Cynthia Coe's *The fractured self in Freud and German philosophy* where Sigmund Freud's position is compared with those of Immanuel Kant, Gottlieb Fichte, Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling, Arthur Schopenhauer, Daniel Ernst Schleiermacher, Karl Marx, Georg Hegel, and Friedrich Nietzsche. In all these, the authors concluded that despite similarities or analogies, Freud's position, in view of particular peculiarities, is a "special case" as it reflects Freud's strong empirical orientation given his medical background.

With these papers, I hope the readers will develop greater appreciation of philosophy and consider publishing their works in this journal for others to enjoy.

Rolando M. Gripaldo
Editor

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IREMOJE FUNERAL DIRGES: YORUBA CONTRIBUTION TO EXISTENTIAL DEATH AND IMMORTALITY

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The theme of death is of great consequence in Jean-Paul Sartre and Martin Heidegger because most of the existentialist views about death are encapsulated in the debate between them. While Heidegger, carrying with a certain religious conviction, is of the view that death confers meaning on human existence, Sartre believes that death is a great evil which makes life meaningless. Sartre's position obviously sprouts from his atheistic persuasion which does not accommodate a presage of a future existence or embrace the ideals associated with the good life. For the Yoruba, however, Sartre's position does not make sense and is preposterous; they believe strongly that the human personality survives death. In this paper, I want to show that the Yoruba conception of human existence and death—as conveyed by the Iremoje*—reflects an extracosmic and a more comprehensive reading of existence that reinforces the values associated with an honourable life.*

...the power which gave existence is able to continue it in any form.

—Thomas Paine

INTRODUCTION

Death is mostly regarded as a phenomenon which causes the end of our existence or extinguishes all our projects and, right from antiquity, the issue of death—and, by extension, of immortality—has been a unique subject for philosophical reflections. The fact of death features prominently in existentialist philosophy, while its theme is of great consequence in Jean-Paul Sartre and Martin Heidegger because most of the existentialist views about death are capsulised in the debate between these two thinkers. While having a certain religious conviction, Heidegger views death as conferring meaning on human existence. Sartre, however, believes death as evil that makes life meaningless. As an atheist, Sartre does not accommodate a presage of a future existence or an embrace of the ideals of the good life.

That extinction awaits us at death does not make sense to the Yoruba and to say that death confers no meaning on human existence is equally preposterous. For the Yoruba, the death of the body is not the extinction of personality. In fact, the Yoruba minimize the confrontation of individual's extinction with assurances of some form of immortality. In this paper, I will show how the Yoruba conception of death and human existence—as conveyed by the *Iremoje*—reflects an extracosmic and a more comprehensive reading of existence which, contrary to the Sartrean conception, reinforces the values associated with an honourable life.

MEANING OF *IREMOJE*

To discuss *Iremoje* it is required that we first discuss what *Ijala* is, since the former derives its meaning *Iremoje* and significance from the latter. *Ijala*, usually rendered in chants, is one of the various types of Yoruba oral poetry and is popularly understood as Yoruba hunters' poetry because it is "associated specifically with hunting and performed at a gathering of specialist hunters" (Finnegan 1970, 224). There is the common belief among the Yoruba, an integral ethnic group in Nigeria, that *Ijala* is in a "mythic" and ritual way connected with Ogun, the Yoruba god of iron and war. S. A. Babalola (1966, 3) explains that:

> Ijala-chanting is a genre of spoken art practised mainly by the Oyo Yoruba of Western Nigeria. It is mythically associated with the worship of Ogun; is performed at well-defined ritual and social occasions by trained specialists (*onijala*); and has a characteristic range of subject-matter, and its own rule and poetic composition, which are understood by both performers and audience.

Wole Soyinka (1976, 28) describes *Ijala* as a form of Yoruba poetic art, practised by the followers of Ogun, which "celebrates not only the deity but animal and plant life, seeks to capture the essence and relationships of growing things and the insights of man into the secrets of the universe." It deals with many themes which convey the culture of the Yoruba and is generally regarded as the hunters' musical entertainment since hunters "predominate among the worshippers of the god, Ogun, and with this is connected the belief that Ogun in his earthly life was a hunter" (Babalola 1966, 3).

According to Babalola (1966, 4), there are many legends which account for how Ogun originated *ijala* during his earthly life. One point to note is that all the legends establish that *ijala* is Ogun's musical entertainment, though we may add that we can have as many legends as there are *ijala* chanters since legends are not always verifiable. As Ogun's musical entertainment, *ijala* chant also belongs to those who use iron implements in their sources of livelihood—like the blacksmiths, the warriors and other devotees of Ogun—since the Yoruba believe that Ogun is the patron of all those who use iron in their sources of livelihood.

Ijala chant is usually performed in hunters' religious ceremonies where the hunters offer sacrifices to Ogun, their god-patron. In such ceremonies, the hunters chant Ogun's pedigree in turns with the assumption that the god would assist them in their hunting expedition or any other human activities like smithing and even farming. *Ijala* is also performed by hunters at private social occasions where only members of the guild are present and at conferences of headhunters called *Oluode*. Hunters chant *ijala* to recount

their encounters with animals and their indelible experiences in the forest. Roland Hallgren (1988, 147) summarily points out the occasion for *ijala*-chanting thus:

> The recitation of *ijala* takes place during the annual festival of Ogun, while other occasions are the death and the funeral of a hunter, or festivals concerning ancestral observance. *Ijala* is also used as a mark of honour towards mighty persons or families of dignity.

The *ijala* chant associated with the death and the funeral of a hunter is of profound metaphysical significance among hunters. During the funeral rites of a deceased hunter called *ikopa* or *isipa ode*, hunters as a matter of course chant a special form of *ijala* which they believe as the last honour that could be given to a deceased hunter. This special form of *ijala* is referred to as *iremoje*.

Iremoje is a funeral dirge which, according to Olukoju (1978, 119), "involves a corporate musical performance of *ijala* chants and songs by members of the hunter's guild." It is "a ceremony rarely performed in the day time, and during which time the deceased's complete armour as a hunter is ceremoniously disposed of in the bush at the outskirts of the town." A myth relates that Ogun, the founder of *ijala*, is also the first to perform or chant *iremoje*. The myth relates that after all the Yoruba gods have arrived on earth, Ogun decided to live in Sakí, a Yoruba town, while the other gods chose different parts of the then Yoruba kingdom to live. Ogun became bored after spending many years in Saki and left for Ife, another town. In Ife, Ogun recounted all his experiences, the pleasant and the sad ones. It is said that he used *ijala* to describe his pleasant experiences and *iremoje* to describe his most harrowing experiences. It is noteworthy here, therefore, to bring out the important differences between *ijala* and *iremoje*, though, says Bade Ajuwon (1982, 17),

> ...each plays a unique role in the social, religious, and ritual life of the Yoruba hunters and other followers of Ogun...; while *ijala* is meant to celebrate festive and happy occasions, *iremoje* essentially laments unhappy occasions like death, or in the mythological days of Ogun, the occasion of the loss of valuable properties.

Ajuwon (1982, 17) further explains:

> ...*ijala* and *iremoje* differ thematically as well. The point is that the occasion of their performance is different and this difference of focus is reflected in their themes. In *ijala*, for instance, there is abundant evidence of social themes as well as salutes to bush animals, birds and trees. But in *iremoje*, the themes of lament, death and loss predominate.

Let us as a summary add that the observance of *iremoje* is due to the following reasons, some of which are characteristics of Yoruba thought:

> (i) There is the common belief among hunters that the performance of *iremoje* is in obedience and honour of Ogun, their god-patron;
>
> (ii) The performance of *iremoje* serves as an opportunity for the living members of the hunters' guild to honour and bid their departed member farewell;

(iii) The performance of *iremoje* is an attempt to effect a separation between the living and the dead;

(iv) The *iremoje* also affords the living members of the hunters' guild the opportunity to evaluate the successes and failures of the deceased. (Ajuwon 1982, 19-20)

DEATH AND IMMORTALITY IN EXISTENTIALIST PHILOSOPHY

Death is mostly regarded as a phenomenon which ends our existence or extinguishes our projects. In the latter sense, consciously or unconsciously, death is generally conceived as an evil, the greatest destroyer of our being and identity. Before the development of philosophical knowledge, death as a phenomenon did not receive much attention. In fact, it was completely eschewed from serious philosophical speculations. But, these days, death has continued to receive serious philosophical attention and, we dare say, much of the theories or discourse concerning death have come down to us from the existentialist philosophers.

Jean-Paul Sartre

In the enterprise of philosophy, "existentialism" is the philosophy of existence. It is essentially the analysis of the conception of man, of the particular state of being free, and of man's having constantly to use his freedom in order to answer the ever-changing and unexpected challenges of the day. Some people have observed that the term "existentialism" is sometimes reserved for the works of Sartre, who used it to refer to his own philosophy in the 1940s. But it is more often used to describe the philosophical thought of a number of thinkers in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries whose major concern revolves around the concrete individual. Existentialism, therefore, "arose as a backlash against philosophical and scientific systems that treat all particulars, including humans, as members of a genus or instances of universal laws" (Guignon 1998, 439). Joseph Omoregbe (1991, 38) captures this when he writes:

> In existentialism, the word *existence* means something different from what is ordinarily meant by it. In ordinary usage, we can talk of the existence of a stone, the existence of a tree, [or] of an animal. But in existentialism, *existence* is restricted to human existence with all its characteristic features. The existentialist philosophers are not concerned with the existence of stones, trees or animals, but only with human existence. In their own peculiar use of the term existence, stones, trees, dogs and cats do not exist, they simply are. Only human beings exist, all other kinds of beings are, but they do not exist. Existentialism is therefore the philosophy of human existence, a philosophy preoccupied with what it means for a human being to exist.

From the above, it can be inferred that existentialism indicates a special concern with the problem of existence, not with each and every type of existence, but with human existence. Thus, central to the existentialist project are such themes as: (1) man and fellow man; (2) man

and the world; (3) man and God; (4) freedom, choice, and responsibility; (5) anxiety and anguish; (6) the facticity of human existence; (7) death. The theme of death is of great consequence in Sartre and Heidegger because most of the existentialist views about death are encapsulated in the debate between these two thinkers.

Sartre is generally considered as the dominant French intellectual of his time. In fact, the lecture he delivered in 1946, translated as *Existentialism is a humanism,* consolidated his position as France's leading existentialist philosopher. Like Friedrich Nietzsche, he denied the existence of God and so his version of existentialism was atheistic. He is mostly remembered for his thorough emphasis on the freedom of the individual. It is not out of place to say, however, that the concept of responsibility cannot be divorced from Sartre's notion of freedom. By responsibility, Sartre means the consciousness of being the incontestable author of event; since man is his own creator, he accepts himself and wholly takes the responsibility. For Sartre, we are thrown into the world, abandoned and without help, and so bear the responsibility of whatever happens afterward. Sartre's idea of responsibility is not resignation; rather it is simply the requirement of the consequence of our freedom, for whatever happens to man happens through him and is automatically his. This asserts that inasmuch as we are free, a great burden lies on our shoulders. Whether or not we accept this burden, it can never be denied. The presence of this burden, Sartre observes, continues to cause anguish in the heart of man. Sartre, accordingly, claims that the one who in this anguish realizes his condition of being thrown into responsibility—that requires from him an abandonment—will have no remorse or regret; he is no longer anything but a freedom which reveals itself. But inasmuch as this freedom defines the nature of man, it is never an absolute freedom, for it is limited in many ways. This is called *tragedy* in existentialism and could be defined in some sense as a clash between the aspirations of human freedom and creativity with the cosmic order that is stronger and is found to defeat man (Mcquarrie 1972, 147).

Death is one of the tragedies that constantly befall and deny or limit man's freedom. Death fights against man in the sense that it conditions his freedom and so Sartre conceives death as rendering life completely meaningless or absurd. Sartre's conception of death is shaped by his idea that man knows and makes himself according to how he wishes. In presenting his discourse on death, Sartre first makes a critique on the position of Martin Heidegger.

Martin Heidegger

Heidegger abandoned the concerns about theories and books that were central to the twentieth-century continental philosophy and directed his attention to the concerns of the thinking individual, the individual's deepest nature when he is thinking as an existing human being. According to him, only man can raise fundamental questions about his being or existence and that is exactly what differentiates him from "things." He therefore coined the word *Dasein* to describe more accurately the experience of human existence. The word *Dasein,* which in German means "being there," describes man as his unique mode of being rather than an object. For Heidegger, death confers meaning on human life; it is a mode of being which *Dasein* takes upon itself as soon as it is. Heidegger sees death as something which must necessarily be part of our existence. "Death," Joseph Omoregbe (1991, 52-53) says, following Heidegger, "is a way of life for man, for he is a being-towards-death, a being

who lives every moment of his life towards his death." Very crucial to Heidegger's thesis is that nobody experiences his own death, except in anticipation; we only experience the death of others.

Sartre's disagreement with Heidegger

Sartre disagrees with Heidegger's position on being-towards-death. According to Jacques Choron (1963, 241), "Sartre sees Heidegger's position as a reaction against the customary views of death as inhuman, in the sense that it is outside of human existence as if beyond the wall, and that as such it escapes human experience."

If *Dasein* freely decides its projection towards death, that is, a being-towards-death, it means that it chooses its own freedom-towards-dying and by so doing is committed to the free choice of finitude. Through interiorizing its demise, the *Dasein* plunges itself into a limitation and destruction of its existence. If truly we are condemned to death, as Heidegger claims, then it means that we can prepare for it; but we know that great men die sometimes of influenza. The suggestion by Heidegger that we should prepare for death cannot be heeded because one cannot really wait for death as such, except specific death as in the case of someone condemned to death. Death, we know, "preserves its essential characteristic as the unexpected" (Choron 1963, 243). Sartre further claims that death cannot be compared to a harmonious conclusion of a melody because we die any time, whether prematurely or at old age. Also, it is useless waiting for death; to do so is to choose finitude and, consequently, model our ends on the foundation of finitude.

Death, Sartre claims, can never give meaning to life due to its absurd character. Meaning usually is seen or manifests itself in the future of our actions; but, as it were, death makes it impossible for us to see this future and thus the future is not accomplished. Death does not necessarily belong to our nature as free existing beings. Since death is not part of us, we cannot claim that it makes life meaningful, for meaning can only come from our subjectivity. It follows therefore that, since death does not belong to our subjective freedom, it can only remove meaning from life. If we must die, then our life has no meaning; it is reduced to complete absurdity.

Apart from the fact that death makes life meaningless, Sartre proposes, too, that death is the greatest enemy to man's earthly projects. The fact that we are going to die someday already garbles our interest in carrying out some of life's projects. For instance, what need will it be to plan seriously for the future when death can come any day and put a stop to our existence? Thus, Sartre regards death as that which puts an abrupt end to man's projects and his position implicitly suggests that there is no point in leading the good life at all. For Sartre, therefore, the idea of immortality is arrant nonsense.

MAKING SENSE OF THE IDEA OF IMMORTALITY THROUGH *IREMOJE*

Perhaps, the difficulty of demonstrating immortality empirically or scientifically has won more votaries against the immortality-hypothesis. Immortality, for Kai Nielsen, is a phenomenon that should be regarded as unreasonable. Speaking empirically, Nielsen argues that nothing survives the body after death because the body simply disintegrates and decomposes. He (1989, 1) contends that:

> Conceptions of the afterlife are so problematic that it is unreasonable for a philosophical and scientifically sophisticated person living in the...twentieth century to believe in life eternal, to believe that we shall survive the rotting or the burning or the mummification of our "present bodies."

Clarence Darrow's position is a clear reflection of Nielsen's. Darrow is not infatuated with the widespread belief in immortality as expressed by various convictions in the world today. For Darrow (1973, 251-53), the belief in immortality is a delusion which affirms the credulity or gullibility of man. The Spanish existentialist philosopher Miguel de Unamuno (1962, 54-71), on his part, reacts to the phenomenon of immortality and sees it as man's natural desire which is bound to be frustrated by the fact of the extinction that awaits his death.

Though they constantly express their fear of death, the Yoruba do not fail to make impressive responses to it. Their responses to the fear of death enact their belief in the meaningfulness of human existence and convey their conviction that man's desire to survive his personal death is guaranteed. It is, therefore, instructive at this juncture to look at some of the ways through which the Yoruba attempt to neutralize the power of death in a bid to enjoy some form of immortality.

Among the Yoruba, the death of the young is believed to be unnatural and that is why they often hold the opinion that such a death is caused by either the deceased's headstrong foolhardiness or by the will of enemies. In this case, the deceased is mourned. But, contrary to this, the death of an aged person is expected; when this occurs, the Yoruba celebrate. Peter Morton-Williams (1960, 34) expresses this view as embodied in Yoruba religious practices:

> Those who die prematurely, before begetting children or before their children have grown and while they have themselves not reached the threshold of old age, are mourned. But the mourning for the young is in private, by near kin only, and although individuals may come to offer sympathy, no public ceremonial marks their passing. Early death so offends that it is hidden from society at large. Although patterns of mourning are stereotyped, and there are social sanctions to ensure their observance, they are never (except, of course, at the death of a king) directed at arresting the general attention. When the very old die, there are displays of joy—often on a grand scale. The grimness of death is masked by celebrations of the achievement of the preceding lifetime.

It must be stressed here that the Yoruba value such blessings as long life, increasing prosperity, and children. So when a child dies, the Yorùbá are bothered by the fact of whether the child is attacked by a witch or, in the case of a series of dying infants, whether the child is an *abiku*, literally "born to die." To neutralize the potency of witchcraft and sorcery, most individuals among the Yoruba often wear amulets and hang some protective charms around the corners of their houses. This measure, they believe, guards against the sudden death of a child by witches or sorcerers. But in their response to the death of an *abiku*, who they believe is unwilling to leave its spirit playmates and live on earth, the Yoruba observe certain rites. Morton-Williams (1960, 35) writes:

> A series of dying infants is held to be qualitatively different from ordinary children, and to be indeed the same child born again and again. There is a name

> for them, *abiku*, meaning "born to die." It is believed that an *abiku* is a child unwilling to leave its spirit playmates (*ara orun*) and to live on earth. Rites are performed to break its attachment to them. It is commonly vilely dressed and...may even be disfigured, to make it unattractive to them; it usually bears chains or a fetter as a charm to bind it to earthly life, or a rattle to frighten away its spirit companions...Showing further that it is not a real child, its circumcision and the cutting of lineage marks on its face may be postponed until its parents are convinced that it is going to remain in the world.

The responses of the Yoruba to the fear of death in the old, however, have some existentialist bearing. For Benedict Ibitokun (1995, 21), the Yoruba worldview is not restrained to the physical or tangible place of existence alone. He explains further that, for the Yoruba, the individual's cosmic totality has to do with his existence on earth, his relationship with his ancestors, his worship of the gods, and his belief that the unborn guarantee future existence. Babatunde Lawal (1977, 51) corroborates the foregoing:

> ...to the Yoruba, death is not the end of life. It is merely a dematerialization of the vital breath or soul, and hence a transformation from earthly to spiritual existence (a kind of After-Life), where the dematerialized soul may choose to stay forever, although it can make periodic returns to earth through reincarnation (*atunwa*). It is this belief in an After-Life and in reincarnation that assures the Yoruba of immortality.

Lawal draws his inference from the popular Yoruba ontology concerning how *Olodumare*, the Supreme Being, and *Obatala*, a Yoruba god, jointly created man. While *Obatala* moulded man's physical body from clay, *Olodumare* animated the moulded image by emitting his vital breath into it. This vital breath from *Olodumare* assures immortality in the sense that the Yoruba believe that the vital breath which is divine (since it is from the Supreme Being) cannot decompose at death, though its withdrawal from the body (an image moulded from clay) results in death. In other words, the vital breath (generally referred to as the soul or *emi* in Yoruba) has the divine power of retuning to earth in different forms and at different periods. The Yoruba belief in reincarnation finds its meaning in and is borne out of this view.

The performance of *iremoje*, as we shall show shortly, is one of the most dramatic demonstrations of Yoruba belief in immortality. It is related that Ogun himself, during the later part of his life, directed his followers (hunters) to observe *iremoje* as a sacred religious duty. Ogun warned however that the deceased hunter would be denied his right place in the ancestral realm should his living guild members fail to observe the *iremoje* after his death. In short, the deceased whose *iremoje* is not observed will in the spirit or ancestral world be "in a state of peril in which he would not be able to find his proper place among the ancestors" (Ajuwon 1997, 174-75). This view is expressed in the following *iremoje* song, where *Olumokin* is used as a praise-name of Ogun:

> *Ode yoowu o ku,*
> *Ta a ba seremoje e*

Odo Olumokin lo n lo
Ode yoowu to side lo,
Ta a ba seremoje
Toun tegbere ni ojo maa je. (Ajuwon 1997, 175)

A hunter who dies,
For whom *Iremoje* is performed,
Shall join *Olumokin* in heaven.
A hunter who dies,
For whom *Iremoje* is denied,
Shall join the company of demons.

Thus *iremoje* ritual performamce could be regarded as a ritual meant to mark the deceased's passage from earth to heaven and, as a divine model from Ogun, meant to elevate the deceased "from an amateur rank (on earth) to a professional rank in heaven" (Ajuwon 1997, 28). The chant below boosts this point:

Igba mii,
Igba mii,
Ka ma tuun jo regbe mo. (Ajuwon 1997, 175-76)

In future,
In future,
Stop going a-hunting with us.

Bade Ajuwon explicates the esoteric import of the above chant. According to him (1997, 176), the chant "represents Ogun's own order to the deceased to refrain from ever hunting again with his living colleagues and, instead, to take up his earthly profession in heaven." It is assumed that the deceased will be exposed to superior hunting skills in heaven. Ajuwon's view is in consonance with the fourth of the six themes identified by Gerald Moore (1968, 57) which embrace the concept of death and paradoxically suggests that death "makes renewal possible." Death among the Yoruba is, therefore, not regarded as the end of existence, but as the rite *de passage par excellence*. With this view in mind, the Yoruba—especially members of the hunters' guild—gather at the second-burial ceremony of their departed member and cushion the death of the latter with an effigy, which they achieve by clothing the effigy in the best dress or hunting smock of the deceased. Lawal (1977, 52) adds that:

> The effigy is paraded round the town and thereafter taken to the bush along with a basket containing the hunting charms of the deceased. After the final rites have been performed, the effigy is either destroyed with gunshots or simply left to perish. This marks the end of the physical existence of the deceased.

Where an effigy is not used, it is worthy to mention, the service of someone of exact resemblance of the deceased is sought. This living impersonator will in dramatic demonstration appear to the assembly of hunters, the deceased's relations and townspeople,

and bid them farewell. This dramatic demonstration, like other forms of Yoruba ancestral worship and naturalistic representations, is a bold refutation of the Sartrean conception of death. This point is also obvious in Ajuwon's exposition of *iremoje* as he points out that death, rather than being the end of existence as Sartre and other thinkers of his persuasion would make us believe, "is a gateway to another kind of life: the life of an ancestor. The *iremoje* thus move from the solemnity of death to the joy of another kind of existence" (Ajuwon 1997, 194). Ajuwon substantiates the plausibility of this point with an *iremoje* chant:

Mo posese-posesee,
Owoo mi o b Akanbi mo,
Babaa wa dina orun ko tie ku mo.
Babaa wa si tie doorun,
Eyi ta o fi saso gbe kale.
Akanbi ire lalede orun. (Ajuwon 1997, 194-95)

I trotted and trotted,
I couldn't reach Akanbi anymore.
Our father has been transformed in a heavenly light
Which never dies.
Our father has even been transformed into a sun,
Whose rays shall dry our clothes.
Akanbi, rest in peace.

Ajuwon cites another chant whose import is not so dissimilar from the one above. This particular chant is replete with metaphors and presents the deceased (now an ancestor) as a "transplanted tree." It reads:

Baba awa ti dimule.
Won ti digi aloye,
Eyii ti o lee ku mo,
Èso weere ni won n so. (Ajuwon 1997, 195).

Our father is now an ancestor in whom we confide.
He is a transplanted tree that thrives,
A tree that no longer dies,
But bears countless fruits.

In the chant the ancestor, as "transplanted tree," demonstrates his ability to live (on earth) by "thriving" or resurrecting "in the countless descendants who have been left on earth to reproduce in the generations yet to come" (Ajuwon 1997, 195). On this account, a synthesis of the first and second chants becomes instructive. If we consider this synthesis and allow the personality of Akanbi in the first chant to replace "*Baba wa*" in the second chant, we will be able to grasp the immortal status given to Akanbi and fathom out that, though Akanbi himself is gone, he has the infinite potential for spiritual transformation and, therefore, the ability to influence and take part in the activities of those living behind him.

Our analysis so far shows that there are some ethical implications of the Sartrean conception of death, though some people believe that ethics should not be discussed in the realm of existentialism. The belief of these people rests on the assumption that most existentialists are amoral atheists who are dedicated to anarchy and nihilism. But a discussion of ethics is crucial here, since existentialism conceives man as a unique individual with a unique life. Man, seen as being alone, determines what is good or bad for himself, courtesy of his absolute freedom. In Sartre's conception of death, life is reduced to complete absurdity. In fact, Sartre's notion of death makes it impossible for us to see any reason why man should lead a moral life. For him, it will be useless telling people to execute good human conduct when, at the end, death will confront man and make his strivings meaningless. The seeming finality that comes to us at death stresses the fact that both our existence and potentialities have been exhausted. The tendency would be to behave in a way that pleases the individual without much emphasis on judging such acts as good or evil; so when the absurd (death) finally strikes, the individual would have been sure of enjoying every bit of opportunity. Since death, in Sartre's atheistic view, is a disaster, the individual must take refuge in behaviour that best suits him.

It is not surprising that this kind of morality which Sartre is imposing on the moral agent is, naturally, unacceptable to the Yoruba whose belief in immortality sprouts from their religiosity—the theistic conviction that gods or ancestors and men mirror and interact with one another. A corroboration of this is found in the Yoruba saying that *Eni sooto ni Male n gbe* (The gods favour those who speak the truth). This saying underscores the connection that exists between the spiritual and the material realms which, by extension, accentuates the Yoruba belief in the spiritual potentials of their gods or ancestors to reward the living who are morally upright or punish offenders who fail to observe certain norms and mores of society. It makes sense therefore to add that "*ooto*" (truth) in the saying cited above could be replaced by any other moral virtues that come to mind; hence, the saying could become "The gods favour those who forgive others," "...those who are faithful," "...those who are kind," and so on, and punish those who flout taboos, those who commit perfidy, and so forth.

Furthermore, Benjamin C. Ray identifies one of the most fundamental features of African religious life which, as we have repeatedly stated in this paper, is the relation between the living and the dead. Ray (1976, 140) contends that this relationship which engenders the worship of ancestors "has powerful moral and psychological dimensions and plays a vital role in the everyday life of almost every African society." Somewhere, contrary to the Sartrean conception of death which discourages the idea of leading the good life, Ray adds that the fact of death reminds the Yoruba of the need to lead a moral life since they believe that we will give account of all our deeds in the afterlife. According to him (1976, 144):

> When the *ori*, or ancestor soul, of the deceased reaches heaven, it goes before Olorun and Obatala and receives judgment, in accordance with the belief that "All we do on earth, we shall account for kneeling in heaven." If the person's life has been good, the *ori* will go to the "good heaven," where there is no sorrow or suffering. Here it may choose another destiny and "turn to be a child" on earth again. Indeed, the same *ori* may be reborn in several people at the same time. But if the deceased has led a bad life, the orí will go to the "bad heaven" of broken potsherds, where everything is unpleasantly hot and dry, and where it will remain forever.

Ray's point seems to give a picture of the Christian assumption about heaven (paradise) and hell; his point, however, has some merit in the understanding of how the Yoruba apprehend the idea of immortality. Thus, the individual who leads the good life has the opportunity of being reborn after death; whereas the man who leads a despicable life will after death be condemned to live in "bad heaven" forever and so denied the opportunity of immortality. This is why the Yorùbá place high premium on proper conduct and why in Yoruba society, as in other African societies, "death is the occasion for praising the departed, and...the concept of praise often included the enumeration of the dead one's faults and failures as well as his virtues" (Moore 1968, 67). Thus, *iremoje* oral text almost certainly fulfills one of the basic tenets of the existentialist thesis which is that man is to a great extent responsible for his own destiny. The term "destiny" here is understood as what becomes of the individual after death, resting on the choice of the individual either to become immortalized or become completely extinct after death. Ajuwon's words are instructive here. He (1997, 196) says:

> ...man will be judged by his own achievements...Each individual...is responsible for his own success. The amount of courage and heroism one is able to bring to the complex problems and confrontations of life must be mixed with a certain amount of opportunism, vigor, and lust for life. Each of these ingredients contributes toward the individual's achieving his own kind of greatness and his own kind of honour. His immortality lies, then, in his heirs' memories of his achievements.

CONCLUSION

We acknowledge the fact that death evokes questions concerning the meaningfulness of life, meaningfulness in the sense of death being the greatest obstacle to realizing our human aspirations. Sartre's idea that death makes life completely absurd has contributed immensely to his promotion of meaninglessness of human existence. If existence were to be meaningless, then, as we have pointed out, moral life would not be worth leading. In fact, the average person thinks of death much more frequently and the result of this is the neglect of the concrete and urgent task of improving the human condition or promoting human welfare generally. The Yoruba believe that human life should transcend the ordinary attitude and, so, we should not see death as an obstacle to the meaningfulness of life. Although it appears that, in death, the meaning of life ends prematurely, the Yoruba conception of death and human existence—as conveyed by the *Iremoje*—reflects a conception of death which engenders profound regard for good moral conduct and respect for humanity. This view is implicitly couched in the words of Jacques Choron (1963, 272-73) who, with ardent enthusiasm, says that "man is capable of leading a morally good life without being certain whether human existence has a meaning which is immune to the destructive power of death." Thus, even if Sartre's conception of death appears so convincing (to the extent of denying the individual the ability to lead the good life) the fact cannot be denied, however, that we all owe a duty to humanity to promote human value and, by extension, the general good without minding the inevitable fact of death.

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Submitted: 15 October 2012; revised: 24 September 2013

Φιλοσοφια
Volume 15, 2:2014

CAN AESTHETICS INCORPORATE RADICAL PROTEST ACTIVITIES?

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A conference held in Manchester University in 2007 and a subsequent book containing papers presented therein (entitled Aesthetics and radical politics*) attempt to legitimize certain radical political activities as art, that is, by conferring the status of art on these protest activities. In arguing that these works would probably fail to be accepted by the artworld, I have resorted to some form of essentialism, i.e., they will likely fail because they were never intended (by their organizers) as art activities, and the activities themselves do not appear to have an aesthetic function, and the spectators do not expect to see an art performance when they encounter one of these protests. But the failure (or potential failure) of these activities to be accepted as art has broader implications, for it reveals that one of the most influential versions of the institutional theory of art (George Dickie's) has failed to describe the sufficient conditions of art.*

INTRODUCTION

Aesthetics and radical politics is a book edited by Gavin Grindon (2008), and contains a collection of papers from a conference (with the same name) which was held in Manchester University on 3 February 2007. Papers delivered at this conference can be divided into two groups: those which discuss activities that are clearly accepted by the public-at-large as works of art or literature and those which focus on activities that are not yet generally accepted into the realm of art. I interpret this book (and conference) as an attempt to confer the status of art on activities which are not yet generally accepted as belonging to the realm of art. By discussing them with clear-cut cases of art in a book on aesthetics, it was hoped that the general public would be persuaded to accept these radical political activities. I will argue that this attempt may not necessarily succeed, and I will provide reasons to show why they may not be brought into the category of art despite the effort of this book to legitimize them as art-activities. Now if I succeed in doing this, I would have also shown a serious flaw in George Dickie's (2007) version of the institutional theory of art. Dickie's definition can clearly include these radical political activities, for they are artifacts, and have been conferred the status of candidate for appreciation by a particular party (i.e., Grindon's book, *Aesthetics and radical politics*) acting on behalf of the artworld. And yet there is a good chance that they may not be taken into the realm of art for reasons that I will discuss in this paper.

By doing so, I would have achieved two objectives in my paper: first, I would have shown that the artworld may not incorporate these radical protest activities as art (i.e., I would have answered the question that I posted as the title of this paper), and second, I would have indicated that Dickie has not described the sufficient conditions of art in his definition in that such activities which can be included in his definition may not still be accepted as art by the artworld.

There are four sections of this paper: (1) I will discuss radical politics in aestheics; (2) I will discuss the role of the artworld in conferring the status of art to new cases; (3) I will also discuss who confers the status of art to new cases; (4) in what way does conferring the status of art be successful?, and (5) my concluding remarks.

BRINGING RADICAL POLITICS INTO THE REALM OF AESTHETICS

Since the beginning of the twentieth century, new or emerging art movements in the West often challenge aesthetic beliefs held by the majority of people in society. One may think of the Dadaist revolution (and particularly Marcel Duchamp's ready-mades) as a good example. These challenges have often expanded the category of art to include a variety of new things and activities; perhaps, most people within the art circle now expect this expansion of the concept of art to carry on indefinitely into the future. This, however, does not imply that everything (or every activity) introduced by emerging art movements will necessarily be accepted into the category of art. In fact, there are many instances of the so-called "new art" (or new art activities) that have not yet been fully legitimized by society-at-large, or even by the artworld .

I will reinforce this point by discussing a book on aesthetics which describes several activities that I believe have not yet been accepted as art by most people in society. In *Aesthetics and radical politics,* scholars discussed activities or works that have clearly been accepted as art, as well as those that are probably not accepted (or at least not yet accepted) as art activity. Examples of the former include discussions on Alexander Trocchi's *Invisible insurrection of a million minds* (Gardiner 2008, 70-71) and Joseph Beuys's actions, that include one entitled *How to explain pictures to a dead hare*, which was conducted in a New York gallery (Ekstrand and Wallmon 2008, 46). Examples of the latter include the Berlin and Hamburg Umsonst activities (discussed by Kanngeiser 2008, 1-23), the SOMA exercises (conducted in the conference) which are classified as an anarchist experiment (Goia 2008, 56-62), and attempts at explaining anarchism (Gordon 2008, 104-125), etc. Trocchi's work is a collection of literary pieces compiled by A. M. Scott in 1991 (after Trocchi's death in 1984). As a collection of fictional or literary pieces Trocchi's work is in every way a literary work of art (no matter how rebellious he may be to established societal values and no matter how lowly a skeptic might rate the quality of his literary pieces).

Beuys's actions may challenge traditionally and commonly held notions on art (e.g., he proclaims that everyone is an artist, and art activities can function to dismantle our senile social welfare system (see Ekstrand and Wallmon 2008, 50), but they were about art and the role of art, and held in art galleries which were (and still are) regarded as proper platforms for displaying or channeling art to the public, and so on. However, the Berlin and Hamburg Umsonst activities will probably not be accepted as art by society at large because (1) the objective of these activities was social and economic in nature, i.e., to ensure that luxuries

like swimming pools, art galleries, and exclusive supermarkets "should not be denied to those who cannot afford them and have an interest in them," and the struggle to make them available for all "should be placed alongside the struggle for basic material necessities such as food and housing" (Grindon 2008, xiii); (2) the participants do not think (nor were aware that) they were engaged in any activities related to art in that they participated principally to achieve their goal of bringing greater fairness to society; (3) the environment in which they participated—they occupied swimming pools, exclusive supermarkets, etc.—were not then considered as part of the art context, in the same way exhibits displayed in an art museum or gallery can be said to have taken place within an art context. These points can also be made on the soma anarchist experiments conducted in the conference (Goia 2008, 56-62), as well as many of the other "works" described in the book.

It is a little puzzling why *Aesthetics and radical politics* has included discussions on these two classes of works described above. There are two possibilities: (i) this book classifies all the works discussed in it as art (including those political activities which have not yet been accepted as art by the majority in the art circle), and (ii) this work only wants to show that all these activities it discusses can be viewed or appreciated from the aesthetic perspective. Now, in order to get a clearer picture of its objective, I refer to an assertion made by editor Grindon (2008, vii) in his introduction:

> Within the realm of aesthetics, the situation is particularly that—as the case studies presented by the articles in this volume demonstrate—this movement [of critical young scholars] often seeks to aestheticise politics, or rather, to treat the aesthetic as a directly political terrain...

From Grindon's claim above as well as papers in the book, it is still not clear how these young scholars seek to "aestheticise politics." The confusion here lies in the difference between considering an activity as "art" or simply viewing it from the aesthetic perspective. Any object or activity can be approached from the aesthetic perspective, but this does not make it an art object or art activity. We can admire the aesthetic beauty of the Space Shuttle, or a football match, without at the same time treating these things as works of art in the strict sense. On the other hand, a clear-cut case of art (e.g., Michelangelo's *David*, or an activity performed by a conceptual artist) will demand that we adopt an aesthetic approach when criticizing or commenting on it—which we need not do in relation to the Space Shuttle or football match. As to those who "seek to aestheticise politics" (see quotation above) it is often unclear whether they choose only to approach such activities from the aesthetic perspective (in the same way that we can approach a gymnastics display from the aesthetic angle), or consider them as clear-cut cases of art (or art-activity).

If we treat all the activities described in *Aesthetics and radical politics* as art (or art activity), then we will face the problem that some of those activities (e.g., the Hamburg Umsonst activism described by Kanngeiser, or the Soma experiments described by Goia, or the discussion on anarchism in Gordon's work, etc.) are either not art per se, or have yet to be accepted by the artworld as "art." On the other hand, if we regard this book as simply employing the aesthetic approach to viewing and discussing certain sociopolitical activities, then it must explain why it employs this approach to both activities that are clearly not art as well as those which are clear-cut cases of art or art activity, such as novelist Trocchi's work (see Gardiner 2008, 70-71) or even Beuys's work (Ekstrand and Wallmon 2008, 46) which,

at least, was conducted in an art context, i.e. , in a gallery in New York, or at least the artworld would have no difficulty accepting these as art. If the aim is to show that the aesthetic approach can be employed for viewing radical sociopolitical activities, then incorporating clear cases of art activity will serve no purpose, as they are meant to be appreciated from the aesthetic angle anyway.

However, I believe this book cannot be simply an attempt to view certain radical political activities from the aesthetic perspective. The fact that *both* clear cases of art (e.g., Trocchi's work as well as the questionable Hamburg Umsonst activism) are packaged in the same book already suggests that they are both meant to be seen as belonging to the same category—the category of "art." In other words, it may be argued that this book (*Aesthetics and radical politics*) wants to be viewed as an agent which, acting on behalf of the artworld, attempts to confer on those political activities the status of candidates for artistic appreciation. In short, this book is an accepted agent (representing the artworld) for legitimizing these activities as art (or art activities). We will discuss whether this and other such attempts to confer the art status on radical political activities can be successful. In doing so, we will dwell on issues like the following: if an accepted agent (such as a respected art historian or critic, or a book on art history and appreciation that was published by an established publisher) has conferred the status of art on a certain activity, must the art circle inevitably accept it as art?

THE ARTWORLD AND ITS CAPACITY TO CONFER THE STATUS OF ART ON NEW CASES

I will now explain the meaning of "artworld," a concept which I have already used in my arguments above. But in order to do this, I need to refer to an attempt to dismiss the possibility of defining the concept of art.

Morris Weitz (1956, 27-35) argues in his paper, "The role of theory in aesthetics" that art is an open concept which defies essentialist definition (i.e., definition by describing necessary and sufficient properties). By doing so Weitz was extending Ludwig Wittgenstein's classification (in his *Philosophical investigations*) of open concepts like "games." Certain activities are classified as "games," but not on the basis of a set of necessary and sufficient characteristics present in all games. Common characteristics may be present in some games, e.g., ball games require balls, card games require cards, chess games require chess pieces, etc., but there is no one common characteristic in all games. We recognize games by their family resemblances , i.e., overlapping characteristics such as the common feature in card games, a different common feature in ball games, and maybe some similar features between some card games and ball games, and so on, but there is no one or set of common characteristics in all games. Likewise with art, there may be a common feature in paintings, another in dramas, another in music, and there may be some similarities between some dramas and paintings, or some music pieces and dramas, etc., but there is no one common characteristic (or set of characteristics) in all artworks. Like games, "art" is an open concept allowing for the continuous inclusion of new things which may not have similarities with most previous artworks (see Weitz 1956, 27-35).

One theory that challenges this anti-essentialist position is the institutional theory of art, introduced by Arthur Danto and George Dickie. It is true that past theories have focused on characteristics or perceived properties in works of art, but the common characteristic in

all artworks is not something that can be extracted by looking at works of art. If there is a common characteristic, this can only be found in some kind of relationship that art has with certain institutions in society (or some kind of action by someone, which then allows us to see something as a work of art). Danto and Dickie, therefore, focus on this "relational property," rather than on some characteristic which can be seen on all artworks.

Danto (2007, 214-15) argues that we can distinguish art from non-art because there is "an atmosphere of artistic theory, a knowledge of the history of art." In order to understand what Danto means, consider his discussion on Brillo cartons displayed by Pop artist Andy Warhol. Now why are Brillo cartons considered as art, while similar cartons in a nearby supermarket are not? In order to see the distinction one requires knowledge of both theory and history of art. According to Danto (2007, 215):

> What in the end makes a difference between a Brillo box and a work of art consisting of a Brillo Box is a certain theory of art. It is the theory that takes it up into the world of art, and keeps it from collapsing into the real object which it is (in a sense of *is* other than that of artistic identification). Of course, without the theory, one is unlikely to see it as art, and in order to see it as part of the artworld, one must have mastered a good deal of artistic theory as well as a considerable amount of the history of recent New York painting.

Notice that for Danto, the *artworld* consists principally of our knowledge of art theory (or theories) and art history. If one is to be able to see something as art, one must have adequate knowledge of art theory (theories) and art history. In order to see Marcel Duchamp's urinal (a ready-made object entitled *Fountain*, 1917) as art, we must know something about the relevant art theory (an ordinary object, including one normally placed in a toilet, may be viewed aesthetically, in the same way that usual art objects like paintings and sculptures are viewed aesthetically), as well as art history (in Western art, there is the tradition of challenging established aesthetic values and beliefs, which Duchamp is doing by exhibiting ready-mades in an art museum). If the knowledge of the relevant theory and history were taken away, Duchamp's urinal would just be an ordinary urinal which rightfully belongs in a men's toilet. As editor Thomas Wartenberg (2007, 206) elegantly wrote while explaining Danto's notion of "artworld":

> ...to be an artwork requires that the object occupy a place in the history of art, something that it does in virtue of the presence of a theory (or interpretation). Without a prior understanding of art history and theory—in short, of the artworld—a viewer could not see an object *as* a work of art.

Any art object (or art activity) has a proper location within the history of art—as new art theories are developed and introduced and accepted in this environment of art history. Duchamp's urinal will probably be rejected as art in the Renaissance Period (for no theory existing at that time could ever accommodate it as art); it can only be accepted as art from the early twentieth century onwards, for it was only then that new theories were developed that enable us to perceive art in new ways, and extend the concept (of art) to include radically new things like ready-mades. Theory and history are, therefore, the necessary conditions for anything to be accepted as art.

Dickie seems to use the concept "artworld" with a broader meaning. He considers the artworld as an institution, which means that it has certain established practices, that is, *established practices* governing the display and presentation of artworks, reactions of the audience, and acceptance of something as a work of art. According to Dickie (2007, 221):

> This institutional behavior [in theater] occurs on both sides of the "floodlights": both the players and the audience are involved and go to make up the institution of the theater. The roles of the actors and the audience are defined by the traditions of the theater. What the author, management, and players present is art, and it is art because it is presented within the theatre-world framework. Plays are written to have a place in the theater system and they exist as plays, that is, as art, within that system.

Dickie's notion of artworld consists not only of art theories and art history (as in Danto's case), but also conventions (or established practices) governing the presentation of artworks, the management of artworks (e.g., they are often kept in art museums), our reactions to artworks (e.g., what the audience of a theater could or could not do while a play is being staged), etc. But this artworld is only a part of his much broader definition of art. In Dickie's (2007, 223) definition, a work of art "in the classificatory sense is (1) an artifact, and (2) a set of the aspects of which has had conferred upon it the status of candidate for appreciation by some person or persons acting on behalf of a certain social institution (the artworld)." The word "artifact" suggests that artworks are man-made and not naturally present, but it must be capable of incorporating a natural landscape or rock which someone (e.g., the artist) can proclaim his piece as a work of art. In this way, it is better to describe "artifact" as something which is the product of human conception, so that the description can include something that occurs naturally but given the status of an artwork by the artist or critic. In doing so, we get into Dickie's second condition, i.e., certain individuals representing or acting on behalf of the artworld have the capacity to confer the status of art on new or novel cases that are being introduced from time to time. Dickie (2007, 224) argues that this conferring of status for appreciation (or art) is usually carried out by the artist:

> In one sense a number of persons are required but in another sense only one person is required: a number of persons are required to make up the social institution of the artworld, but only one person is required to act on behalf of the artworld and confer the status of candidate for appreciation. In fact, many works of art are seen only by one person—the one who creates them—but they are still art. The status in question may be acquired by a single person's acting on behalf of the artworld and *treating an artifact* as a *candidate for appreciation*. Of course, nothing prevents a group of persons from conferring the status, but it is usually conferred by a single person, the artist who creates the artifact.

Dickie goes on to argue that there is a difference between simply presenting an object for appreciation and actually conferring on it the status of object for appreciation (which, in this context, makes it an artwork). A plumber may display a urinal which he has repaired for our appreciation, but unlike Duchamp's *Fountain* (1917), it will not be classified as art

(Duchamp presented his urinal as a candidate for appreciation in 1917 and it has subsequently been accepted as art). The reason, according to Dickie (2007, 225), is that "Duchamp's action took place within the institutional setting of the artworld and the plumbing salesman's action took place outside of it." The artworld (in Dickie's scheme) consists principally of "established practice," or a set of conventions and rituals pertaining to works of art—how an artwork is presented (e.g., it should be presented in an art museum or gallery or some space which has been declared as appropriate for presenting an art activity), the accepted or "institutionalized" behavior of the spectators and actors, the roles of the management, actors, artists, and spectators, etc. In other words, Duchamp's urinal (*Fountain*) was presented within this set of conventions, while the plumber's urinal was outside of it, which was why the former is art while the latter is not. But surely Dickie's artworld must also incorporate art history and theory (which were emphasized by Danto), for art conventions and rituals are certainly determined by history and theory. In fact one cannot overstate the role played by art theory in the inclusion of Duchamp's *Fountain* as art, and the rejection of the plumber's urinal into the category. It was the emergence of new theory (and new thinking about art) that enabled us to accept as art things that are readily available (or ready-mades) and not created by the physical skill of the artist.

WHO REALLY CONFERS THE STATUS OF ART ON NEW CASES?

Dickie's view on how we confer the status of art or "object for appreciation" (on certain objects or activities) is certainly relevant to our discussion of *Aesthetics and radical politics*. This is largely because this book can be construed as an *attempt* to confer the status of art (or art activity) on all those political and semipolitical activities which it describes. After all, the artworld also contains art critics and aestheticians, and their published writings can play a role in conferring the status of art on certain radical political activities. Dickie (2007, 223), however, argues that although the artworld is made up of people with different functions and skills ("painters, composers, writers, producers, museum directors, museum-goers, theater-goers, reporters for newspapers, critics for publications of all sorts, art historians, art theorists, philosophers of art, and others"), it is usually the artist, or creator of the artifact (and not the others who made up the artworld), who confers the status of "object for appreciation" on his work. He (2007, 224) insists that although "nothing prevents a group of persons from conferring the status [of object for appreciation on an artifact]...it is usually conferred by a single person, the artist who creates the artifact." There are at least three possible objections here.

(1) In conferring the status of "object for appreciation," the roles played by some (if not all) of the other elements of the artworld are as important as that played by the artist. One must not ignore the important role played by the art critics, theorists, aestheticians, and art historians (as emphasized by Danto). It is true that Marcel Duchamp was responsible for placing a urinal in an art exhibition in 1917, and naming it *Fountain*, as well as signing on it. At this stage, it may be said that Duchamp has proposed his ready-made as a work of art, or as an "object for appreciation." In other words, it is not yet being conferred the status of art until all or most of the other elements of the artworld (especially the art theorists, critics, and art historians) accept it as art. Now, if all or the vast majority of art critics, art historians, theoreticians, and spectators had rejected Duchamp's work as art and continue to reject it

as art, then the *Fountain* may not have ended up as a work of art today. The artist alone without the support of these other important elements of the artworld may not make much headway.

(2) This leads to the second objection, viz., not every attempt to confer the status of "object for appreciation" is successful. It may be said that the artist is the first person to try to confer the status of art on his artifact, but one can imagine the number of such attempts that are not successful. What of the role of art critics, historians, and theorists? Today most art critics and theorists express their views in art journals and books, so can the fact that a new work has been mentioned in an art journal or book suggests that it has been successfully conferred the status of "object for appreciation"? That will depend on several factors. Duchamp's urinal (or *Fountain*) has been discussed as a work of art by many well-known art critics and historians, and the books that contain these writings were published by well-established publishers around the world, and most art lovers have come to accept it as a piece of Dada art. Now this is surely sufficient to show that the urinal (or *Fountain*) has been successfully conferred the status of work of art, and accepted as art by the majority of people in the art circle. But proposals by critics to make something (let us call it **A**) an artwork can still end in failure. Perhaps **A** was mentioned in a published paper by a relatively unknown commentator (or in a book by a little known author), and both the work and the commentator's writing were subsequently ignored by others in the artworld. Perhaps a well-known and respected critic accepts A as a work of art in his publication, but the majority of those in the artworld disagree with his decision, and so there were no other papers written by other critics to support the respected critic's proposal. Examples of such failures can be multiplied. Hence, not all attempts to confer the status of art will necessarily be successful.

(3) Some works are conferred the status of art even though their creators never intended them to be so; e.g., stoneware bowls, bronze lamps, porcelain flower pots, etc., which were in the past used as household utensils but have been elevated to "objects for appreciation" in art museums, etc. Such elevation of the status of ordinary household items from the past can only be achieved by a shift in aesthetic beliefs and tastes, and the publications by art critics and aestheticians may play a great role in changing beliefs and allow the conferring of the status of art on these objects.

WILL ATTEMPTS TO CONFER THE STATUS OF ART ON CERTAIN RADICAL POLITICAL ACTIVITIES BE SUCCESSFUL?

In the light of the above discussion, *Aesthetics and radical politics* must be seen as an *attempt to confer the status of art* (or "activities for appreciation") on those activities described in the book. Or it must at least be construed as a *proposal* to view those activities as art-activities. But this book has a mixed bag which includes (1) works that have been accepted (as art) by the art circle and the public, and (2) cases that are still highly contentious and not yet widely accepted as art. This mix of the two "kinds" of works must be seen as a strategy to get the more contentious cases accepted as "art" by the reader. The inclusion of generally accepted cases will lure the reader into accepting the contentious cases, since they are both being described in the same book which deals with aesthetics. Works described in this book which have long been generally accepted as art include Trocchi's *Invisible insurrection* or his other literary works, and, Beuys's actions, including *How to explain*

pictures to a dead hare [1968], *I like America and America likes me* [1974], etc. Beuys's actions were performed in an *art context,* that is, they were held in art galleries and he considers his actions to be art-activities or social sculptures aimed at bringing about social transformation. There is, therefore, little difficulty in accepting his actions as art. Trocchi's creations were presented in the form of literary works, and literary works are clear-cut cases of works of art. The contentious cases described in *Aesthetics and radical politics* include the Berlin and Hamburg Umsonst activist campaigns discussed in Kanngeiser (2008, 1-25), the SOMA anarchist experiments conducted in the conference (see Goia 2008, 56-62), etc.

The question is: Will this inclusion of clear cases of art (in the book) necessarily influence the reader into accepting the more contentious cases as art? Not necessarily, if the reader is a critical reader. Firstly, those who initiated the Berlin and Hamburg Umsonst protest activities do not see themselves as artists, nor do they see their campaigns as art (or art-activities). Kanngeiser (2008, 6, 10, and 12) has elegantly phrased their intention(s) in the following question: "Why should we be denied 'luxuries' just because we don't have the financial resources required to take part?" The slogans of the Umsonst activists also make their intention clear —"everything for everyone," and for free, too. The intention of the participants is political, social, and economic in nature: to enable poorer segments of society an equal opportunity to enjoy expensive and exclusive facilities like swimming pools, exclusive supermarkets, and other such luxuries (see Grindon 2008, xiii). Like the anticapitalist "Occupy Wall Street" international movement in 2011, the Hamburg Umsonst activists never had intentions or goals that were aesthetic in nature. As stated earlier, this is unlike Beuys's social sculptures, which were presented in art galleries as art performances (i.e., the artist intended for his works to be seen as art), and the audience who visited the gallery to see Beuys's exhibition will expect to see some form of art or art performance. The same can be said for Duchamp whose ready-mades were intended to be seen as art (i.e., they were introduced in an art context). Now, even if the ready-mades were not initially intended as art, they were still meant to challenge traditional views on art (which was why they were exhibited in art galleries), and this implies that they were meant (even from the beginning) to play some sort of aesthetic function. Hence, the Hamburg and Berlin Umsonst protest activities are *contentious* because (1) they are not intended by the organizers as art-activities, (2) their organizers and participants do not see themselves as artists, (3) the protest activities do not appear to have any aesthetic function, and (4) the audience, or those who witness the protests, do not expect to see an art performance (they probably saw them as political or social protests). These points can also apply to the soma anarchist therapy performed at the venue of the conference. The declared aim of soma anarchist therapy is to help participants develop skills for horizontal relationships, in order to resist vertical relationships based on domination by others in everyday life (Goia 2008, 58 and 61). Despite Goia's insistence that soma is a form of "life art," its aim is essentially social and political in nature. The fact that it was carried out in the conference does not imply it operated within the art context (the conference is an arena for academic discussion and exchange of ideas). Hence, most elements in the artworld will be reluctant to call these exercises art activities.

One possible objection is to say that I am simply employing one form of essentialist notion of art in denying the status of art to these activities. In order to explain this objection we must first restate the four conditions above in a positive manner, i.e., (1) the artist must intend to present his activity as art, (2) organizers of, and participants in, the

activity should consider their performance as art, (3) the activity must have an aesthetic function, and (4) the spectators must consider the activity as art. The objection is that I have rejected the Umsonst activities and soma exercises as art simply because they failed to fulfill conditions (1) to (4). It can then be argued that my position is weak because (1) to (4) cannot be considered as the necessary and sufficient conditions of art. One can easily think of examples which do not satisfy one or some of these conditions (e.g., Ming porcelain bowls that have been elevated to the status of art and are now kept in art museums may not satisfy the first two conditions). Firstly, I want to stress that the characteristics listed in (1) to (4) above are not meant to be necessary and sufficient conditions, but rather as what Wittgenstein would call "family resemblances" in his *Philosophical investigations*. It may then be argued that if each of the items stated here is not necessary, and neither is the entire list sufficient, then why do I reject the Umsonst activities and soma exercises as "art" on the basis of not fulfilling all of these conditions? My reply to this is simple: maybe there are no necessary and sufficient conditions of art, but there can still be such conditions for the different forms (or kinds) of art. We are talking here of new art (or new forms of art) that are presented today in order to challenge older or more traditional notions of art.

I begin with the case of Ming porcelain vases that are kept in art museums. Now, as early as the Song Dynasty (10th and 11th centuries AD), antique bronzes from the Shang Dynasty (1500 BC) had been kept by scholars as objects for appreciation (i.e., their functions had been transformed from water and food containers to objects of aesthetic worth). So this practice of keeping everyday objects from antiquity as objects for appreciation is not new. In collecting Ming vases, we are simply continuing an old tradition. More importantly, this practice is not directed at challenging established notions of art (unlike, say, the display of Duchamp's ready-mades in the 1910s). These works need not fulfill the first condition stated above (i.e., the artist or maker must intend to present his work as art) because they already contain features which most people at the time of their display would consider as value-conferring from the aesthetic viewpoint. It was their possession of such features which enabled them to be picked up for display in art museums. On the other hand, new and novel cases which are intended to challenge our traditional thinking on art must necessarily lack features that are accepted as possessing aesthetic worth (for only by lacking these features can they be seen as a challenge to traditional notions of art). And because they lack these features, they must be shown to be related to art in some way. Now, one way to show that they are related to art is to emphasize that the artist who made them actually wants them to be seen as art (i.e., he presents them as art or primarily as an art-activity). And so, while artistic intention may not be important in the case of the Ming vases, they are certainly very important to new cases that are intended to challenge traditional notions of art. In other words, novel or new cases must at least fulfill the first of the four conditions stated above (it will be good, however, if they fulfill all the four conditions).

The problem with the Berlin and Hamburg Umsonst activities is that they cannot even fulfill the first condition. The same is definitely also true of the soma anarchist experiments. Although *Aesthetics and radical politics* was a book intended to legitimize such sociopolitical activities as art, I do not think the effort is successful. Much more will need to be done if such cases are to be accepted as art-activities.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

The problem with the institutional theory of art (especially the one proposed by Dickie) is the inability to explain failures, or works that were proposed as art by some party but did not gain general acceptance in the artworld. The institutional theory of art was meant to challenge the antitheory trend that emerged in aesthetics after disciples of Wittgenstein called for an end to the search for essential properties of art. In his attempt to reinstate the essential properties, Dickie named two features: firstly, an artwork must be an artifact, and secondly, it "has had conferred upon it the status of candidate for appreciation by some person or persons acting on behalf of a certain social institution (the artworld)" (Hagberg 2002, 490). But even when these two conditions are fulfilled, a work may still fail to be accepted as art. The work may fail to be art because it cannot satisfy one or more conditions that are necessary to the kind or category of art that it strives to be. Contemporary art that questions the traditional or accepted notion of art (in order to expand the number of things and activities that are included as art) may have to satisfy the condition of artistic intention, only if it is intended as something that is related to art , whether it may be seen as "questioning" or challenging traditional notions of art. Activities that are purely social and political in nature and not intended to have anything to do with art cannot, strictly speaking, be a new form of art. Activities like the Berlin and Hamburg Umsonst campaigns and the soma exercises are novel and new if they were accepted as art (i.e., they will be seen as a challenge to more traditional notions of art). Unfortunately, the creators, organizers, and participants of these activities never intended their activities to be seen as art (in fact, the Umsonst activists may rightly insist that their activities will lose their social and political impact if they were seen as art rather than political actions). Witnesses to these events will also not consider these activities to be art. Hence, most people in the art circle will reject these activities as art, despite the attempts of the authors in *Aesthetics and radical politics* —and this implies that not all attempts to confer the status of art-hood must succeed.

There is another point that is noteworthy. Beuys believes that his "actions" could transform society and dismantle the social welfare state (see Ekstrand and Wallmon 2008, 48-53). His social art is also a political activity, geared to bring about political and social transformation. The social actions of Beuys raise a serious question: Could art activities have dual functions? Could they function both as art-activities as well as political protest actions at the same time? The answer to this question is related to the issue of *autonomy* of art (or *autonomy of the artwork*). Roger Scruton (1974, 18) describes "autonomy" to mean that "we appreciate art not as a means to some end, but as an end in itself." He goes on to assert that "Even if there are examples of works of art—buildings, martial music and jars—that have characteristic functions, in treating them as works of art we do not judge them as means to the fulfillment of these functions." In fact it is this (treating the art object as independent of its other functions) that distinguishes the aesthetic attitude from the practical, moral, scientific, or political attitudes. But Beuys could argue that transforming society is also the aesthetic function of his social actions (after all, transforming society would for him be the main objective of art!). By conflating the political functions of these social actions with the aesthetic, Beuys has effectively destroyed the distinction between the aesthetic and other perspectives (e.g., political or moral perspectives)! By considering everyone as an artist, and every action to transform society or the status-quo as art (see Ekstrand and

Wallmon 2008, 50-51), he has literally eliminated the distinction between art and non-art. But there is still a difference between Beuys's view and what the artworld considers as art. It is still possible to judge his social actions from a truly aesthetic perspective (e.g., there was beauty in the way the ideas were expressed, etc.) without its sociopolitical motive of transforming society. In the same way that we need not necessarily judge an artwork by the artist's (or maker's) criteria, we may choose to assess Beuys's social actions in ways that are different from his prescription.

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Submitted: 20 May 2012; revised: 20 December 2013

Φιλοσοφια
Volume 15, 2:2014

ARISTOTLE'S FOUR ETHICS*

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In the Aristotelian corpus of writings as it has come down to us, there are four works specifically on ethics: the Nicomachean ethics, *the* Eudemian ethics, *the* Magna moralia *(or* Great ethics*), and the short* On virtues and vices. *Scholars are now agreed that the first two are genuinely by Aristotle and most also believe that the* Nicomachean *is the later and better of the two. About the* Magna moralia, *there is still a division of opinion, though probably most scholars hold that it is not genuine, Those who hold it is genuine suppose it to be an early work or a redaction of an early work made by a later Peripatetic. As for* On virtues and vices *almost everyone holds it to be a spurious work written some two centuries after Aristotle's death. However, the arguments scholars give for these opinions are entirely unconvincing. In fact, they beg the question by assuming the conclusion in order to prove the conclusion. My own contention is that all the hard evidence we have compels us to conclude that all of these works are definitely by Aristotle but that they differ not by time of writing, as scholars universally suppose, but by audience and purpose. In brief, the* Nicomachean *and* Eudemian ethics *are writings internal to Aristotle's School with the* Nicomachean *being directed to legislators and the* Eudemian *to philosophers. The* Magna moralia *is an exoteric work meant for those outside the school.* On virtues and vices *is a collection of* endoxa, *or common and received opinions about virtues, perhaps meant as a handbook for young students but also for use in philosophical analysis. It is almost certainly referred to as such by a cryptic remark in the* Eudemian ethics.

ARISTOTLE'S ETHICAL WORKS THEN AND NOW

In the Aristotelian corpus of works as it has come down to us from antiquity there are found four works on ethics: the *Nicomachean ethics*, the *Eudemian ethics*, the *Great ethics* (or *Magna moralia*),[1] and the short *On virtues and vices*. Of these, the best known and most read and studied by scholars and by general readers is the first. The *Eudemian ethics* has, at least in recent years, come to be read and used as a useful support and confirmation and sometimes foil for the *Nicomachean*. The *Eudemian* was considered for some time by scholars to be inauthentic, but it is now held to be as genuine as the *Nicomachean*. The *Great ethics*, on the other hand, is judged to be of doubtful authenticity and generally languishes in obscurity, while *On virtues and vices* has long been condemned by scholars and is now consigned to a sort of academic outer darkness.

In the Ancient and Medieval Worlds, by contrast, all four were accepted as being by Aristotle.[2] The only doubts expressed about the authenticity of the ethical works were that the *Nicomachean ethics* was attributed hesitantly to Aristotle's son Nicomachus by Cicero and positively by Diogenes Laertius, and that the *Eudemian ethics* was hesitantly attributed to Eudemus by Aspasius (see Cicero, *De finibus* 5.5; Diogenes Laertius viii, 88; Aspasius 1989, xix, pars. 1, 151, 18-27). The *Great ethics*, by contrast, was never doubted but whenever mentioned is attributed to Aristotle.[3] Doubts first began again to be cast on some of them during the Renaissance when scholars puzzled over why Aristotle, notorious otherwise for his brevity, could have gone to the trouble of writing three major works on ethics that all covered pretty much the same ground in the same way. Their suggested solution was to say that one or two of them were written by someone else, and since by then the *Nicomachean ethics* had achieved canonical status as *the* ethics of Aristotle, it was the *Eudemian* and *Great ethics* that they cast into doubt.[4]

These doubts, while not altogether allayed, ceased to attract much attention until Friedrich Schleiermacher (1835) raised them again in the early nineteenth century by propounding the controversial thesis that only the *Great ethics* was by Aristotle. Schleiermacher argued for his thesis on the philosophical ground that only the *Great ethics* was consistent and coherent because, unlike the *Nicomachean* and the *Eudemian*, it downplayed or ignored the so-called intellectual virtues and located morality where it properly belonged in the moral virtues.[5] Schleiermacher was challenged by Leonhard Spengel (1841 and 1843) who responded with philological and historical arguments, such as references to the *Nicomachean ethics* in other genuine works of Aristotle, that the *Nicomachean ethics* was genuine and the only genuine ethics of Aristotle.[6] Spengel's view became the norm for most of the nineteenth century, though a few dissenting voices could be heard here and there [notably that of W. Thomas (1860)].

The next major stage in the controversy occurred in the early twentieth century when Werner Jaeger (1923) popularized the developmental or chronological thesis about all of Aristotle's works (and not just his ethical ones), and this developmental thesis is still accepted by many scholars today. The thesis says that Aristotle's works as we have them are a compilation of disparate writings from different stages in Aristotle's career and reflect different stages in his intellectual development. About the ethical works, Jaeger held that the *Nicomachean ethics* was Aristotle's mature ethics and that the *Eudemian* was a less mature version from his younger years. The *Great ethics*, he thought, was a work by a later follower of Aristotle dating from after Aristotle's death. Scholars are now inclined to think that both the *Nicomachean* and *Eudemian ethics* are certainly by Aristotle (with doubt as to which is earlier), and that the *Great ethics* is perhaps or perhaps not by Aristotle but, if it is, roughly contemporaneous, at least in its origin, with the *Eudemian*.[7]

ARGUMENTS ABOUT AUTHENTICITY

Passing on from this overview of scholarly opinions, the next thing to consider is the reasons on either side about the authenticity of Aristotle's ethical writings. These reasons are many and a full treatment of them would be a volume in itself. There are also two ways, at least, to approach them: either as a whole according to the legitimacy of the method of reasoning adopted, or severally according to the particular facts the arguments rely on. For instance, there are, in the case of the *Great ethics*, certain uses of words that are said not to

be Aristotelian, and to assess the truth of such claims we need to examine both the relevant word use and the method of reasoning whereby it is deduced that such use is not something Aristotle could or did adopt.

There are two problems to consider with respect to legitimacy of reasoning, the first of which concerns what conclusions may rightly be drawn from what evidence and the second of which concerns the way rival hypotheses about the evidence are accepted or rejected.[8] To take the first point first, there are, as a general rule, two basic kinds of evidence to use in arguments about authenticity: either (1) those intrinsic to the text or (2) those extrinsic to it. By the latter I mean information about the texts from other authors or from other works of the same author, or from the actual material on which the original texts, or at least early copies thereof, are written (their archaeological date or location or their physical composition and the like, as in the case of Oxyrynchus papyri or the Dead Sea Scrolls). By the former I mean evidence within the texts themselves, which will be either (1.1) those based on its matter or content or (1.2) those based on its words or its verbal form. By the matter or content I mean either (1.1.1) the actual statements and arguments of the text, or (1.1.2) the references present in these statements and arguments that go outside these statements and arguments, either to historical facts or to statements and arguments elsewhere in the same or other texts of the same or other authors. By the verbal form (1.2) I mean the style of the writing, such as its word use, its phraseology, its sentence structure, and so forth, although I should properly exclude from this division and add under 1.1.2 any verbal data, such as technical or novel or foreign vocabulary or meanings, that contain an implicit reference to external facts, say, of first invention or discovery. Arguments based on the matter we may call "philosophical" if they regard the statements and arguments, and "historical" if they regard the references. Arguments based on the verbal form we may call "literary" or "philological."

So we have four kinds of argument, one extrinsic (2) and three intrinsic, namely the philosophical (1.1.1), the historical (1.1.2), and the literary (1.2). If we compare these kinds, it can be shown that no compelling argument about authenticity can be made on either philosophical or literary grounds alone. Such arguments, to be persuasive, must rely instead or additionally on extrinsic and historical grounds. The reason is as follows. Arguments about authenticity based on philosophical or literary grounds, in order to be successful, must say that the work said to be inauthentic contains philosophical statements or arguments or uses words or phrases or sentence structures that are foreign to the author whose work it is said to be. But in order to know that these statements or arguments or verbal forms are foreign to the author we must first know which works the author actually wrote, since it is only from his works that we could know what was or was not foreign to him. But in order to know which works he actually wrote we would have to know that the works said to be inauthentic are indeed inauthentic. In other words, we would have to know that he did not write these works in order to be able to assert the premise on which the proof rests that he did not write these works—a manifest begging of the question.

In order to make this point as clear as possible, for it may seem too quick, one can illustrate it by means of the following argumentative schemata:

1. Author **A** could not have written any text with properties XYZ (say philosophical ones like incoherence, contradictions, falsehoods, or literary or philological ones like certain words, sentences, phrases, and so forth).[9]
2. Text **T** (for example, the *Great ethics*) has properties XYZ.[10]

3. Therefore, author **A** could not have written text **T**.

Or, in another form (which includes reference also to questions of relative dating):

1. Author **A** could not have written both text **S**, which has properties ABC (sophistication, intelligence, and so forth) and text **T**, which has properties XYZ (the opposite or different qualities) either simply or at the same period of development.[11]
2. Author **A** wrote text **S** (for example, the *Nicomachean ethics*).
3. Therefore, author **A** could not have written text **T** (for example, the *Great ethics*) either simply or at the same period of development.

The problem with both these argumentative schemata is the first premise. For that premise must be either an empirical claim or some sort of non-empirical or an a priori claim. If it is an empirical claim, it presupposes the truth of the conclusion. For we could not know that author **A** could not write a text with properties XYZ or write both text **T** and text **S** which have different or opposed qualities if we did not already know that author **A** did not in fact write those texts. For if he did write them, which, if the claim is empirical, must at least be possible, then premise 1 is false. So, to rule out this possibility and to be able to assert premise 1, we would have to know in advance that he did not write them, which is to say we would have to know in advance that the conclusion was true, which is to beg the question. If, however, premise 1 is a non-empirical or an a priori claim then it is false. There is no telling, before the event, what texts a given author could or could not write. A clever writer who was master of several styles (as we know Aristotle was) could, if he chose, write a bad book or a worse book than some other he also wrote, or could write one book in one style and another in another style, and do so at the same period.

Such is the general form of the reasoning against arguments about authenticity based on literary and philosophical features. But there is a second problem with the legitimacy of reasoning in arguments about authenticity, the exclusion of rival hypotheses. Let us suppose that certain writings attributed to the same author show significant divergence in terms of literary and philosophical features. Let us further suppose that this divergence is sufficient to call for special explanation. In order to know which explanation to adopt we would need first to consider which explanations are possible or plausible (for we need not consider outlandish possibilities, as that the author wrote one of the works while under hypnosis by Martians). In the case of the *Great ethics* there are several possibilities. The first and most obvious, if not indeed the most popular, is that the divergences between it and known works of Aristotle are to be explained on the hypothesis that it is not by Aristotle but by a different (and inferior) author. Another and perhaps equally popular one is that it is by the same author but at an earlier stage of development. A third and related one is that it is by the same author but as mediated through some editor or redactor or student reporter. A fourth, and least popular, is that it is by the same author but as directed to a different audience.[12]

The question arises about how one is to decide between the truth or likelihood of these options (or of any others that might plausibly be suggested). Scholars have devoted very little attention to this question, and not surprisingly because, if we confine ourselves to the literary and philosophical evidence, it has no answer. For either each of the options explains this evidence or it does not. If it does not, the option is not an option but a mistake.

It purports to explain but fails to do so. We must confine our attention to those options only that do explain. But among options that do explain there can be no good reason, on these grounds, to prefer any as more true or likely than another. For *ex hypothesi* they do explain, and since explanation is the only criterion we are supposed here to be using to judge between them, all are successful. Therefore all are, to this extent, equally true or likely. One of these options might be simpler than another or more elegant or easier to handle or more in accord with our tastes, but it would not, on that account, be shown to be truer. The choice of one option over another, which is supposed to be a choosing of the true account over false accounts, cannot, if made on literary or philosophical grounds alone, be anything of the kind. The evidence is *ex hypothesi* not historical or extrinsic and so cannot contain any indication of facts outside the text (as time of writing or manner of transmission), but it is only by reference to such facts that we could determine, as regards options all presumed successful as explanations, which of them was truer or more likely than which other.

This conclusion is again very strong, but it is also very limited. It concerns only one sort of evidence (literary and philosophical evidence) and only one set of options (those that do explain this evidence). If some of this evidence contains, whether implicitly or explicitly, extrinsic or historical data, or if some of these options turn out not to be very good at explaining, then this conclusion will no longer apply. There will now be good reason, reason based on *further* evidence, to prefer one or more options as truer or more likely, namely, those that do a better job of explaining and that better save the extrinsic or historical data. Scholars do typically rely on such further data when making a judgment of authenticity. But no less typically they slide, sometimes unconsciously, from such data to literary and philosophical data and think that their preferred explanation of this latter data provides *independent* support for their judgment, when in fact it does not.

The only way to draw conclusions about authenticity is to have recourse to other grounds, namely those referred to above as extrinsic and historical grounds (numbered 2 and 1.1.2). That all those grounds in the case of Aristotle's ethical writings speak in favor of authenticity and none of them against it is plain from what has been said.

AUTHENTICITY OF THE *GREAT ETHICS*: INTRINSIC EVIDENCE

The sort of literary or stylistic features that distinguish the *Great ethics* from the rest of the Aristotelian corpus and are said to show that it cannot be authentic are numerous,[13] the most notable being the extensive use of *hyper* instead of *peri* to mean "about" or "on." In addition, there are certain historical references.[14] If the identifications are correct,[15] they require a dating of the *Great ethics* in the form we now have it to a period not much earlier than the 330s or 320s, or toward the end of Aristotle's life (he died in 322 BC). Since those scholars who favor the authenticity of the *Great ethics* judge it to be an early or juvenile work (because of its relative lack of philosophical sophistication), they are forced to suppose that the *Great ethics* underwent some revision or reworking by an editor or student near or after the time of Aristotle's death (Kenny 1978, 216-19). Such a supposition is not impossible, but it complicates rather than simplifies the theory that the work is authentic. There is, on the other hand, one reference in the *Great ethics* that embarrasses partisans of the view that it is not authentic, namely, the assertion by its author that he is also the author of the *Analytics* (1201b25), a reference almost certainly to the *Analytics* of Aristotle,[16] and there are, one would think, few more direct ways an author could indicate to readers his own identity.

The historical references of the text are compatible with Aristotelian authorship, if of relatively late Aristotelian authorship. The literary or philosophical elements are also compatible with Aristotelian authorship, if untypical Aristotelian authorship (they all appear, though not with the same frequency, in others of his writings).[17] For those elements show that the *Great ethics* has marked differences of style and content from Aristotle's other known works. The question is what to make of those differences. Some explanation is necessary, but more than one explanation is possible. The hypothesis of difference of author is only one such explanation and there are others, namely, those mentioned before that hypothesize difference of time of writing, or also medium of transmission, or audience addressed.

The hypothesis of difference of audience has no problem explaining any of the literary or philosophical features of the *Great ethics*. The hypothesis is that the work is an exoteric one directed to a popular audience outside the school. One would not expect it, therefore, to display all the philosophical elaboration or sophistication of a work intended for those within the school (such as the *Nicomachean* and *Eudemian ethics* are). One would not expect it to contain all the doctrines of a work of the school. One would even expect it, where necessary, to hide such doctrines if, for some reason, an exoteric audience would be puzzled by them or have an instinctive, if unfounded, prejudice against them. One would also expect it to follow the speech patterns and terminology common and familiar to an exoteric audience, and not, say, the more careful and nuanced style that an author might prefer in a formal work of philosophy; hence, in particular, one should not be surprised to find, as one does find, many Hellenistic elements in the language of the *Great ethics*, for these would reflect the speech of its intended audience.[18] One would, further, expect it to make its arguments and process of reasoning easy to note and follow for an exoteric audience that would be unlikely to be practiced in argumentative subtleties[19] (so, for instance, it would be more likely, where it gives lists, to make the lists simple and without much elaboration or nuance).[20]

The hypothesis also explains the division among scholars about the quality of the *Great ethics*, that some think it a poor work (see Brink 1933, Donini 1965, Pansch 1841, Ramsauer 1858, Rowe 1971, Walzer 1929) while others think it a fine or, at least, respectable work.[21] Both views can be correct. The work is indeed simple and heavy handed and undeveloped,[22] but it is also subtle and sophisticated and provocative (as is discussed more fully in the commentary); indeed even the simplicity has an imposing vigor and the serried arguments a compelling directness.[23] That the same book could have such divergent characteristics is readily explicable on the hypothesis that the *Great ethics* is an exoteric work, written for the wider public outside Aristotle's school. The other ethics, the *Nicomachean* and *Eudemian*, will be meant for those within the school. The *Great ethics*, therefore, will not display the philosophical qualities of the other ethics, which would be too much for a general audience, but it will, besides the expected simplicity and directness, contain invitations and hints (the subtlety and sophistication and provocation of the work) to pique the interest of the more curious and intelligent so as to attract them, if they prove themselves otherwise worthy, into joining the school.[24] The hypothesis is thus in principle better *qua* explanation. The other explanations, even those that accept authenticity, account well for one side only of the character of the *Great ethics*, the side of unsophisticated directness and repetition.

The same hypothesis has no trouble dealing with any of the historical references. For it posits no special date within Aristotle's life for the work's composition. Whether Aristotle was writing it in his last years, or whether he wrote it first in his younger years and continually updated it, makes no difference to the hypothesis *qua* explanation. By contrast the

hypothesis that it is a juvenile work is embarrassed by the historical references, and the hypothesis that it is not a work of Aristotle's at all is embarrassed by the claim the author makes to be Aristotle, as well as by the universal witness of the ancient tradition, noted earlier, that Aristotle is the author. There are shifts one can make, as have been noted, for saving the hypotheses from such embarrassment, but those shifts do have to be made.

AUTHENTICITY OF THE *GREAT ETHICS*: EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE

The hypothesis says that the *Great ethics* is an exoteric work meant for an audience outside the school, so extrinsic evidence of two sorts is relevant: that relating to the character of an ancient exoteric audience and that relating to the character of the *Great ethics*.

As for the audience, there is first a speech attributed to Callicles in Plato's *Gorgias* (484c-486d) which praises the value of philosophical study and practice provided it is indulged in moderately and at an early age. If it is pursued beyond that limit (in the way Socrates has done) it will ruin a man and prevent him from being a good and decent citizen. Persons with Callicles' view would be likely to value the limited treatment of the subject one finds in the *Great ethics* but not the more elaborated and developed treatment one finds in the *Nicomachean*, especially if the effect of the *Nicomachean* was to draw men away from the active life of the citizen into the contemplative life of the philosopher, which, of course, the *Nicomachean* notoriously does in its last book (and the *Eudemian* arguably does the same).[25]

Socrates in the *Republic* (497e-501a) gives voice to a like opinion with the *Nicomachean ethics* about the pursuit of philosophy, and criticizes the existing contrary practice in cities, which practice he describes as being what Callicles said it was and should be. Socrates notes further that most people are prejudiced against extensive philosophic learning. He also admits, in the passage about philosophers needing to rule which opens his praise of the philosophic life (473c-74a), that there is need to be careful about praising such life before an audience of decent citizens, at least until they have been brought, if they can be brought, to see that philosophy is not what they think it to be.

The conversation in Plato's *Meno* (90a-94e) between Socrates and Anytus, who is a classic example of a decent citizen prejudiced against philosophy, shows on Anytus's part a similar pattern of regard for learning in moderation but an angry fear of learning very much, especially if the learning comes from intellectualists like the sophists. Notoriously Anytus, who was one of Socrates' accusers at his trial, could not or did not distinguish sophistry from philosophy.

Another piece of evidence is Isocrates in the *Antidosis* (written 354 or 353 BC), where the aged orator writes:

> I do not think it right to call philosophy what is of no help in the moment either for speaking or for doing, but rather I would call such a pastime a gymnastic of the soul and a preparation for philosophy; more manly, to be sure, than what boys in school do but for the most part very similar...I would advise the young to pass a certain time in such education but not to allow their nature to get all dried up on these matters...For I think that such verbal quibbles are like jugglers' tricks which, though of no benefit, attract crowds of senseless people, and that those who want to do something valuable must remove from all their pastimes vain words and acts with no bearing on life." (Secs. 266-69)[26]

A second is a work attributed to the ancient Sicilian lawgiver Charondas (6th or 5th Century BC) though perhaps dating much after his time (see *The anthology of Stobaeus*, IV.151.20-23): "Let each citizen make profession rather of moderation (*sôphronein*) than of wisdom (*phronein*), since profession of wisdom is significant evidence of pettiness (*smikrotçtos*) and lack of experience with what is fine (*apeirokalias*)." These sentiments nicely mirror those of Callicles and Anytus referred to earlier. A third such source is Tacitus (1st/2nd Century AD), who says of his father-in-law (*Agricola* 4.4-5):

> He used to relate that in his early youth he would have engaged with more fervor in the study of philosophy than was permitted to a Roman and a senator had not the prudence of his mother kept his ardent and burning spirit in check: for his lofty and upright mind sought the beauty and splendor of great and exalted glory with more eagerness than discretion. Reason and age soon tempered him, and from wisdom he retained what is most difficult: moderation.

As to extrinsic evidence about the exoteric character of the *Great ethics*, there is first Aulus Gellius (*Noctes Atticae*, 20.5.) who, when speaking of the two classes or kinds that Aristotle's works were said to fall into, the *exoteric* and the *acroatic*,[27] writes:

> Those were called exoteric that had to do with rhetorical reflections and the ability to argue and knowledge of civil matters, but those were called acroatic in which more remote and subtle philosophy was handled and which pertained to the study of nature and dialectical disputations. To the exercise of this latter discipline, the acroatic, he would devote time in the Lyceum in the morning and would not admit anyone rashly, but only those whose intelligence and foundation in learning and attention to teaching and hard work he had tested. But the exoteric lectures and exercise in speaking he used to give in the same place in the evening, and he offered them to the young openly and without distinction, and he used to call them "evening walk" but that other earlier one "morning walk,"[28] for he used to discourse on each occasion while walking. He divided up his books too, his treatises on all these things, so that some were called exoteric and part acroatic.

Note that the *Great ethics* is properly described as "knowledge of civil matters" (*civilium rerum notitiam*), for it significantly omits the reflections on philosophy and legislation [the "more remote and subtle philosophy" (*philosophia remotior subtiliorque*)] that mark the other two ethics and that make them rather more than merely "knowledge of civil matters." Also note that the *Great ethics* can be viewed as a suitable vehicle for testing the "intelligence and foundation in learning and attention to teaching and hard work" of potential hearers of the acroatic lectures, since its arrangements and syllogisms, with their directness in some respects and indirectness in others, might well serve to show which hearers had the capacity and the will to learn enough from the first to sort out the second, and so accordingly had the capacity and will to enter the school.

To this evidence we can add that of Cicero (*De finibus* 5.5) who says, speaking of Aristotle and Theophrastus:

> About the *summum bonum*, because there are two kinds of books, one popularly written which they called exoteric, the other more carefully composed

> (*limatius*), which they left in their treatises (*commentariis*), they do not always seem to say the same thing; there is not, however, any variation in the sum itself (*in summa ipsa*) of what those at least whom I have mentioned say, nor any internal disagreement with themselves.

Note again that the *Great ethics* does seem not to say the same thing as the other ethics yet, in the end or in sum, it does say the same (as will be discussed in some detail in the commentary).

Some further and stronger support for the hypothesis that the *Great ethics* is exoteric comes from the passage of Cicero just quoted. This passage immediately precedes the one where Cicero speculates that the *Nicomachean ethics* could be by Aristotle's son Nicomachus (as mentioned in an earlier note), and from such a circumstance one can construct an argument that Cicero must have been aware of at least three ethics by Aristotle. For first he speaks (in the passage just quoted) of an exoteric ethics as opposed to a different and non-exoteric one found among the treatises. Then he speaks (a few lines later) of an ethics that could be by the son because it is like another ethics[29] that Cicero already attributes to the father and because Cicero does not see that the son could not, in this respect, be like the father. But the ethics that could be by the son could not be either of the first two ethics mentioned, for then Cicero would not have two separate ethics by Aristotle to contrast as exoteric and non-exoteric. Therefore it must be a third ethics.[30]

Now if this third ethics, the one that could be by the son, is the *Nicomachean*, then the ethics which Cicero says the *Nicomachean* is like, and which he judges definitely to be by the father, will be either the *Eudemian* or the *Great ethics* or something else. But of the *Eudemian* and *Great ethics* only the latter could plausibly be judged an exoteric text. So either the *Great ethics* is the exoteric ethics Cicero is thinking of (in which case the ethics that he thinks is definitely by the father will be the *Eudemian*),[31] or one or more of Aristotle's other works now lost is (as the *Protrepticus*, or precisely one of the dialogues). It would be hard, however, for Cicero to say of these lost writings (if we go by what we know of them, as of the *Protrepticus* in particular) that any of them, despite "not always seeming" to say the same thing, nevertheless agreed "in the sum itself" with the ethical treatises, for they do not say enough about the several virtues and about the mean and about choice and deliberation and continence and friendship and the like to count as covering the same ground as those treatises, and so do not say enough to count as agreeing with them in sum despite not always seeming to. The *Great ethics* does cover the same ground and does precisely agree in sum with the other ethics despite not always seeming to (as argued in the commentary). So it well fits the context and content of Cicero's remarks.

THE AUTHENTICITY OF ON *VIRTUES AND VICES*

The *Great ethics* has thus shown itself to support and be supported by the argument about authenticity given above. The same argument supports and is supported by *On virtues and vices* despite its slightness. The way into considering the question of the authenticity of *On virtues and vices* is best done through considering a controversial and puzzling passage in the *Eudemian ethics*.

In the *Eudemian ethics* (Bk. 2, ch. 2, at 1220b10-11), a well-known crux in the phrase *åí ôïùò áðçëëáãìåíïéò*. The context makes clear that Aristotle is using this phrase to refer to some writing or other, but scholars have been puzzled both about what the phrase means and what writing it refers to.

In the part of the text where the phrase occurs, Aristotle is discussing moral character and he has just concluded that characters are qualities in the soul brought about by custom or habituation. He continues that what must next be discussed is what qualities in what part of the soul. From what he stated earlier (at 2.1.1219b39-20a12, 29-37), as well as from what he has just concluded here, he is able to say, in general terms, that these qualities are in accord with the powers whereby people feel the various passions and in accord also with the soul's customs or habits whereby people are spoken of as being accustomed to feel or not to feel the several passions in some specific way. But such generalities are not enough. Aristotle needs to go beyond them and descend to details (in particular the details, in the next chapters, of the several virtues and that each virtue is a mean between two opposed vices). His method, as he has just recalled (at 2.1.1220a15-18, repeating what was said at 1.6.1216b30-35), is to begin with truths already known but unclearly so as to reach truths that are clear. So the thing to do would be to appeal to the unclear truths about moral characters that we already have and use them to advance to what is clear, and it is at this point that Aristotle appeals to a division, *åí ôïùò áðçëëáãìåíïéò*, of passions and powers and habits.

As for *áðçëëáãìåíïéò*, the suggestions are that it means "the canceled version" "the separate section," both from D. J. Allan (see Mansion 1961, 312 n4d) or "the finished works," that is, works separated off or released from further discussion, from Franz Dirlmeier (1962, 39-40). Another suggestion worth considering is that it means, or carries the idea of, "abstracts," for things "released" or "separated" (the literal meaning of the Greek word) are the sort of thing that abstracts are. They are statements or summaries separated or taken from a fuller discussion or writing and presented on their own (the English word *does*, after all, comes from the Latin "abstraho," which means to remove or take away). "Abstracts" would also fit the context of Aristotle's argument since the work he is referring to would seem to be some set of summaries or abstracts of moral characters.

There are good reasons for thinking that the reference is neither to Aristotle's lost work *On divisions* nor to the list given in chapter 2 of *Eudemian ethics*. These reasons come from what Aristotle immediately says following his mention of the division and the writing that contains it, for his words here give valuable clues as to what sort of thing he has in mind. The passage runs (1220b12-20):

> After this there is the division *åí ôïùò ðçëëáãìåíïéò* of passions and powers and habits. I mean by passions such things as these, spirit, fear, shame, desire, things generally which are for the most part followed of themselves by perceptible pleasure or pain. And according to these there is no quality, but there is active feeling. There is quality, however, according to powers. I mean by powers things according to which people are said to be active with respect to their passions, as the angry person, the insensible person, the erotic person, the shame-faced person, the shameless person. Habits are all those things which are cause that these [sc. the powers and/or passions] are either in accord with reason or the opposite, such as courage, temperance, cowardice, license.

If we judge, then, by these comments we should say that the work referred to should have the following features. First, it should be about moral characters, for Aristotle's aim now is to find what sort of things in what part of soul moral characters are, and so a set of abstracts or selections relevant to such a search should be of moral characters. Second, it should be of moral characters in such a way as to include some sort of division of passions (as spirit and fear), powers (as that whereby angry and shameless people are angry or shameless), and habits in accord with or against reason (as courage and cowardice). But, further, in view of what Aristotle immediately goes on to argue in the next chapter, this writing can contain no explicit statement of the doctrine of actions and passions being divisible into excess and defect and mean, nor of the accompanying doctrine that virtues are in the mean and are opposed by two vices each, one at either extreme. For these doctrines are the clearer truths that we do not yet possess and that Aristotle intends to argue for by using the less clear truths he here briefly summarizes, and so these less clear truths can hardly include the doctrines already. Aristotle confirms the point himself, for his examples of habits in accord with and against reason (given at the end of the passage quoted) include only one of each, courage and temperance being opposed only to cowardice and license and not also to rashness and insensibility. Still, even if this writing contains nothing about the mean, it must contain something about reason being what separates the habits into opposites. It must also, and more importantly, contain something from which the doctrine of the mean may be reached. It will necessarily do so, however, if it contains a division of powers and passions and habits. For Aristotle's argument to the mean, which he gives and illustrates with several examples in the next chapter (2.3.1220b21-35) proceeds from the fact that the habits are qualities in the powers for exercising, or being active with, the passions in certain ways. Such action, he says (b26-27), is change, and change is a quantity (a continuous quantity), and quantities admit of a mean and an excess and a deficiency (b21-22), of which the mean for us as commanded by knowledge and reason is best (b27-29).

Recall then the character of *Virtues and vices*.[32] It is a set of selections or abstracts; it is about moral characters; it talks about them in terms of passions and powers and habits; it lists virtues against only one opposed vice; it makes clear, in its descriptions, that the virtues are cause of rational and the vices of irrational behavior. In evidence here are some representative passages.[33]

> 2.1250a6-9: Courage is a virtue of the spirited part that makes people hard to panic in face of the fears of death. Temperance is a virtue of the desiring part that takes away their appetite for enjoying base pleasures...
>
> 3.1250a18-21: Cowardice is a vice of the spirited part that makes them panic in face of fears and those of death most of all. License is a vice of the spirited part that makes them prefer joy in base pleasures...
>
> 4.1250a44-b3: It belongs to courage to be hard to panic before the fears of death, and to be bold readily in terrible things, and to dare dangers well, and to take rather noble death than disgraceful safety, and to be cause of victory...
>
> 4.1250b6-10: It belongs to temperance not to marvel at enjoyments of bodily pleasures, and to have no appetite for any pleasure of shameful enjoyment, and to fear disorder, and to live an orderly life in things both small and great...
>
> 6.1251a10-15: It belongs to cowardice to be easily moved by any chance fear and by fears of death and bodily maiming above all, and to suppose that it is

better to win safety by any means than to die nobly. Along with cowardice come softness, unmanliness, shirking of toil, love of life.

6.1251a16-23: It belongs to license to take enjoyment in harmful and disgraceful pleasures, and to suppose that those people are most of all happy who live in such pleasures, and to be fond of laughter and mockery and witticisms, and to be reckless in words and deeds. Along with license come disorder, shamelessness, lack of decorum, luxury, slackness, carelessness, contempt, looseness...

8.1251b26-37: In general it belongs to virtue to make one's disposition of soul good, with use of emotions peaceful and ordered, in harmony in all its parts. That is why a virtuous disposition of soul seems also to be model of a good regime.... Along with virtue come usefulness, decency, kindliness, optimism, and further such things as love of home and of friends and of comrades and of strangers and of mankind and of beauty.... The opposite things belong to vice...

One notices about these brief descriptions of virtues and vices that in each case they are in terms of a division of passions and powers and habits. So courage is of the spirited part (a power) and makes people hard to panic (a habit) by fear of death (a passion); temperance is of the desiring part (a power) and makes people cease to have appetite (a habit) for base pleasure (a passion); cowardice is of the spirited part (a power) and makes people panicked and easily moved (a habit) by fear of death (a passion); license is of the desiring part (a power) and makes people prefer (a habit) base pleasure (a passion).

If we look further at what is said of these habits, or of these vices and virtues, we will see that in each case they are described as being in agreement with reason or contrary to it. The words reason and unreason do not appear in the descriptions (they do appear in the accounts of prudence and folly and of continence and incontinence), but the kinds of behavior listed are described in ways that all would see to be rational or irrational. The fit, therefore, between the work referred to in the crux phrase from *Eudemian ethics* and *Virtues and vices* is tight. Moreover, the features of *Virtues and vices* that scholars have used to reject its authenticity (that it fails to talk about the mean and the extremes in the case of actions and passions; that it lists only one vice for each virtue; that it begins with an appeal to the division of soul proposed by Plato; that it talks of *äáβïïíåò*; that it gathers certain virtues under others; that it is, in general, eclectic in character) are all features which make that work to be just the sort of writing *Eudemian ethics* is here referring to.

Accordingly, we have good reasons to conclude that *Vitues and vices* is the work (or at least one of the works),[34] being referred to by the phrase *åí ôïὸ ðçëëáãìåíïéò*. The reasons are not determinative proof (we are unlikely to get such proof in these of matters), but they are sufficient to make the conclusion plausible, even probable.

CONCLUDING REMARKS: TITLES OF THE WORKS ON ETHICS

A couple of questions remain: first about why Aristotle wrote two esoteric ethics, the *Nicomachean* and *Eudemian*, when one might have sufficed, and second about the names of the ethical works and in particular of the *Great ethics*. A suggestion is that the two esoteric ethics differ, as is in large part evident from their beginnings and endings, in that

the *Eudemian* is directed primarily to philosophers and the *Nicomachean* (which continues immediately into the *Politics*) primarily to legislators (which will include especially advisers to kings). So the *Eudemian* will have the name it has because it commemorates Eudemus of Rhodes, student and colleague of Aristotle, who established a school of philosophy at Rhodes after the fashion of the one established by Aristotle at Athens. Eudemus will thus represent the philosopher, which is why the *Eudemian ethics* bears his name. The *Nicomachean* will have the name it has because it commemorates Aristotle's father and son (both named Nicomachus), the former of whom was physician and adviser at the royal court in Macedon (where Aristotle himself was also long an adviser), and the latter of whom was no doubt destined for a similar life at the same court. That he was to die young was unknown to his father who had already predeceased him. Nicomachus *père et fils* will thus represent the wise legislator, which is why the *Nicomachean ethics* bears their name. The *Great ethics*, by contrast, will have the name it has because it has a great audience, the large and extended audience of decent citizens to whom it is directed.[35]

Citizens, legislators, philosophers, these three, would seem, on reflection, to cover the full range of an ancient philosopher's ethical concern. Citizens, both rulers and ruled, are they who compose the city; legislators are they who fashion it and its constituent households; philosophers are they who, superseding the parochial and all-too-human mythology of the poets, point it to what is truly beyond and divine.[36]

Finally, as for *Virtue and vices*, a likely answer is that it is a brief summary or abstract of the chief virtues and vices, to be used as a quick and handy guide, especially perhaps by younger students, for judgment and direction of behavior. Such an answer is proposed by J. Zürcher, who suggested it was written first by Aristotle as a sort of ethical *vademecum* for Alexander and other young princes under his tutelage at Pella. The suggestion is attractive but it could never be more than a happy guess (it lacks any independent support). Another answer, compatible with and not opposed to the first, is that it is a brief summary or abstract of ethical phenomena, or *endoxa*, for use in philosophical analysis and in the exposition of ethical theory.

NOTES

*Paper delivered on 2 March 2013 as the first lecture in the Philippine National Philosophical Reseach Society's Lecture Series, Max's Restaurant, Gateway Mall, Cubao, Quezon City.

1. Such are the standard names, but we know from Elias (1989, xviii, pars. 1, 32, 31-33.2) that the *Great ethics* was also called the *Great Nicomachean ethics* and the *Nicomachean ethics* the *Lesser Nicomachean ethics*.

2. The fullest accounts are by Franz Dirlmeier (1958, 93-146; 1962, 109-143) and Erenbert Schächer (1940). In English there is a brief account of the modern period by Christopher Rowe (1971, 9-14) and a fine one of the ancient period by Anthony Kenny (1978, 1-49). Franz Susemihl (1883, ix-xxix) has a helpful collection of many of the ancient references. Also worth consulting are Richard Bodéüs (1973, for the ancient period), Friedemann Buddensiek (1999, 22-36), V. Décarie (1978, 10-12), H. Diller (1936, 134-37), Gerhard Fahnenschmidt (1968, 1-28), Eleutherio Elorduy (1945, 364-66), A. Plebe (1965, vii-x), Richard Walzer (1929, 2-13), P. Wilpert (1946, 123-37, mainly about and against the school of Werner Jaeger (1923).

3. See in particular the accounts by Dirlmeier and Kenny, both of whom will show that none of the historical evidence impugns its authenticity.

4. The details are again in Dirlmeier. John Case (1596, 1-7) explicitly defended the *Great ethics* against these doubts, arguing that it served a different purpose and was for a different audience.

5. Schleiermacher (1835) arguments have found echoes among contemporary scholars who have been engaged for some time in a debate about whether the *Nicomachean ethics*, which they nevertheless hold to be genuine, is inconsistent in its argument about happiness and whether it is incoherently split between the practical life of moral virtue and the contemplative life of intellectual virtue. See the discussion in Carlo Natali (2001, 111-14) and Irene Caesar (2009).

6. Spengel (1841, 1843). His move to philological considerations from philosophical ones was compelling and enough to defeat Schleiermacher's thesis in the eyes of most scholars, despite the fact that, for instance, the references to the *Ethics* in other writings of Aristotle are to books of the *Nicomachean ethics* that it has in common with the *Eudemian* (Kenny 1978, 5-8). But Spengel's rejection of the *Eudemian* did not, ultimately, win as much favor as his support of the *Nicomachean*.

7. See Plebe (1965, vii-ix) for a summary review of those who accept the authenticity of the *Great ethics*, to which list we can add also the name of Elorduy (1939). Others, as John Cooper (1973), Kenny (1978, 219-20) and Willy Theiler (1934), are also inclined to accept its authenticity but at one remove, through the medium or editorship of someone else. Pellegrin, too (in Dalimier 1992), seems inclined to accept it though his official position is one of neutrality. Among those who reject authenticity one may note, besides the school of Jaeger, are Donini (1965), Fahnenschmidt (1968), and Rowe (1971, 1975). Doubt, if not rejection, is expressed by Bobonich (in Kraut 2006, 16) and by Natali (2001, 10).

8. The argument that follows was first developed independently, though with much stimulus from Wilpert (1946). It was, however, to some extent anticipated by Shute when he remarks (1888, 16): "As to the arguments from style and matter these must always be of very doubtful nature, resting, as they needs must, upon preconceived ideas of the arguer," and anticipated even more, in the reverse direction, by Littré (1834 I.17—appositely quoted by Shute 1888, 17), when Littré writes the following about using such arguments for judging the authenticity of works of Hippocrates: "...il y a là une petition de principes; car avant de dire que tel style appartient à Hippocrate, il faut prouver que les ouvrages où l'on croit, à tort ou à raison, reconnaître ce style, sont réellement de l'auteur auquel on les attribue."

9. Examples of the sorts of properties in question here abound in the scholarly literature on Aristotle, not to mention Plato and many others.

10. A classic instance is the first page in Walzer (1929, 1).

11. The standard Jaegerian position, adopted also by his opponents, like von Arnim (1924), who disagreed less with Jaeger's method than with his results.

12. The first hypothesis was espoused by Spengel and all who followed him including the school of Jaeger; the second by the school of von Arnim; the third, in different degrees, by Dirlmeier, Cooper, Kenny; the fourth, definitely by Case, though as a general possibility, if not specifically for *Great ethics*, it is noted by Allan (1957), in S.Mansion (1961), and Wilpert, as well as by Kenny (1992, 141) for the *Nicomachean* and *Eudemian ethics*.

13. See the summary and review of Fahnenschmidt (1968, 2-51), but also of Dirlmeier (1939, *passim* and especially 217-28).

14. The following personages are mentioned: a certain Mentor (1197b21), most likely as already dead, and the likely Mentor died about 337 BC; a tyrant called Clearchus (1203a23), who ruled from about 364-352 BC; a certain Neleus (1205a19-23), who is most likely the Neleus who inherited Theophrastus's library on the latter's death in 285 BC; Darius of Persia (1212a4), most likely Darius III who was defeated by Alexander and died in 330 BC; a certain Archicles (1189b20-21), and the best known Archicles was a trierarch who fought in a battle in 334/3 BC.

15. It is not clear that they are all correct, but for the purposes of the argument here, nothing hangs on the question.

16. A complication is that Theophrastus also wrote an *Analytics*, which has not survived, and the reference could conceivably be to that [Pellegrin, in C. Dalimier (1992, 23)].

17. Fahnenschmidt (1968, 15) regards the frequency of the use, not the mere use (which he cannot deny to be Aristotelian), as the sign of inauthenticity.

18. Spoken speech patterns tend to anticipate written speech patterns so that when such patterns first appear in formal writing one can usually expect them to have existed in speech and popular writing for much longer. The style of Greek found in the *Great ethics*, as scholars have often noted [see K.Berg (1934), Dirlmeier (1958, 138-39), Elorduy (1939, 64-45 n1), Fahnenschmidt (1967, 13, 15), P. Stevens (1936)], is like the written Greek of the Hellenistic age (the *koinç*), and such Greek, whose elements are already present in authors of the Classical period, including Aristotle himself, was presumably more widespread in the spoken Greek of that period than the written.

19. A point that Fahnenschmidt (1968, 24, 26, and 48) concedes even against himself, for he allows that the *Great ethics* has the character of a lecture simplified according to pedagogical necessities and lacking the subtleties of Aristotle's other works, which, for a work before a popular audience, is exactly what one would expect.

20. Something complained about by Ramsauer (1858, 31) and Fahnenschmidt (1968, 7 and 184).

21. Schleiermacher (1835) and Elorduy (1939), who both think it the only authentic ethics of Aristotle, because it is the best; see Hans von Arnim (1924-29), Dirlmeier (1958), Cooper (1973), Gohlke (1944), Plebe (1965).

22. Kenny's "philosophically naïve and crude" (1978, 218) is too strong but captures something of the right spirit.

23. Pellegrin [in Dalimier (1992, 25-26)], speaks of the *Great ethics* as "*un traité aussi subtil, à argumentation aussi serrée, aux interrogations aussi originales*" and of "*la grandeur de la pensée*"[also in Elorduy (1939, 27 and 65)].

24. Elorduy (1939, 68) remarks a propos Aristotle's exoteric writings, such as the lost *Eudemus* and the *Protrepticus*, that they were a sort of advertising or "propaganda" for the school. But while exoteric works can point to an esoteric meaning, there is no reason to think, unlike say the followers of Leo Strauss, that esoteric works themselves point to some additional esoteric meaning (see Simpson 1998, xiv-xv). Further, the meaning that exoteric works point to, if they do, can only be learnt from comparing them with the relevant esoteric texts and not independently. If the *Great ethics* is an exoteric work, and the other two ethics are the esoteric works to which it is exoteric, and if comparisons between these works can show us what, for Aristotle, an exoteric work looks like, then the *Great ethics* can serve as a standing refutation of the Straussian theory of esotericism, at least as applied to Aristotle.

25. The point is controversial [see Kenny (1978, 1992)], and contrast Peter Simpson (1998, 13).

26. See Broadie's apposite comments (2002, 54) on this passage in the context of Aristotle's ethical thinking.

27. Or acromatic, designed for hearing. The quotation is from *Attic Nights* 20.5. I. Düring (1957, 431-34) discusses this passage and invents the story that its story is invented.

28. Aulus Gellius was writing in Latin but he here uses the Greek words and the Greek for "walk" is *peripatos*, which is what gave to Aristotle and his school the name of *Peripatetics*.

29. That there must be at least two ethics under consideration by Cicero at this point in his argument is missed by many commentators but is rightly noted by Kenny (1978, 16, following F. Titze 1826). Kenny says nothing about the need, within the larger context, for Cicero to be considering a third ethics as well.

30. This argument that Cicero must be referring to three ethics and not just one was already anticipated by Shute (1888, 55-56), save that Shute does not suggest that the third or exoteric ethics was the *Great ethics*.

31. That the *Eudemian* is the ethics Cicero thinks definitely to be by Aristotle was suggested by Shute (1888) as well as by Titze (1826, 39), noted and endorsed by Kenny (1978, 16).

32. As to the reasons given against the authenticity of *Virtues and vices*, too involved to go into here, there is a fine book by E. A. Schmidt, *Aristoteles. Über die Tugend* (1965).

33. The text used for the translations is Susemihl's (n. 2).

34. That one of these other works might be *Rhetorica* and, in particular *Rhetorica* 1.9, is possible but unlikely because *Rhetorica* 1.9 does not speak of the virtues and vices in terms of a division into passions and powers and habits.

35. These suggestions about the names are entirely speculative since we do not know from ancient sources how any of them arose; see the discussion in Décarie (1978, 17-31). The prevailing view about the *Great ethics*, for instance, is that the name comes from the fact that both its books are unusually long, so that the rolls on which it would have been written out in the ancient world were "great," that is, longer than any of the rolls that contained the books of the *Eudemian* or *Nicomachean*. The opinion is of course possible but by no means compelling. Case, by contrast, opines (1596, 5) that the *Great ethics* is called great because though little in mass it is great in virtue, that is, in the great richness of the matter of virtue dealt with in it. Pellegrin, in Dalimier (1992, 26) has recently said something similar ("*cette éthique est 'grande' aussi par la grandeur de la pensée qui s'y déploie*"), though without, to my knowledge, being aware of Case's work.

36. We can throw in the *Virtues and vices* too, if we like, as an ethical *vademecum* for the noble young. For there is something to be said for J. Zürcher's (1952, 259) charming suggestion that the *Virtues and vices* was first conceived and written for the young Alexander (and other princes) under Aristotle's tutelage at Pella.

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Submitted: 17 March 2013; revised: 28 January 2014

Φιλοσοφια
Volume 15, 2:2014

QUITO, CENIZA, TIMBREZA, GRIPALDO: DLSU PROFESSORS' CONTRIBUTIONS TO FILIPINO PHILOSOPHY[1]

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This paper explores the thoughts of Emerita Quito, Claro Ceniza, Florentino Timbreza, and Rolando Gripaldo as contributions of De La Salle University to the development of Filipino philosophy in the cultural sense. These philosophy mentors are selected based on their textual productivity and on the fact that they retired from DLSU as full professors. Filipino philosophy in this paper is limited to the following discourses: logical analysis, phenomenology/existentialism/hermeneutics, critical philosophy as an academic method; appropriation of foreign theories; appropriation of folk philosophy, revisionist writing, interpretation of Filipino worldview, research on Filipino values and ethics, identification of the presuppositions and implications of the Filipino worldview, and the study on Filipino philosophical luminaries. This exploration concludes with some assessments of the aforementioned philosophers' more specific impact on Filipino philosophy.

INTRODUCTION

The Philosophy Department of De La Salle University, Manila, has acquired the reputation of being eclectic in as far as the systems of thought that are taught, expounded and researched on by its professors. Such reputation was built through the years in contradistinction with the reputations of the other three leading universities in the Philippines (University of the Philipines, Ateneo de Manila University, and University of Santo Tomas). Amidst the perceived eclecticism of De La Salle University, however, there exists a solid tradition, dating back to the 1970s, that reflectively and substantively works on the enrichment and development of Filipino philosophy.

The term "Filipino philosophy," unfortunately, has become a contentious phrase among Filipino academicians who desired to inscribe on it a definitive meaning. In my paper entitled "Status and directions for Filipino philosophy in Zialcita, Timbreza, Quito, Abulad, Mabaquiao, Gripaldo, and Co," I unearthed sixteen meanings of "Filipino philosophy" that are contained in the writings of these seven leading scholars who problematized the meaning of the aforementioned phrase: (1) grassroots/folk philosophy; (2) lecture on scholasticism/ Thomism; (3) lecture on other foreign systems; (4) critical philosophy as non-academic discourse; (5) application of logical analysis; (6) application of phenomenology/existentialism/

hermeneutics; (7) critical philosophy as an academic method; (8) appropriation of foreign theories; (9) appropriation of folk philosophy; (10) philosophizing with the use of the Filipino language; (11) textual exposition of foreign systems; (12) revisionist writing; (13) interpretation of Filipino worldview; (14) research on Filipino values and ethics; (15) identification of the presuppositions and implications of the Filipino worldview; and (16) study on the Filipino philosophical luminaries (Demeterio 2013, 208).

Hence, on one extreme end of its semantic spectrum, "Filipino philosophy" can refer to everything philosophical going on in these islands as manifested in meanings numbers 1 to 11, 13, 14, and 16; while on the other extreme, the term could refer to the almost non-existent and under-represented practices of revisionist writing and the identification of the presuppositions and implications of the Filipino worldview. Therefore, in order to give this paper a more *specific* focus, there is a need to adopt a functional definition of "Filipino philosophy" taken from somewhere in between the aforementioned semantic extremes. There is a need to exclude meanings number 1 to 3 as they are non-textualized practices, meaning number 4 as it is outside the parameters of the academe, meaning number 11 as it is the most common and the most abused textual philosophical practice in the country, meaning number 10 as it overlaps with the other discourses, and meaning numbers 12 and 15 as they are currently merely desired discourses. Thus, in as far as this paper is concerned, "Filipino philosophy" is taken as application of logical analysis, application of phenomenology/existentialism/hermeneutics, critical philosophy as an academic method, appropriation of foreign theories, appropriation of folk philosophy, textual exposition of foreign systems, interpretation of Filipino worldview, research on Filipino values and ethics, and study on the Filipino philosophical luminaries.

This paper explored the thoughts of some of the philosophical luminaries of De La Salle University as the contributions of this institution to the development of Filipino philosophy. Due to the restrictions on length set by the article format of this study, however, the number of these luminaries had to be delimited using two criteria: (1) they should have extensively published their philosophizings, and (2) they should have retired as full professors in this said institution. Thus, this paper examined only the thoughts of Emerita Quito, Claro Ceniza, Florentino Timbreza, and Rolando Gripaldo.

To define what we mean by a *very specific focus*, we mean writings of these four which has a relation, direct or indirect, to the *Filipino subject matter*. This qualification is important because Quito has extensive writings on continental philosophy; Ceniza, on logic and Western metaphysics; Timbreza, on Chinese philosophy; and Gripaldo, on the analytic tradition, particularly, on philosophical logic and the philosophy of language. There will be another time to discuss these matters.

EMERITA QUITO

Quito was born in 1929 in San Fernando, Pampanga. Thinking that she wanted to take up law, she enrolled in philosophy at the University of Santo Tomas and earned her bachelor's degree in 1949. Falling in love with the discipline, she pursued graduate studies at the same university and earned her master's degree in 1956. She left the country in 1961, and worked for her doctorate degree at the Universite de Fribourg, Switzerland, and earned the degree in 1965, with a dissertation on the thoughts of Louis Lavelle. She came back to the country and taught at the University of Santo Tomas until 1967. Bro.

Andrew Gonzalez, FSC, invited her to transfer to De La Salle University. Quito is the person who charted the course of philosophizing in De La Salle University away from its original fixation with Scholasticism and Thomism. She retired from this university as a full professor, university fellow, and professor emeritus in 1993.

In 1990, De La Salle University honored Quito with a voluminous festschrift containing thirty-four of her major books and articles that were originally published from 1965 to 1988. This paper used ten pertinent works from this collection, as listed in the sources below. The contents of these ten books and articles yielded a conceptual map that summarizes Quito's contributions to the development of Filipino philosophy:



Figure 1. Conceptual Map of Quito's Contributions to the Development of Filipino Philosophy

This map shows us that Quito's work on Filipino philosophy, aside from her reflection and analysis on the state of Filipino philosophy, is concentrated on Filipino philosophy—in the qualification we just made—as the academic practice of critical philosophy (meaning number 7) and as the research on Filipino values and ethics (meaning number 14).

Quito's reflective thoughts on Filipino philosophy

Quito made a distinction between academic and formal philosophy, on the one hand, and grassroots philosophy or folk philosophy, on the other hand. Whereas academic and formal philosophy, in their strictest sense, may not be present in the country, for the bulk of our philosophical activities are limited to the exposition of foreign philosophical theories, Quito asserts that the Filipinos have a rich reservoir of grassroots philosophy (or folk philosophy), or philosophy in its loose sense, which remains unexplored by our

Western-oriented academicians. She believed that understanding this level and sense of philosophy will not only provide us with a deeper understanding of the Filipino's own national and cultural identity but will also endow Filipino philosophy, in the strict sense, with concepts, languages, and systems of thought that can be used to build and develop itself into a more significant and powerful discourse.

Quito (1990g, 707-13) then focused her attention on the question why the academic and formal philosophy in the Philippines remained underdeveloped and



Figure 2. Conceptual Scheme of Quito's Reasons for the Underdevelopment of Filipino Philosophy

subsequently presented ten reasons which we may cluster into (1) factors pertaining to our political and cultural climate, (2) factors pertaining to institutional and structural shortcomings of our universities and colleges, and (3) factors pertaining to professional capacities of our philosophy professors. The following figure conceptually maps out these reasons (see Fig. 2).

Quito's critical philosophy

Philippine politics: In *A life of philosophy: Festschrift in honor of Emerita S. Quito*, aside from Quito's curt but scathing mention on how the Marcos regime had contributed to the underdevelopment of Filipino philosophical thinking—specifically found in the essay "Teaching and research of philosophy in the Philippines" (1990d, 713)—her critical political outlook is substantially manifested only in "Should communism be taught in our universities" (1990e, 95-99). In this short article, Quito expressed her negative sentiments to both the repressive academic policies of the Marcos regime and the looming threat of a communist takeover. Quito believed that once communism is thoroughly studied by the Filipinos, our people would be repelled by the prospects of living in a communist regime. On the contrary, by making communism a taboo in the Philippine academic setting, the government only stoked the curiosity of the youth towards this ideology.

Colonial mentality: In the *Festschrift*, Quito's (1990d,762) take on our colonial mentality is substantially found in "Philosophy of education for Filipinos." She framed her analysis of our colonial malady in terms of our collective psychological development as a people. She mentioned that our experiences from the political and cultural subjugation under the Spaniards and Americans had wrecked our soul. Through the more than three-hundred years of subservience we ended up denigrating our own culture and selves while valorizing the culture and selves of our foreign masters. But worse than this self-chastisement, is our almost schizophrenic love/hate and attraction/contempt for the foreign. Colonial mentality did not only give us inferiority complex, but also this almost schizophrenic mind set. Quito believed that the Filipino intellectuals have the duty of pulling us out from the mental malady of colonization by freeing us from the shackles of our past and by bringing us to a nationalistic future that is free from all traces of our colonial baggage.

Filipino language: In the book,*The state of philosophy in the Philippines*, Quito (1983, 41) mentioned that there are two streams of theorizing about Filipino philosophy: one insisted on using only the Filipino language in order to fully capture and express the Filipino spirit, while the other argued that philosophy need not be restricted by any language and utilized the existing colonial English language. Quito tended to position herself with the first stream. She explained that Filipino philosophy can be extracted from the grassroots, built, developed and shared among Filipinos more efficiently if these activities are done using the Filipino language. Quito invited our attention to the wisdom of the Chinese Prime Minister Chou En Lai's plan of making English China's second language. Quito was definitely not against the Filipinos' desire to master the English language. What she (1990b, 603) was against was the Filipino's self deception that lured him to the idea that English is his first language and therefore should be the language of the academe. Quito's advocacy for the use and development of our national language is not only intended for the emergence and development of Filipino philosophy but more so for the cultural and economic development of our country.

Philippine education: For Quito, education in the Philippines, as it is, needs a thorough critique in order for it to become a functional weapon against colonial mentality. In the *Festschrift*, Quito's critique of the status of Philippine education is also found in "Philosophy of education for Filipinos." Quito's (1990g, 766) first move was to debunk the universalist definition of education as "the eduction (from the Latin *educare)* of potentialities out of a person" because such universalism could only veneer the ugly reality that Philippine education so far only preserved and propagated colonialism that made the totality of our educational system dysfunctional amidst the problems and concerns of the present. Thus, instead of supporting our current universalist philosophy of education, she called for the construction of nationalistic, contextualized and relevant, transformational, and ethical education. For her, a nationalist philosophy of education meant an education that assures that Filipinos know their culture and history and instills on their minds and hearts the pride of their being Filipinos. A nationalistic education, however, should close its door to the knowledges and theories that proliferate in the world. A nationalist education should in fact keep track of these intellectual developments and make itself abreast with the international pace of knowledge production. The ethical nature of Quito's (1990d, 765) proposed educational philosophy is not limited to the thorough study and application of ethics and morality, but more so to the intensive understanding of Filipino axiology in order to make them the foundations of a more contextualized ethics and morality.

Status of the Filipina: In "The role of the university in changing women's consciousness," Quito (1990i, 595) made a cursory look at the diachronic image of the Filipina starting from the creation myth of Malakas and Maganda that symbolizes the pre-Hispanic gender equality among the Filipinos. The Spanish period, however, subdued this gender egalitarianism with the propagation of the European patriarchalism. The Spanish suppression of this deeply ingrained tradition was reversed with the coming of the Americans who at that time had already a more than five-decade old history of feminism. They did not only open the universities to women but also the other opportunities that previously were possible only for the males. Quito was especially thankful for the technological innovations brought by the Americans that freed the Filipinas from the drudgery of domestic toils and gave them enough time to devote to the public sphere. But even with the gains of the Filipina, Quito was not satisfied. She invited the attention of those who are interested in increasing the gains of the Filipina and in utilizing such gains to the fact that the Philippine universities are predominated by women. She saw the tremendous potential of these universities as vortices of transforming the Filipinas into agents of development and change.

Quito's research on Filipino values and ethics

In the *Festschrift*, Quito's efforts in profiling Filipino values and ethics are specifically found in "The Filipino and the Japanese experience: A philosophy of sensitivity and pride" (1990h), "Ang pilosopiya: Batayan ng pambansang kultura" (1990c), "Teaching and research of philosophy in the Philippines" (1990g), "Structuralism and the Filipino *volksgeist*" (1990f), and "A Filipino *volksgeist* in

vernacular literature" (1990a). To peer into the Filipino soul, she used as her window the prior sociological discourses of Filipino and foreign scholars that attempted to describe the Filipino axiology, such as those of Jaime Bulatao, Vitaliano Gorospe, George Guthrie, F. Landa Jocano, Frank Lynch, and Armando Tan. From these existing researches, Quito (1990f, 34-37) listed down what for her are the most discernible highlights of the Filipino philosophy of life, namely: (1) the *bahala na* (come what may) attitude, (2) the *gulong ng palad* (life is up and down) attitude, (3) the *kagandahang loob* (compassionate) value, (4) the reciprocity value, and (5) the *hiya* (shame) value. These attitudes and values are the bases of the outward Filipino behavior as well as of the articulated maxims and folk sayings. But Quito is less interested with these external and articulated phenomena, because for her these belong to the expertise of the sociologists and anthropologists. On the contrary, she is more interested in piercing through the Filipino attitudes and values in order to reveal their underlying foundational principles. Quito (1990h, 517) believed that the attitudes and values of the Filipinos are founded on their extreme sensitivity and unreasonable pride.

CLARO CENIZA

Ceniza was born in 1927 in Cebu City. Like Quito, he gravitated to philosophy because of his desire to become a lawyer. Unlike Quito, however, Ceniza indeed became a lawyer after finishing his bachelor of laws from Silliman University, Dumaguete City, in 1953, and practiced the profession for twelve years before totally giving it up for the academic life of a philosophy teacher. He pursued his graduate studies at Syracuse University in New York and earned his master's degree in 1971, and his doctoral degree in 1974 with a dissertation on the presuppositions of classical philosophy. He came back to the country to resume his teaching job at Silliman University. Bro. Gonzalez invited him to transfer to De La Salle University, where he became known for his expertise in logic, metaphysics, epistemology, and philosophy of science. He retired from this university as a full professor in 1991 and was made professor emeritus in 1993. He died of cancer in 2001.

Ceniza had published a number of books on metaphysics, epistemology, and logic. However, his contributions to Filipino philosophy as defined in this study are contained in some five articles that are dispersed in the volumes of *Σοφια: Journal of Philosophy* and *Karunungan: A Journal of Philosophy*, and these are listed in the References. The contents of these five articles yielded a conceptual map that summarizes Ceniza's contributions to the development of Filipino philosophy (see next page).

This map shows us that Ceniza's work on Filipino philosophy, aside from his reflection on the ideal direction of Filipino philosophy, is also concentrated on Filipino philosophy as the academic practice of critical philosophy (meaning number 7) and as the interpretation of Filipino identity and worldview (meaning number 13) that specifically dealt with the profiling of how the Filipino reasons out.

Ceniza's reflective thoughts on Filipino philosophy

In "Self-identity and the Filipino philosophy," Ceniza (1982, 22) did not problematize the status of Filipino philosophy. What he pondered on was the question why young Filipinos

tend to dismiss philosophy as an irrelevant discourse. He then presented his answers at two levels. The first one is at the level of philosophy's being a foreign subject matter that do not relate well with our Filipino experiences and questions, while the second one is at the level of philosophy's disconnectedness with the students' stage of maturity and concerns.



Figure 3: Conceptual Map of Ceniza's Contributions to the Development of Filipino Philosophy

In order to bridge the gap between philosophy's foreign origin and the Filipino students' context, Ceniza (1982, 24) wrote: "In the field of philosophy, we can express our nationalism by reading the thoughts of our heroes and by encouraging our students to speak up and express their ideas and opinions on major issues." In order to reconnect philosophy to the students' stage of maturity and concerns, he said: "There has to be a balance between objective lessons and student response. We must allow students some leeway for discussions, even if we disagree with the opinions they express. We must, if possible, situate the lessons and examples in terms of the students' personal experiences." But once Filipino philosophy is fully developed it could stop problematizing its Filipinoness and underdevelopment and just go on philosophizing about universal issues and themes.

Ceniza's critical philosophy

Philippine politics: Ceniza's take on Philippine politics is found in "The Filipino in politics." Like a logician that he was, he (1988,14) neatly conceptualized Philippine politics as an interaction between three classes of Filipinos: (1) the class that is composed of the professional politicians, (2) the class that is composed of the educated and highly idealistic citizens, and (3) the class that is composed of the ordinary Filipino citizens, or the masses. Ceniza noted that there are very few Filipinos belonging to the first class, but because of their economic and political power they tend to dominate and control Philippine society.

Although the Filipinos belonging to the second class outnumber those who belong to the first class, their lack of cohesiveness, the fluidity of their aspirations, and the diversity of their origins, make them much less dominant when compared to the first class. When opportunity comes, some members of the second class would even migrate to the first class and forget about their past idealisms. The Filipinos belonging to the third class far outnumber even the sum of Filipinos belonging to both the first and second classes. But because of their economic, educational, and political poverty, more often than not, they are being preyed upon by those who belong to the first class.

According to Ceniza, the Filipinos belonging to the first class can easily manipulate and victimize not only those who belong to the third class but even those who belong to the second class because of the Filipinos' general acceptance of the politics of advantage, which he described as "the politics of particular—either personal, familial, or sectoral—advantage." This is the politics whose main aim is the achievement of a particular gain at the expense of the rest of the population. It is the politics that extracts blood from the ordinary citizens and rewards with sinecures the economically unproductive but politically powerful or useful" (Ceniza 1988, 17). For him, the opposite of the politics of advantage is the politics of justice and the politics of the common good.

Ceniza imagined that our way out from the shackles of the politics of advantage is to indirectly attack the dominance of the first class by expanding the membership of the second class through shrinking the membership of the third class. For him, the more specific interventions for the expansion of the second class and the shrinking of the third class would be the implementation of a more functional and realistic land reform program that would not only economically empower the members of the third class but also dilute the feudal nature of Philippine commerce and industry, substantial wage increase, the dismantling of the huge monopolies on mass media, the establishment of a more nationalistic economic planning, and the encouragement of more citizens to engage in entrepreneurship.

Colonial mentality: Ceniza's (1982,17) analysis of our colonial mentality is found in "Self-identity and the Filipino philosophy." Ceniza started with the assertion that individuals normally identify themselves with other individuals, things, collectivities, or ideas in order to make their existence more meaningful and worthwhile. In the political context, this identification is the basis of nationalism, which Ceniza understood as the normative association of individuals to their homeland. Ceniza (1982, 18) believed that nationalism is not something static that exists in the minds and hearts of certain individuals, for he conceptualized nationalism as the act of committing to belong to the collectivity of one's fellow countrymen with its attendant conviction to become a true representative of such collectivity.

Because nationalism is a dynamic process of committing and becoming, it is in fact a very vulnerable phenomenon that can be subject to disruptions, either during its initial stage or during its later stages. Ceniza (1982, 18) argued that the root cause of the development, underdevelopment, and even non-emergence of nationalism is something psychological. He (1982, 19-20) stressed:

> A man identifies himself with things he can be proud of and dissociates himself from things which tend to give him shame, he tends to identify himself with things he loves and puts psychological distance between himself and things he hates; he tends to identify himself with things which increase his self-esteem and disconnects himself from things that tend to embarrass him.

Ceniza (1982,19-20) further clarified:

> Let your people be continually oppressed, insulted, and otherwise treated in a degrading manner. Either of two things can happen here. Either you feel personally oppressed, insulted, and treated in a degrading manner and react more or less violently. Then you become a rebel—either in spirit or in act. The other thing that can happen is that you escape from this feeling of personal oppression, insult, and degradation by identifying with the oppressors. You adopt the values of the oppressors, affect his manners, learn and master his language—in other words, become culturally and spiritually one with the oppressor.

It is unfortunate that instead of standing up as real or spiritual rebels against the cruelties of our colonizers, the Filipinos started bashing and murdering our own souls while glorifying the icons and culture of our past masters.

Philippine nationalism: In addition to his metaphor of identification or dissociation with the collectivity of individuals who are committed to their homeland, Ceniza also conceptualized nationalism as an incremental movement of an individual's commitment from the smaller spheres of family, ethnic, and civic groups towards the bigger sphere of nation or homeland. Ceniza (1982, 21) argued that our disrupted nationalism did not only give us the problematic phenomenon of colonial mentality but also the presence of regionalism and other forms of stunted loyalties to smaller collectivities. Ceniza (1988, 20) assumed that the commitment to the nation and homeland is a necessary sentiment for the maintenance of a modern democracy that is based on the idea of a nation-state. He believed that once the commitment of the Filipino individual reaches the sphere of the nation and homeland, it should not stop there but should continue its incremental journey towards the sphere of the international groups that would lead him to the realization that he belongs to one humanity.

Occasional reflections (death penalty and EDSA II): Ceniza's reflection on the controversial reimposition of the death penalty for heinous crimes provided a window into his moral and ethical philosophy. As a metaphysician, he (2000, 2) believed that at the ontological level there is no such thing as a morally free action, because man has no absolute freedom from the influences of his genetic make-up, background, environment, and other complex circumstances. But Ceniza did not end his reflections on the reimposition of the death penalty at the ontological level, for he also invited our attention to the pragmatic level of governing and living in a real society. Even though death penalty, or any other penalties, cannot be legitimated at the ontological level, Ceniza accepted it as a necessary evil at the pragmatic level. He (2000, 3) said:

> But, yes, let us face it. To protect our interests and our safety and the safety of those we love, perhaps we need to kill some of our fellowmen so that we could have a more peaceful society to live in. I can think of some cases where the death penalty may be meted out, for example, in cases of serial killing, rape, or robbery with murder, and similar cases.

The conflict between the constitutional discourse and the middle-class Filipinos' assertion of the propriety and morality of the deposition of President Joseph Ejercito

Estrada as well as the assumption of office of Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo gave Ceniza the opportunity to peer into the otherwise opaque Philippine political axiology. In his process of reading such axiology, he (2001, 4) profiled four Filipino political values: (1) the desire for substantive justice instead of sheer legalism and the rampant circumventing of the laws undertaken by well compensated lawyers of the rich and powerful; (2) the move and assertion for a constitutional hermeneutics that is autonomous from the majority of the Western countries; (3) the perpetuation of the spirit of EDSA as a safeguard of Philippine democracy; and (4) the collective frustration against the traditional politicians who are mired in corruption and their selfish interests.

Ceniza's interpretation of the Filipino worldview

Ceniza's only attempt to venture into the project of interpreting the Filipino identity and worldview is found in "Filipino logic: A preliminary analysis," which is a product of a collaboration with Florentino Timbreza and Bro. Andrew Gonzalez (1989, 94-96). The materials that were thoroughly analyzed by the team are some randomly collected Filipino maxims and sayings, as well as statements and assertions made by various Filipinos that found their way to some newspapers, magazines, and comics. There were fundamental methods employed by the team: (1) logical analysis under the frameworks of Aristotelian logic and modern symbolic logic, and (2) phenomenological reading in order to reveal their hidden assumptions. The study revealed seven characteristics of the way Filipinos reason out: (a) metaphorical instead of being literal, (b) concrete instead of being abstract, (c) personal and subjective instead of being impersonal and objective, (d) practical and socio-ethical in nature instead of being theoretical and cognitive, (e) particular instead of being universal, (f) rhetorical and functional instead of being logical and empirical, and (g) theological instead of being scientific.

FLORENTINO TIMBREZA

Timbreza was born in 1938 in Tayum, Abra. He studied philosophy at Far Eastern University and earned the degree in 1962. He finished his master's studies at the Ateneo de Manila University in 1971, and his doctoral studies at the University of Santo Tomas in 1980 with a dissertation on Lao Tzu. In 1983, he joined De La Salle University as a full-time faculty member. He retired from this university as a full professor in 2003, and continued to teach part-time until he reached the age of seventy in 2008. Because septuagenarians are no longer allowed to hold teaching posts at the De La Salle University, he continued to serve this university as the editor of the interdisciplinary Filipino journal *Malay*.

There are three books that compete as the most comprehensive receptacle of Timbreza's philosophical thoughts: *Intelektwalisasyon ng pilosopiyang Filipino* (1999), Alejandro Padilla's *The Florentino T. Timbreza reader* (2004), and *Sariling wika at pilosopiyang Filipino* (2008). After thoroughly comparing the tables of contents of these three books, this paper opted to use the third one as its window in probing into the philosophy of Timbreza based on the reasons that it is the most comprehensive and recent one. This third book contains twenty-one essays that were mostly originally published between 1976 to

2004, nineteen of which have direct relevance to Filipino philosophy as defined in this paper, and these are listed in the References. The contents of these nineteen articles yielded a conceptual map that summarizes Timbreza's contributions to the development of Filipino philosophy (see Fig. 4).

This map shows us that Timbreza's work on Filipino philosophy, aside from his reflection on the ideal direction of Filipino philosophy, is dispersed through the areas of Filipino philosophy as academic critical philosophy (meaning number 7), appropriation of foreign theories (meaning number 8), research on Filipino values and ethics (meaning number 14), and study on a Filipino philosophical luminary (meaning number 16).

Timbreza's reflective thoughts on the nature of Filipino philosophy

Timbreza (2008n, 3) broadly conceptualized philosophy as either critical or constructive and substantive discourse. Critical philosophy is necessary not only in clarifying ideas and systems of thought but also in goading culture towards a better and more



Figure 4: Conceptual Map of Timbreza's Contributions to the Development of Filipino Philosophy

reasonable future (Timbreza 2008s, 101). However, he (2008n, 3, 5) argued that Filipino philosophy as a whole tends to focus on philosophy as a constructive and substantive endeavor aimed at the reconstruction of a folk philosophy, instead of philosophy as a

critical discourse. In order to construct or reconstruct or substantiate, this otherwise implicit folk philosophy, Filipino academicians have to extract them from the following sources and materials: (1) from the oral and written literature of the Filipino people, including myths, legends, epics, songs, folklore, riddles, rituals, dances, sayings, poetry, and the like; and (2) from the writings of Filipino intellectuals.

In order for these raw materials to become a fully articulated and textualized Filipino philosophy, the Filipino academicians have to process them using the following cognitive methods: (1) the practice of reflective thinking, which includes "analysis, examination, reflection, ordering, critique, explanation, [and] meaning construction for the native spirit and views of the Filipinos"; (2) the practice of creative interpretation, during which the interpreter "enhances, brings to the surface, extracts, excavates, searches the spirits that are implied in the folkore that conceals the self experiences and thought patterns of the common folks"; (3) the progressive effort, which Timbreza understood as the "proposal, establishment, formulation of a new system of thinking which is similar to a movement"; (4) the practice of indigenization, which follows either the exogenous (the use of Western and foreign concepts in order to explicate native concepts) or the indogenous patterns (the use of native concepts in order to explicate Western or foreign concepts); (5) the practice of intellectualization, a concept that he most probably borrowed from the linguists Bro. Gonzalez and Bonifacio Sibayan, who advocated the intellectualization of the Filipino language; and (6) the practice of Filipinization, which is rooted in Timbreza's (2008n, 5-6) advocacy of using the Filipino language in philosophizing.

In "Mga tagapaghawan ng landas ng pilosopiyang Filipino," Timbreza (2008l, 24-33) mentioned the Filipino academicians whom he considered pioneers in the development of Filipino philosophy: (1) Ramon Reyes of the Ateneo De Manila University, (2) Quito, (3) Leonardo Mercado of the Society of the Divine Word, (4) Manuel Dy of Ateneo De Manila University, (5) Romeo Abulad of De La Salle University, and (6) Timbreza himself.

Timbreza's critical philosophy

Critique of Filipino traits: Timbreza's critique of some Filipino cultural traits is found in "Mga negatibong pag-uugali ng mga Pilipino." In this essay, Timbreza (2008g, 74-80) was able to gather at least fifteen such general negative traits: (1) the desire to be ahead or to be greater than the rest to the extent of doing questionable practices just to maintain such desired status; (2) the practice of brown nosing in order to gain the favors of one's superiors; (3) the dishonesty in terms of producing goods such as the low quality of Filipino manufactured products, in terms of weighing goods in the market, in terms of the diminishing size of the famous breakfast item *pandesal*, in terms of substituting high-quality spare parts with lesser quality spare parts in repair shops, and in similar other situations; (4) the propensity to borrow items and forget about returning them to the owner; (5) the lack of sportsmanship; (6) the propensity to have tantrums in the face of failure/losing; (7) the procrastination that is accompanied by last minute rush and that usually results to topsy-turvy processes and inferior results; (8) the impatience that motivates him to crowd and elbow his way into buses, movie houses, and even churches; (9) the childish and idle curiosity that compels him to explore and investigate even the insignificant events that occur along his way; (10) the habit of spitting and urinating in public places, which Timbreza thought of as a behavioral baggage from his provincial and rural ways of life; (11) the

carelessness in handling his garbage that Timbreza connected with the Filipino's low sense of community; (12) the superficial religiousity; (13) the fondness for extravagant feasts and gatherings; (14) the gullibility and ignorance that makes him victim of scammers and violator of simple ordinances such as pedestrian and traffic rules; and (15) the tendency to bribe officials that is one of the roots of our deplorable graft and corruption .

Occasional reflections (death penalty, coup d'état, and violence): Timbreza's (2008p, 167) reflection on death penalty addressed the core controversy concerning the legitimacy of this sanction. In trying to address this moral and political problem he surveyed the pertinent and conflicting ideas from the Old Testament, the New Testament, Lao Tzu, the sentiments of the Filipino people, and some Anglo-Saxon philosophers who all pondered on the tension between the state's duty to protect each and every human life and the act of the state to take away the life of certain criminals. After doing so he focused his attention on the arguments of the British utilitarian thinkers Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill, as well as of the Scottish deontological moral theorist William David Ross. The utilitarianism of Bentham and Mill has a consequentialist moral theory that considered an action as something morally good if it results to the happiness of the greatest number of people. Probably sensing the tendency of utilitarian moral theory to sacrifice the one for the sake of the many, Timbreza deepened his support for the re-instated death penalty by using the deontological moral theory of Ross. Ross believed that there are prima facie duties that a human being must pursue because of their irrefutable goodness. These prima facie duties are fidelity, reparation, gratitude, nonmaleficence, justice, beneficence, and self-improvement. In cases when these prima facie duties would be in conflict with each other, then the moral agent has to determine which is the most significant and the weightiest duty that he should follow while putting into consideration the context that circumscribes his moral dilemma. In the case of a death penalty that is imposed on an atrocious criminal the prima facie duties of nonmaleficence (against the criminal) and self-improvement (for the criminal) would be in contradiction with the prima facie duties of reparation, justice, nonmaleficence (against the society) and self-improvement (for the society). In a context, therefore, where there is greater danger and damage if the state allows the atrocious criminal to live, then it would be morally just to impose the death sentence on such criminal.

The Oakwood mutiny of July 2003 gave Timbreza the inspiration to ponder on the reasons that make some military uprisings legitimate and successful, as well as the reasons that make others illegitimate and unsuccessful. From his reflections, he (2008s, 240) concluded that there are four elements that differentiated EDSA I and EDSA II Revolutions as legitimate and successful uprisings compared to the other illegitimate and unsuccessful attempts to topple the government: (1) the uprising should be founded on a reasonable, just, and sufficient cause; (2) the uprising must have the involvement of the military; (3) the uprising must have the involvement of the Catholic Church; and 4) the uprising must have the sympathy, empathy, and assistance of the masses. Timbreza explained that the Oakwood mutiny did not sufficiently have these four elements which resulted to its failure.

The series of violent crimes that shocked the Philippine nation in 1993 gave Timbreza (1980s, 44-80) the occasion to reflect on the Filipino's perception of violence and nonviolence. Using his signature phenomenological reading of some folk sayings that he collected from the various Philippine ethnolinguistic groups he asserted that the Filipinos have an aversion for violence because of his foundational belief on the law of karma.

Timbreza's appropriation of foreign theories

On terrorism: "Pilosopiya ng terorismo" contains Timbreza's (2008h, 213 and 225) reflections on the terror attacks that occurred locally and internationally at the outset of the twenty-first century, including the infamous 11 September 2001 tragedy. He probed the nature of terrorism using the thoughts of Karl Marx, Georg Wilhelm Hegel, Niccolo Machiavelli, as well as of the character of Thrasymachus in Plato's *The republic*, as his philosophical framework. Timbreza called these thinkers "mightistic" theorists as they tended to justify power and violence for the sake of progress and development. He explained that from the perspective of the terrorists, the attacks that they unleashed into society are justifiable because they are the only effective means in attaining their goal of establishing what for them is a good and just society. But Timbreza (2008h, 226-27), based on his earlier discourse on violence, did not only disagree with the legitimacy of a terror attack; he moreover pointed out the senselessness of terrorism based on the wisdom that any social order or situation that is established by means of terror and other illegitimate means will also perish due to terror and other illegitimate means. Timbreza adhered to the Filipino belief in the law of karma and declared that a good and just society can only be attained through just and peaceful means. Although he supported the state's, as well as the international community's, military efforts in combating both local and international terrorism, he went back to his steadfast adherence to the principle of nonviolence and stated that at the bottom line the state and the international community should also address the foundational problems that nurture the growth of the terrorists' bitter ideologies.

On ecology: "Ekolohiya at ang landasin ng tao" contains Timbreza's reflections on ethics and metaphysics of ecology. He (2008c, 190 and 197) stated that "in the law of ecology there is no strong or weak, there is no wild or meek, there is no rich or poor, because all who live in this home are beneficial to the others. All help the others in order to survive." Using Aristotle's teleological metaphysics, Timbreza argued that man should not meddle with the elements of nature, because these elements have their own specific purposes and meddling with them might derail them from their pre-ordained goals. He said that this teleological metaphysics was given a theistic twist by Thomas Aquinas when this Scholastic thinker linked the doctrine of specific purposes with the eternal and grand design of an all powerful God. An offense against ecology for this matter is an offense against metaphysical and theological principles. Timbreza pointed out that Lao Tzu's way of the Dao is teaching us to live with nature and not against nature. He supplemented Lao Tzu's speculation with Chuang Tzu's famous distinction between the essence of nature and the essence of man. Chuang Tzu elaborated that whereas plants and animals follow their natural essences, man tends to follow his artificial, man-made, and conventional goals.

Timbreza's research on Filipino values and ethics

"Pilosopiya ng buhay ng mga Pilipino" contains Timbreza's attempt to articulate the Filipino philosophy of life. Still using his signature phenomenological reading of selected folk sayings, he (2008r, 134-43) was able to explicitate five philosophies of life according to the Filipino point of view: (1) the law of karma that restrains Filipinos from engaging in evil and violent deeds as these are thought to recur in the near or far future against them or their

loved ones; (2) the balance of nature that implies the divine wisdom in the design of things, the teleological dimension of events and situations, and the divine justice in the distribution of physical qualities and internal gifts to all men; (3) the circular view of life that is aptly expressed by the metaphor of the wheel of life that brings one person at the top in a certain moment and at the bottom the following moment; (4) the Filipino view of life and death that conceptualizes life as a turn to be born, to grow, and to die; as a borrowed gift from God; and death as something that could happen any moment, and as the ultimate equalizer of all men; and (5) the attitude of self restraint that is a way for a longer and contented existence, a source of inner strength, and a powerful weapon against the trials of life.

Timbreza's study on a Filipino philosophical luminary

Timbreza's (2008l, 198-212) discourse on Jose Corazon de Jesus is found in "Mga sangkap ng pilosopiya ng buhay ni Huseng Batute." De Jesus is a great Filipino poet who is one of the creators of the *balagtasan* genre and who penned the poem "Bayan ko" that eventually became the lyrics of a doleful song of the same title that is currently reputed as the Filipino second national anthem. He then commented on de Jesus' salient metaphors about human life: life as a burning candle, life as a growing tree that the moment it reaches impressive heights is exposed to dangers of the wind, the radical equality of human beings, life as an endless struggle, life as a *carnivalesque* existence, the ironies of endurance in suppleness and strength in weakness, and the lure of love as the eternal fountain of youth.

ROLANDO M. GRIPALDO

Gripaldo was born in 1947 in Madrid, Cantilan, Surigao del Sur. He finished his bachelor's degree in philosophy at the Mindanao State University, Marawi City, in 1969. He pursued his graduate studies at the University of the Philippines, Quezon City, where he earned his master's degree in philosophy with the specialization in the analytic tradition in 1975, and his doctorate degree in Philippine studies with specalization in Filipino philosophy in this same university in 1984. His dissertation was on the political and social thought of President Manuel L. Quezon. He taught for more than twenty years at Mindanao State University, retired, and moved to Metro Manila.He taught at the Ateneo de Manila University and at Adamson University. He became a full-time faculty member of the Philosophy Department of De La Salle University in 1994, where he became known for his dedication to Filipino philosophy, philosophical logic, and the philosophy of language. After serving as chair of the Department of Philosophy for a number of years, he retired from this university as a full professor in 2007. Instead of pursuing a post-retirement career in the academe, he opted to devote his time and energy to the management of the Philippine National Philosophical Research Society and for the editorship of its biannual journal *Φιλοσοφια: International Journal of Philosophy.*

Gripaldo published nine books, edited five books, and also published more than one hundred articles.[1] Based on our qualified criteria of Filipno philosophy, this paper opted to focus its analysis on just three books and one article: (1) *Filipino philosophy: Traditional approach*, Pt. I, sec.1; (2) *Filipino philosophy: Traditional approach*, Pt. I, sec. 2; (3) *The making of a Filipino philosopher and other essays*; and (4) "Bahala na: A philosophical analysis." The pertinent twenty six articles from

these three books that were used in the paper are listed in the References. The contents of these twenty six articles plus the additional article yielded a conceptual map that summarizes Gripaldo's contributions to the development of Filipino philosophy (see Fig. 5 on page 196).

This map shows us that Gripaldo's work on Filipino philosophy, aside from his reflection and analysis on the conditions and prospects of Filipino philosophy, is concentrated on Filipino philosophy as the academic practice of critical philosophy (meaning number 7), as appropriation of some foreign theories (meaning number 8), and as study on some Filipino philosophical luminaries (meaning number 16).

Gripaldo's reflective thoughts on the problems and prospects of Filipino philosophy

Hindrances to Filipino philosophy: Gripaldo's identification of the elements and factors that hindered the development of Filipino philosophy are primarily found in "Filipino philosophy: Western tradition, and nation building" and "The making of a Filipino philosopher," where he (2009h, 44-45; 2009y, 67-69) uncovered six such elements and factors: (1) the widespread misconception of Filipinos on what philosophy is that is brought about by their narrow exposure to philosophy; (2) the limited career opportunities offered by philosophy as a terminal degree program; (3) the Filipino philosophy's Western orientation and its failure to dialogue with its own local and native traditions; (4) our infatuation with Western philosophies and our failure to think for ourselves in building our own philosophical tradition—whether from Western, Eastern, or local traditions—or that had given us philosophical activities that generally are expository and devoid of direction; (5) the Filipinos' easy and contended life and lack of drive for professional excellence; and (6) the deficiences of the philosophical organizations in the Philippines that failed to unite under one umbrella organization, that failed to foster research and publication, and that failed to be developmental in its outlook.

Critique of the cultural approach to Filipino philosophy: Gripaldo's critique of the cultural approach to Filipino philosophy is mainly found in "Cultural approach to Filipino philosophy," "Is there a Filipino philosophy?," and "The making of a Filipino philosopher." For him, the traditional approach to Filipino philosophy is his main basis for his insistence that there is such a thing as Filipino philosophy. What Gripaldo (2009e, 170-71; 2009l) meant by "traditional" is connected with the way philosophy is written and studied in the West, as well as in the East, in which individual philosophers are named, their biographies are recounted, and their works are analyzed and explored as in Greek, British, French, German, and American philosphies. He argued that although we do not have similar individual philosophers in the past (eighteenth and early twentieth centuries), who worked as, or who were known as, philosophers in their own lifetime, it does not follow that we do not have individual intellectuals who thought and wrote about problems and things that may turn out to be philosophical. On the other hand, the cultural approach in Filipino philosophy for Gripaldo (2009e, 173; 2009l) refers to the project that started in the 1970s on the extraction of philosophical insights from anthropological data, such as folk sayings, folklores, folksongs and other popular practices. Although he affirmed the discursive significance of the cultural approach to Filipino philosophy as it is geared towards the articulation and understanding of the



Figure 5: Conceptual Map of Gripaldo's Contributions to the Development of Filipino Philosophy

Filipino folkways/folk philosophies and mores/morals, he (2009e, 177) warned the Filipino scholars who intend to focus on this area of philosophizing that they should not fall into the theoretical error of arguing that the factual "is" should also be the moral "ought," in the nationalistic attempt to respect the radical autonomy of the Philippine society.

Developmental path of Filipino philosophy: Gripaldo's suggested developmental path for Filipino philosophy is mainly contained in "Is there a Filipino philosophy?," "Filipino philosophy, Western tradition, and nation building," and "The making of a Filipino philosopher." This developmental path is actually constituted by the remedies that he (2009g, 53-58; 2009y, 47-70) thought of for the hindrances that he already uncovered and itemized: (1) the attainment of a more functional definition of what philosophy is, which for him can be done by properly conceptualizing philosophy as a discipline; (2) the explanation that philosophy is an effective training ground for a career in research firms, business firms, and publishing companies, or for further studies in law and other graduate programs; (3) the emphasis that Filipino philosophy should try to convert its Western orientation by focusing on its own philosophical tradition; (4) the recommendation that philosophizing should be done in the service of nation building, specifically in strengthening the intellectual capital of our youth and citizens, and consolidating and enriching further our intellectual heritage as a nation; (5) the challenge to Filipino academicians in philosophy to continuously devote themselves to research and publication; and (6) the suggestion for the restructuring, consolidation, and re-orientation of the philosophical organizations of the country.

Gripaldo's critical philosophy

Critique of padrino *system and Philippine governance:* Gripaldo's critique of the *padrino* system and Philippine governance is mainly found in "Cultural traditions, the person, and contemporary change: The Filipino experience." While other anthropologists and sociologists have already explored the negative side of the *padrino* system, Gripaldo (2009f, 189) made a rather broad historical study on this cultural system and demonstrated its being one of the root causes of misgovernance in the country. The *padrino* system is something that is related to the feudal Filipino patronage system where the landlord acts as the patron to his tenants, as well as to the *compadrazgo* system where two individuals who are not related by blood are socially bonded together as a consequence of their involvement in the rites of baptism or marriage. In the *padrino* system, the superior individual may not be a landlord just as the inferior individual may not be a tenant, for the system can exist outside the feudal context. The dominant feature of the *padrino* system appears to be the mutual and symbiotic commitment between a more powerful and a less powerful individual. Gripaldo argued that the *padrino* system is one of the root causes of our misgovernance and rampant corruption in the sense that it engenders nepotism, when the *padrino* places his protégé in an otherwise meritocratic position, and in the sense that it leads to other forms of corrupt practices, when the *padrino* expects his protégé to reciprocate his initial placement with honest or dishonest favors. He mentioned that this system was practiced during the Spanish period by Filipinos who wished to belong to the principalia class through the backing of Spanish officials, Spanish friars, or other principalia who happened to be favored by the Spaniards. The same practice was reinforced by the Americans. Gripaldo (2009f,191-93) pointed out that Ferdinand Marcos and his cronies, and Joseph Estrada and his midnight cabinet, are but more recent manifestations of the *padrino* system.

Critique of Philippine tourism and heritage conservation: Gripaldo's critique of Philippine tourism and heritage conservation is contained in "Tourism and heritage in a global society: The Philippine experience." Gripaldo (2009z, 187) started with the affirmation that tourism is a good, both for the tourist and for the host country, and that heritage conservation is also a good, in the sense that a heritage site needs to be appreciated by the present and the future people of a given nation. He argued that there ought to be a natural connection between tourism and UNESCO heritage sites, because these sites are supposed to attract tourists, and the coming of tourists is supposed to generate funds to conserve such heritage sites. However, the Philippines seemed to be a special case, because even if it boasts of five heritage sites in 2009, which are actually spread on eight locations, it lagged behind the other ASEAN countries as a tourist destination. Gripaldo (2009z,191-92), then, laid down eight reasons why the Philippines is not a favorite tourist destination in the ASEAN region: (1) the heritage and tourist sites might not be well maintained, such that it would be incapable of drawing enough interest locally and internationally; (2) the country might not be spending enough for advertising and marketing to make these heritage and tourist sites known to potential tourists; (3) the country as an archipelago is isolated from the other ASEAN countries, and this gave it the disadvantage as tourists would prefer destinations that are linked to other destinations in other countries through the more economical bus routes or railways; (4) the professional organizations in the Philippines are not fond of hosting international conferences which draw international participants who double as tourists during the conference breaks; (5) the country's relatively frequent natural calamities either damage our heritage and tourist sites or periodically discourage potential tourists from coming; (6) the presence of transnational and huge companies near heritage and tourist sites that spoil their natural purity with pollution and abrupt urbanization; (7) the country's government is not very keen and strict in protecting its heritage and tourist sites from the ravages of infrastructural developments; and (8) our peace and order situation is a little scary for potential tourists, especially in Southern Philippines.

Gripaldo's appropriation of some foreign theories

On mass media: His philosophical reflection on modern mass media is contained in "Media powerhouse: Challenges to contemporary philosophers." Gripaldo (2009, 175-83) started his critique with the identification of the tremendous powers of the modern mass media: (1) their awesome speed that is made possible by the developments in science and technology; (2) the capacity of these modern media to subtly propagate their ideology through their recurrent and far-reaching circulation of messages, sounds, and images; (3) the capacity of these modern media to equally subtly propagate their national, cultural, and ethnic epistemes; (4) the convincing facility of these media to interpret the world, or any aspect of it, for their recipients; and (5) the power of modern media to dish out relative meaning by manipulating the contexts and connotations of their messages, sounds, and images is already self-evident to be threatening and dangerous to their recipients.

On the public good: Gripaldo's politico-economic take on the public good is contained in "The concept of the public good: A view from a Filipino philosopher." He (2009w, 87) started with the widely accepted politico-economic definition of *public good* as a nonrivalrous and non-excludable good. *Nonrivalry* refers to the criterion that whenever somebody uses such good it would not diminish or exhaust the value of the same good; while *non-*

excludability refers to the criterion that the access and use of such good is open to all individuals. Upon this common understanding, he (2009w, 83, 91-94) proceeded to introduce three nuances: the first one of which is his constriction of the range of his public by limiting it to communal and national publics. His second nuance is his elaboration of the goodness of the public good based on its desirability and beneficial impact to the communal and national publics. His third nuance is his introduction of the distinction among *public public goods, private public goods*, and *mixed public goods*. By *public public goods*, Gripaldo meant those public goods that are made available to the communal and national publics either from nature or from the government; *private pubic goods* are those that are made available to the communal and national publics through the efforts of the private sector; and the *mixed public goods* are those that are similar to public public goods but are made available to the communal and national publics through the efforts of some private organizations which are disinterested in profit making.

After laying down his politico-ethical construct of the public good, Gripaldo (2009w, 95-97) revealed at least four important implications: (1) the private sector may provide public goods for the reason that it may indirectly profit from them; (2) the government should provide public goods based on its obligation for social service; (3) when a government provides public goods based on purely electoral reasons, that is, in order for its political leaders to gain favorable votes in the next elections, and such government is exposing itself to the possibility of dishing out only an apparent public good; and (4) in the case of the inability of a given government to provide some public goods, it is still possible for some private organizations, or groups of individuals, to band together and pool their resources in order to come up with such needed public goods.

Circumstantialist moral theory: Gripaldo's attempt to construct his own moral theory is found in "Freedom to choose: An essay on situational determinism" and "He could have chosen otherwise?" which are both based on his book *Circumstantialism.* He (2009j, 144) started his formulation with a distinction on the two different meanings of *circumstance*: the first refers to a totalized situation in which the moral agent is compelled by his own situation to act in a certain way, while the second refers to a situational condition which gives enough room for the moral agent to make a rational choice on what to do. Gripaldo founded his circumstantial moral theory on the second meaning of circumstance that allows the possibility of making authentic rational choices.

To emphasize his focus on the authenticity of rational choices/decisions/actions, he (2009j, 147 and 150) adapted T. F. Daveney's five conditions for choices/decisions/actions to be authentic: (1) "there must be genuine alternatives"; (2) "the chooser must be aware of these alternatives"; (3) "he must believe that these alternatives are attainable or doable"; (4) "he must have a prior aim, purpose, or want for choosing"; and (5) "the alternative chosen must be that one which suits [the chooser] best." Gripaldo proceeded to outline his conceptualization of the process of choosing/deciding, which he partitioned into three stages. The first stage pertains to the moral agent's recognition of the alternatives that are in front of him. This is followed by the second stage which pertains to the moral agent's weighing of the "merits and demerits, advantages and disadvantages, pluses and minuses of each alternative." Finally, Gripaldo's process of choosing/deciding is capped by the third stage, which pertains to "the level or phase where the agent acts out his/her decision/choice," or more simply, to the full consummation of the choosing/deciding process.

Gripaldo (2009j, 150 and 154) pointed out that it is during the second stage of the

choosing/deciding process when the situational conditions, or the circumstances of the moral agent, would start to determine his weighing of the pros and cons of the alternatives that are available to him. He grouped these situational conditions into four: "the person's present external environment (Source1), the person's past (Source2), the person's future (Source3), and the person's present physical and mental condition (Source4)." He further explained that some of these specific situational conditions may or may not be directly present in the moral agent's consciousness at the time of his choosing/deciding; however, the sources are all latently there. Gripaldo emphasized that because each individual person is unique, and because the configuration of situational conditions that surround him is unique at every point in time, each choosing/deciding situation is, therefore, unique. Gripaldo maintained that the moral agent's choice/decision is a product of human freedom. It is in this sense that he can be grouped with the other moral theorists who believed in the compatibility of freedom and determinism. He believed that the moral agent is free as he goes through all the three stages of the process of choosing/deciding.

Finally, Gripaldo (2009j,159-60) revealed the five corollaries of his circumstantialist moral theory: (1) the feeling of remorse has no part in his rational ethics as he is in favor of adopting a stoic attitude towards past mistakes that prioritizes the making of amends in order to rectify a situation; (2) a moral agent should not think of his alternatives in terms of black and white, because there are instances that such an agent can take more than one alternative when the situation demands it; (3) a moral agent should try to broaden his awareness of the situational conditions circumscribing him in order to assure a more reliable decision-making; (4) the understanding of the process of decision-making should make us deemphasize the punitive aspects of moral formation and, instead, put more importance on the incentive aspects of moral formation; and 5) the awareness of the process of decision-making should make us aware to struggle on how to control our passions so as to make our choices/decisions more rational.

On Bahala Na*: Bahala na* is a Filipino cultural expression that is taken as the verbal manifestation of the Filipino cultural attitude of fatalism and lack of will to control one's own life and future. In the essay "*Bahala na*: A philosohical analysis," Gripaldo reexamined this concept using a handful of Western philosophical theories (2005). He wrote: "while '*Bahala na*' can presuppose both the Spinozistic/Stoical and Leibnitzian deterministic systems, it is more in keeping with panentheistic, deistic supernaturalistic, and circumstantialistic theological frameworks" (2005). In effect, he unbundled the positive sense that carries the notion of self responsibility and the negative sense, that exclude the notion of self-responsibility in this attitude. He enjoined all Filipinos to be conscious of these subtle polarity of *Bahala na* so that they may be able to pursue its positive sense and avoid its negative sense.

Gripaldo's study of Filipino philosophical luminaries

Figure 5 shows that Gripaldo ventured into the historical presentation of certain luminaries in an attempt to present a historyof Filipino philosophy, albeit still incomplete. He discussed ten Filipino intellectuals: the national heroes Jose Rizal, Andres Bonifacio, and Emilio Jacinto; the presidents Manuel Quezon and Jose Laurel; the political historian Renato Constantino; the painter Restituto Embuscado; the poet and literary critic Cirilo

Bautista; the philosopher Ceniza;, and his own circumstantialist philosophy that has already been discussed. But due to the limitations of space, this paper will only discuss his studies on Rizal, Quezon, and Constantino.[3]

On Jose Rizal: Gripaldo's discussion on the philosophical insights of Rizal is contained in "Rizal's philosophy of nonviolence," "Rizal's utopian society," and "Agnostic deism: Rizal's religious philosophy." As hinted by the titles of these essays, Gripaldo focused his attention on the presentation of Rizal's philosophical thoughts on nonviolence, his utopian vision, and his theodicy.

Rizal's philosophy of nonviolence is rooted on his notion of freedom, which according to Gripaldo (2009t, 13), is the condition that allows man to attain his full potentialities. This is the reason why for Rizal there seemed to be no contradiction between freedom and the full integration of the Philippines as a true province of Spain. The country's status of being a colony did not accord it substantial rights; hence, individual freedoms of Filipinos were trampled upon by Spanish officials and the elite principalia. But if the Philippines would become a *true* province of Spain it would be accorded with rights and privileges that sooner or later would assure that each and every Filipino would have the chance of attaining his/her full potentialities. Hence, education and enlightenment are more important than revolution for Rizal. But as history unfolded in front of him, Rizal realized that his philosophy of nonviolence was inadequate.

Gripaldo presented Rizal's utopian society. He (2009u, 27) listed down six characteristics of Rizal's utopia: (1) "the Philippine archipelago must be united as a Filipino nation: compact, vigorous, and homogeneous"; (2) the Filipinos will have sound education about civic virtues that would lead them to enlightenment, so that each one of them will be capable of fighting slavery and injustice and working for their individual and collective good; (3) the country will have sufficient schools that would be effective in humanistically, professionally, and vocationally molding the Filipino youth; (4) the Filipinos will have a national language that is based on one of their native languages that will unite the Filipinos and sufficiently articulate their aspirations; (5) the state will guarantee that all Filipinos will have their liberties, such as "freedom of speech, of assembly, of the press, redress of grievances, and the enjoyment of other human rights"; and (6) the Filipinos will have a strong sense of nationalism.

Gripaldo (2009a, 52) called Rizal's theodicy, or religious philosophy, as "agnostic deism," in the sense that Rizal believed in a "God who does not interfere in man's affairs and whose attributes are unknowable." About the human soul and its immortality, Gripaldo, expounded on Rizal's almost Pythagorean and Platonic utterance that God shared with man a spark of His divinity, and arrived at the conclusion that Rizal believed in the existence of the human soul and its continued existence after death.

On Manuel Quezon: This short presentation of Gripaldo on Quezon's political philosophy is based on "Quezon's political philosophy," "Social justice: Cornerstone of Quezon's social thought," and "Quezon's philosophy of Philippine education." Gripaldo focused on what he claimed to be Quezon's dual-stranded political philosophy: the first of which pertained to the latter's political strategy, while the second to the latter's substantive theorizing that was geared towards the preparation of the country for its eventual independence from the United States.

Gripaldo called the strategic strand of Quezon's philosophy (2009q, 113, 122-40) as "political pragmatism," which is defined as the conviction that "one should fight for ideals and principles, but in case obstacles to an ideal are difficult to surmount, one must be ready

to fall back on an alternative that is better than nothing or that is a right step toward the idea." According to Gripaldo, Quezon used this strategy in working out a roadmap that would eventually lead to Philippine independence, which at the same time contained milestones that are palatable both to the American officials and the Filipino public. The second strand of Quezon's political philosophy is more complex in the sense that it dealt with the more detailed plan on how to make the Filipinos and the youthful Filipino government ready for the tremendous responsibilities of an independent nation-state. The most interesting aspect of the second strand of Quezon's (2009q,122-40) political philosophy is probably his critique of the weakness of the Filipino character which led him to formulate a code of ethics/ conduct that he thought could rectify such defective character. According to Gripaldo (2009q, 169), this code contained sixteen items that every Filipino should learn and master by heart: (1) faith in God, (2) unconditional love for the country, (3) respect for the constitution and the government, (4) proper payment of taxes, (5) commitment to the sanctity of elections, (6) love and respect for parents, (7) valorization of one's honor, (8) truthfulness, justice, and charity, (9) clean and frugal life, (10) commitment to emulate the virtues of our heroes, (11) industry, (12) self-reliance and the tenacious pursuit of one's legitimate ambitions, (13) love for one's work, (14) promotion of social justice, (15) dedication to buy Filipino products, and (16) wise use of natural resources and vigilance against the exploitation of fellow Filipinos.

On Renato Constantino: Gripaldo's analysis of Constantino's cultural and political philosophy is contained in "Renato Constantino's philosophy of nationalism: A critique." According to Gripaldo (2009s, 203-204), Constantino's critique of colonialism had been a two-pronged project. On the one hand, Constantino explored our psychological colonialism and, on the other hand, our economic colonialism, which is otherwise known as our neo-colonial bondage. Psychological colonialism is manifested by our having a captive consciousness, or the consciousness that is shaped by the needs and desires of the Spanish and American colonizers.

Constantino (Gripaldo 2009s, 206) argued that the antidote for our psychological colonialism is *nationalism*, which he defined as the realization that we have our own country and, therefore, we should have the commitment to keeping it our own and developing it for our own people. He, however, warned us that there are at least four types of nationalism and that only one of them could be the proper medicine for our colonial malady: (1) lip-service nationalism, which is unreliable and dangerous; (2) emotional nationalism that nurtures the strong sentiment for the country without necessarily understanding what nationalism really is all about; (3) intellectual nationalism that thoroughly understands what nationalism is all about but is uncommitted to its required actions and sacrifices; and (4) genuine nationalism that merges affection, understanding, commitment, and action. This fourth type is the kind of nationalism that can effectively address our psychological colonialism, and this can be established and propagated through the concerted efforts of our intellectuals and through a reconceptualized nationalist educational system.

Economic colonialism, or the neocolonial economic system, pertained to our economic structure that retained much of the colonial machinations of the American occupation that were geared toward the reduction of our economy to a mere appendage of the American global economy. Constantino argued that after the Americans left us our colonial economy, nothing changed much as manifested by our mendicant policies that still focused on the

export of raw materials and the import of so much manufactured goods. Even our industries are dependent on imported raw materials. These are the roots of our underdevelopment and widespread poverty. According to Gripaldo (2009s, 211), Constantino's proposed antidote for the economic aspect of colonialism is the formulation of an economic system that takes into consideration the masses, instead of merely the elite members of the society who predominantly benefit from our mendicant policies, and an economic system that is anti-imperialist.

CONCLUSION

All the four professors of philosophy have examined the state of Filipino philosophy in the country: Quito spent time diagnosing the factors that caused the underdevelopment of Filipino philosophy; Ceniza talked about the reasons why philosophy and Filipino philosophy are marginalized as discourses; Timbreza expressed his conceptualization of what Filipino philosophy should be; and Gripaldo did a similar diagnosis on the underdevelopmental factors before he proposed his developmental pathway for Filipino philosophy.

All of them engaged in the critique of Philippine culture and politics: Quito examined Philippine politics, our colonial mentality, our language, our educational system, and the status of the Filipina; Ceniza scrutinized Philippine politics, our colonial mentality, our nationalism, the re-imposed death penalty law, and the EDSA II Revolution; Timbreza analyzed our cultural traits, the re-imposed death penalty law, the recurrent coup d'état, and violence; and Gripaldo pored over Philippine governance and the state of our tourism industry and heritage conservation initiatives. But these four luminaries have diverse modes of positioning themselves as Filipino thinkers: Quito postured herself as a philosophy teacher who is hopeful that one day a truly Filipino philosophy will emerge from the collective efforts of Filipino philosophy scholars; Ceniza did not problematize much the issue of Filipinoness, but instead went directly into philosophizing as a cosmopolitan thinker; Timbreza styled himself as a pioneering Filipino philosopher who is anchored on his self-stipulated methodology; while Gripaldo took the stance of a Filipino philosopher, among other Filipino philosophers, who should not be hesitant to express and publish their own philosophical views.

Quito suppressed the hegemony of Thomistic and Scholastic philosophies within the department of philosophy in De La Salle University and cultivated an environment of eclecticism that is open to the possibility of pursuing researches and speculations on Filipino philosophy. Substantively speaking, Quito contributed to the development of Filipino philosophy in the area of critical investigations on Philippine culture and politics. Ceniza did not have much work on Filipino philosophy, as he was preoccupied with his researches and speculations on the areas of metaphysics, epistemology, logic, and philosophy of science. Timbreza churned out more texts on Filipino philosophy, as he was more focused on this area than Quito or Ceniza. His impact on Filipino philosophy would be his insistence that there is such a thing as folk philosophy that can be extracted from our folklores and can be used as a framework in speculating on more contemporary philosophical issues. Substantively, he was specialized in the research on Filipino values and ethics. Cummulatively speaking, Gripaldo could easily equal, if not surpass Timbreza's textual production on Filipino philosophy. His impact on Filipino philosophy

would be his argument that there is such a thing as Filipino philosophy in the real or traditional sense of the word "philosophy." Consequently, he devoted much of his time and energy trying to research and present these philosophical insights from the writings of some Filipino intellectuals, and in enjoining the other Filipino scholars in philosophy to assert themselves as real philosophers, among other Filipino philosophers, through the constant expression and publications of their views and speculations. These four luminaries are the concrete contributions of De La Salle University to the development of Filipino philosophy.

NOTES

1. See Gripaldo's curriculum vitae at https://independent.academia.edu/Rolando Gripaldo/CurriculumVitae.

2. See his two books, *Filipino philosophy: traditional approach,* Pt. I, secs.1-2 (2009aa and 2009bb).

3. For a summary of these Filipino philosophers, see Gripaldo (2006).

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Submitted: 25 January 2013; 21 February 2014

Φιλοσοφια
Volume 15, 2:2014

A HUMANISTIC-MARXIST AND LABOR-ORIENTED PARADIGM OF ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE

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One of the aims of this study is to lay the ground for the possibility of intermingling Marxist ideas with organizational development. The paper explains the meaning of humanism in organization setting in the light of a labor-oriented paradigm. It also proposes steps on how this alternative frame and mindset will work on actual change practices in the organization by juxtaposing Richard Beckhard's organization development strategies with the Humanistic-Marxist paradigm.

The critiques of industrial society attained concreteness in a historical mediation between theory and practice, values and facts, needs and goals. In the absence of demonstrable agents and agencies of change, the critique is thus thrown back to high level of abstraction.

—Herbert Marcuse, *One dimensional man* (1991)

Genuine human freedom is only to be found outside of necessary labor.... Work as free play of faculties is the positive "abolition" of alienated labour as it exists in advanced capitalistic societies (organizations). It is an activity whereby the individual or collectivity seeks to enhance, develop or merely exercise man's faculties and sensibilities, with no other aim than human joy, happiness, and pleasure. It takes place in the realm of freedom.

—Peter Lind, *Marcuse and freedom* (1985)

UNVEILING OF A NEW HUMANISM FOR ORGANIZATION CHANGE: A MARXIST PERSPECTIVE

Man finds himself at the center of reality, change, and development. He is the precursor and the receiver of his material activities in this material world, within social boundaries, beyond the prospect of his limitations. This is reality for him of which every action rendered is bound within social context. In this social awakening, man as individual is both a change

agent and social being. Capable of interpreting as well as changing his world (his social climate, e.g., corporate organization), man becomes then the "measure of things." This Protagorean axiom[1] has given birth to the philosophical trend called anthropocentrism and eventually signified the advent of a new humanism.

Karl Marx, known for his radical critique of capitalism, has also put an implicit inquiry on humanism where a great deal of concern is concentrated on human movement. Raya Dunayevskaya (1973, 151) believes that the individual is a "social entry imbued by humanistic ideology." Undoubtedly, this has given a new meaning of Marxism, that is, humanistic in approach, in practice, and in essence. This conjecture placed man as the mover—the revolutionary "being" that would create a new vision or paradigm in society vis-à-vis corporate organization's status quo. In addition, contemporary interpretations given by Antonio Gramsci and Herbert Marcuse on individuality and humanism will be used.

Corporate organization as organic and dynamic entity

Corporations are organic organizations that continuously change because of internal and external forces. A correct path towards organization change should be dynamic. Change means the new state of things is different from the old state of things (French and Bell 1995, 3). Within this parameter, change in organizations as theoretical and practical must correspond rather as a challenge and opportunity. In this regard, Jerry I. Poras (1987, ix) tells why:

> Change...has been both a plague and an opportunity for organizations. Those who viewed it as something to resist and overcome have atrophied and died. Those who seized it, used it, flowed with it, integrated it, and accelerated it, have, by and large, flourished and prospered.

Management sources treat change as something ambivalent as both crucial and challenging. Philosophical analysis, however, explicates change as dialectical yet developmental, using Marxist vision of Marcuse and Gramsci.

All in all, this inquiry presents humanistic Marxism as a paradigm or as an alternative for organization change. Man plays a vital role in the organizational context. Indeed, it is in this role that the individual resuscitates his own meaning and essence. The discussion and the elaboration of humanistic Marxism as a viable principle of organizational change will have to address three questions:

1. What is humanistic Marxism?
2. How would Organization Development (OD) be managed in the light of humanistic Marxism?
3. What are the strategies or interventions suggested to bring about a labor-oriented paradigm of organization change?

The extent of critique and practice

One of the aims of this study is to scrutinize philosophically Human Resource Development (HRD) concepts such as *organization change and development*. The intermingling of theory and practice is indeed available as far as management is concerned.

However, a philosophical undertone will, in a way, strengthen the development of this science. Theories surrounding the tenets of the science of management, as well as other discipline, are in Georg Hegel's mind, *Entfaltung* (unfolding). A discursive underpinning for this purpose applicable for HRD is seen as important and necessary. In fact, Peter Winch (in Gordon 1993, 638), the author (1958) of the *Idea of a social science and its relation to philosophy*, argues that "The study of social phenomena must be 'philosophical' rather than 'scientific,' by which he means that the proper way to comprehend such phenomena is by conceptual analysis rather than by means of empirical research."

Although philosophy is emphasized, it does not dislodge the empirical import of the sciences. Philosophy partakes and supplements learning. It is a metascience in itself of which its every methodology seeks to criticize but in the end or along the process, it synthesizes ideas and practices. This brings to mind the criterion of interdisciplinarity, which the study aims to establish. This study is in one way or the other an alternative for organizational change. There are so many literatures on organization development but, perhaps, this is the first kind to blend philosophy and HRD and to situate a Marxist paradigm within capitalistic concepts and notions. The concept of organization change (or development) is not a monopoly of any capitalist discourse. Even the Buddhists, Shintoists, or Zen monks can use the practice of organization development. This is an alternative. It may always appear to have contradictions but the fact remains—it is necessary. In fact according to Georg Hegel, contradictions exist in reality: "dialectic is not only a feature of concepts, but also of real things and processes" (Inwood 1992, 80).

Humanism: man positing humanity

At this point, let us presuppose some queries: Can we still situate humanity within an ever-increasing rate of change? Is humanity present in modern corporate organizations?

Quite problematic in this sense are the different claims on the notion concerning humanism. This section closely analyses the theories comprising our understanding of man as far as individualism, individuality, and humanism are concerned.

Methodological individualism

To start with, methodological individualism is the doctrine that facts about societies, social phenomena generally are to be explained solely in terms of facts about individuals (Bhaskar 1989, 4). This illustrates to some extent the shaping of the social sphere not on ideology but on the socially manifested behaviors of the individual. For example, criminality and violence to some extent are reduced to having a single explanation and thus far points to individual poverty. It is said that poverty is the root of all social maladies. Specifically, social events are to be explained by deducing them from the principle governing the behavior of the "participating individuals and description of this situation."

In organizations, productivity is normatively deduced as outcome of a well-motivated, fully compensated workforce. In some aspect, this can alter behavior but not universally because there are other factors that bring about productivity and prosperity in corporate organizations.

When there is an explicit and dynamic interaction of individuals, their experience becomes a valid assumption of their activity. This activity in a broader perspective constitutes

social or political exigency. Hence, we can see that the broader the exigency of experience, the better it pursues a societal structure. It produces either a well-defined institution or a complex aggregation of individuals with one common goal. In this respect, social institutions are merely "abstract models" designed to interpret the facts of individual experiences (Bhaskar 1989, 4). The labor organization, for instance, can be understood as workers' mechanism to spell out their grievances and demands in their work settings. However, Ian Forbes (1990, 119) highlighted the counter-arguments to this doctrine of methodological individualism. It can be inferred that this doctrine is too limiting and is reductionistic in scope, "which attempts to restrict as much as possible any reference to collectivities or institutions by focusing on the intentions and actions of individuals." He (1990, 119) outlines his contention by saying that:

> Methodological individualism...does not seek to explain individual actions and intentions. Instead, a dialectical element is introduced at the methodological level, in order to establish the form and content of mediating links between individual and society. In this way a social explanation can be the intent and result.... Thus [it] is distinct from a more metaphysical account based on the absolute commitment to the idea that the individual can be perceived and understood without reference to society.

Practically this means that there is a separation of context between individuality and society. Though a society in this theory denotes individual behaviors as criteria for its existence, the intentions or results do not necessarily come from the individuals themselves but can be brought out by the society per se.

Individualism is the notion that individual human beings (using the Protagorean maxim) are the "measure of all things." In this context, there pervades a burgeoning responsibility imposed on every human being, that is, to exist as human beings and to exist individually. It entails at this point moral implications, too. If she/he is the sole caretaker of humanity, then value judgments rest upon volitions and self-will. On the other hand, simply put, humanism can be summed up as a theory, doctrine, or ideology which concerns itself more or less with humans than with something other than humans (Forbes 1990, 3). Humanism means valuing the human persons (individually or collectively) above all else.

Perhaps we can draw the conclusion that there is humanism in individualism and vice-versa. Therefore, the source of morality or moral values and principles is the individual. Philosophically, this has been addressed by the Kantian moral imperative, which says "Act only on a maxim by which, at the same time, it can be evaluated into as a universal law."

Humanism and Karl Marx

According to Karl Marx (1970), it is social existence that determines class consciousness. It is through man's engagement with production that delineates the vital forces in society. The mode of production in material life determines the general character of the social, political, and intellectual processes of life. When man subdues himself with this activity the entirety of his human creativity and freedom is gradually being fettered almost in all directions. His labor creates an atmosphere of exploitation, though interwoven in society it appears as natural and ordinary. Inevitably, this kind of social relationship only

perpetuates oppression by capitalism—Marx's object of criticism. Humanism is more or less taken out of context within this postulation. Does humanism have a place in his critique of capitalism? The answer is indeed positive.

> What Marx proposed instead was that...the principle of a new society be the freedom of man, the reconstitution of his wholeness, the development of all his innate talents, the unity of mental and manual labour which exploitative society has fragmented, alienating from man not only the products of his labour, but the very activity of labour. (Dunayevskaya 1973, 152)

Marx did not abandon a theory signifying a humanistic construct, which centers on freedom, creativity, responsibility, and authentic labor activity. In defense of having a humanistic approach in Karl Marx's voluminous works, Ian Forbes (1990, 220) sheds light on the matter:

> Marx has wrongly been seen as an "anti-individual" thinker...(He) was not a philosophical anti-humanist who denied the significance of the individual. Marx's view of the individual has a strong affinity with humanist accounts; his contribution was to extend humanism into historical materialist method...

His recognition of the proletarian as the prime mover for revolution is quite paradigmatic. It is a classical struggle between two opposing groups: the bourgeois and the proletariat, or the elite and the masses. This is what paradigm means as a class consciousness, a determination of a place in humanity amidst exploitation, oppression, and repression. It is based on so-called class conflict where the elites are sustained by capitalism and the masses are being reduced to subjugated and passive beings. Products are manufactured primarily for their realization as value and profit, and not for their capacity to satisfy human wants and desires (Held 1989, 41). The productive outcome begins to identify itself as alien to the worker's creativity and potentiality. It becomes a separate entity distinguished mainly for its capacity to effect profit and capitalization. Hence, this situation regresses man's conscious effort to emancipate himself. However, in the end if the masses are awakened from this sublimated repression and oppression at the proper time, the order of things would be turned the other way around. Raya Dunayevskaya (1973, 158) reiterates, "No man is whole when the social order is so alien, and to end alienations one must become a radical, for to be a radical means to grasp something at its root. The root of mankind is man. It still is."

Marcuse's humanism: humanity, technology, and creative emancipation

Herbert Marcuse, one of the leading philosophers of the Frankfurt School, made a critique of the existing social order, namely, the advanced industrial society. He criticized modern society by reiterating that it was unfree and repressive. According to him, individuals enjoyed complacency with material goods while not realizing that their minds were enslaved by the dictates of "civilized condition." The bombardment of material goods brought about by an advancing technology had corrupted the masses. People tend to rely on the influx of technology without managing the repercussion it might entail.

According to Marcuse (1991), freedom and well-earned satisfaction of individuals are "universals" and "objects" of one's conscious effort to exist. Apparently, the essence or consciousness is predetermined by human existence. These "universals" critically stipulated by Marcuse must be anchored in man's aim to develop. David Held (1989, 239), author of *Introduction to critical theory,* expounds Marcuse's point:

> The realization of control, of freedom and reason, requires a transformation of the situation—a universal revolution which ensures that the universal will no longer operate as a 'blind natural force', but rather as a general plan formulated by freely combined individuals.

Individual progression towards collectivity will remain crucial for organization development. Corporations as organic organizations are akin to a microcosmic society because the elements of societal structure are present: the individuals, culture, environment, values, and technology. Change, therefore, operates within these corporate spheres but it should be noted that the development of the human resource is still the pivot of concern. As Marcuse (1991,1) says, "Indeed, what could be more rational than the suppression of individuality in the mechanization of socially necessary but painful performances; the concentration of individual enterprises in more effective, more productive corporations..."

Marcuse stipulates the technical rationality as the false rationality of the present time, as an impetus for alienation and repression.[2] According to Marcuse (1991), the emergence of a market economy, the rise of industrial production, the establishments of labor divisions, new forms of poverty, and technological advancement are just some of the sociological factors that dictate the modern man. Man no longer knows the basis for his existence amidst all these facades and pseudo-images for content and satisfaction. He equates technology and domination as having a pandemic influence on man's logic of existence. Marcuse adds, "there is an essential connection between technology and the domination of man by man in the existing industrial societies. He asserts his claim by employing two familiar concepts—domination and technology—in a strange and unfamiliar combination: technology and vice-versa" (in Feenberg 1988, 226). This has also paved the way to his claim that this reality is a product of capitalism's rationalization of human affairs. Rationalization according to Marcuse subjects events to human reason, which leads to a "technical mode" of understanding the world as a single universe of ultimate facts. This contention was framed from Max Weber's concept of rationalization.

> The prevailing forms of social control are technological in a new sense. To be sure, the technical structure and efficacy of the productive and destructive apparatus has been a major instrumentality for subjecting the population to the established social division of labor throughout the modern period. The technological controls appear to be the very embodiment of Reason for the benefit of all social groups and interest—to such an extent that all contradiction seems irrational and all counteraction impossible. (Marcuse 1969, 9)

Marcuse importantly pointed out that modern man, in his civilized state, no longer brings about the possibility of man discovering his autonomous self. Modern man is socialized into his role as instruments of the apparatus by the seemingly automatic system

of rewards, penalties, and alternatives. He also stressed that modern man represses his own instinct thus resulting in aggression with others.

The concept of domination for Marcuse does not only lie in the sociological or political context. It also accentuates the psychological dimension of domination. He explains that domination is not a condition of relations between individuals but rather a condition of individuals. Domination becomes complete, according to him, when individuals abandon the capacity of opposition. Without resistance to the ensuing order of things in society, Marcuse pointed out that there can be no means by which the individual may express his power and autonomy.

With the above critique of Marcuse, humanism becomes a sublimated area of the individual. Because of technological rationality, domination and repression, the self turns out to be biased with contradiction or opposition. He would rather stay in front of the television than to imaginatively write a poem. This kind of situation is also prevalent in most organizations. Domination nurtures human repression of artistic and creative potentiality.

In this respect, Marcuse pointed out the need for a "revolution." He suggested that people in society must aim for individual happiness in order to rise above suffering. If man finds his way to gratify his needs based on his will and freedom, then the liberation from technical rationality will be self-assuring. This kind of revolution is not a bloody sort of struggle against existing hegemony. It is rather a tapping of man's psychic energies, which lay more or less securely passive and repressed. Thus, what Marcuse is aiming at is a revolution from within one's self. If thus reconstructed, humanism at this height will cast a progressive act for human development and social transformation.

ORGANIZATION CHANGE:[3] INTERVENTIONS AND STRATEGIES IN THE LIGHT OF HUMANISTIC MARXISM

> We are observing a battle for power in modern organizations that has enormous implications for management. It has nothing to do with the battle between unions and management – that is just a minor skirmish left over from the past wars. The real battle is one taking place between the individual and the organization itself.
>
> —David Limerick and Bert Cunnington, *Managing the new organization* (1993)

Change from the base yet managed from the top

The disintegration of conflicts in the organization is a vital way of introducing the planned change and of proceeding to successfully attain the desired goal. It is easier to construct a model than to actualize the move in so far as the "withering" of conflicts is concerned. For this matter, the collaboration of management and employees as change agents themselves are important in organizational transformation. The need for dialogue, for example, between members of management and members of the workforce, is much greater today than when each stayed in his own class compartment and communicates only in terms of work tasks (Beckhard1969, 4). Change from the base means the employees must assume responsibility in converging the needed change in the organization. At this point, they perceive their effort and action as goal-oriented, towards a common end (whatever it is, say, an increase in production or quality management program).

Gramsci (1971), the Italian thinker and revolutionist, suggests the dynamic participation of both the intellectuals and workers—in the context of this paper, the management and employees. Gramsci's philosophy of praxis involves an attempt to bring "intellectuals and masses together in a cooperative effort of revolution" (Curtis 1981, 219). This is where the collectivity of individuals enters. It is just like building a team and putting the members to work and be in charge with one common goal. Discussing their vision for the organization reinforces the fact that they share aspirations and have much to gain through collaboration (Tjosvold 1991, 80). The importance of a man as change agent in corporate organizations entails human activity and labor consciousness. Human activity is taken to mean that labor and its manifestations are derivative of man's consciousness. The labor-oriented paradigm is a key factor also to realize organization change. For Marcuse (1969, 236-37), labor is defined as "an expression of desire, a lack, and is oriented toward the overcoming of this through creation and appropriation...the means for the development of humankind's 'universal nature'." Thus, labor would mean the emancipation of mankind from a demeaning situation where oppression and exploitation are prevalent. For Gramsci, the collaborative power of mankind is very important and this has to be carried out by intellectuals in society. Gramsci (1971, 8) emphasized the distinction of what intellectual is by asserting that "All men are intellectuals...but not all men have in society the function of intellectuals." The managers are intellectually qualified in the sense that they have attended formal education and rigorous training in their respective fields. The employees, on the other hand, have their own way of being intellectual in the sense corollary with their activities and skills. Both have a certain degree of autonomy but mutually interdependent with each other as far as organizational function is concerned.

The relationship between the intellectuals and the world of production is not directed as it is with the fundamental social groups but is, in varying degrees, "mediated" by the whole fabric of society (in this case, of organizations) and by the complex infrastructures of which the intellectuals are, precisely, the functionaries (Gramsci 1971, 8).

As long as conflict is contained and collaboration has been formally achieved, organization change can be viewed as possible and plausible. The formation of vision and clinging to it for the purpose of achieving end goals is necessary at this point. It should not be compromised. This is a commitment and a responsibility at the same time and thus, in response, both parties must take part on this. The drive for progress arises from a deep human urge—to explore, to create, to discover, to achieve, to change, and to improve (Collins and Poras 1996, 82).

Labor-management conflict solution and intervention

With two contrasting expressions of autonomy and of the prevailing rights they have, organizational conflict could ruin the integrative collaboration. Being stakeholders in the organization with different claims, interests, and motives of their own raises the consequence and risk of divisiveness. In fact, the managers can invoke their management prerogatives or proprietary rights over the employees. The employees on the other hand have the right to self-organization and other rights granted by the government for their welfare and protection against unfair labor practice.

Nevertheless, we must underscore the need to view labor-management conflict in a positive way. Conflict arising from class status, as one asserting power over the other, would be disastrous and disorienting to the organization. However, conflicts that have arisen due to inefficiency of management or its gross abuses against labor could show ways to overcome such undermining power in favor of the labor sector. Once labor is united with one common cause and employees are conscious about their need for self-actualization and emancipation, then there would be room for changing the hegemonic culture pervading within the organization. To close therefore the gap, or to minimize the effects of conflicts between labor and management, certain possibilities must be realized.

Integrative recognition

This perspective has sought to make each class viable for mutual recognition of the contributions each can wage for positive results. The impact of a newly identified problem or discovery or the search for the source of an unexplained difficulty demands that a number of people in a variety of organizations be involved almost simultaneously (Sayles and Chander 1986, 567). The organization in this sense is seen as a community of people having their roles and obligation paralleled and coordinated with each other. In this way, one recognizes then that labor and management can decide on matters affecting the organization without uncertainties and contradictions. Until and unless differences are ameliorated, collaboration between the two will remain impossible. This collective consciousness can and must happen in organizations, otherwise what has been known as class conflict and consequent struggle would always leave an indelible mark.

Communicative action

It is in this area that understanding the other is rather a salient point to consider. Once integrative recognition is in place and mutual acceptance of one another is readily realized, understanding for a common goal would become feasible. In this regard, Jurgen Habermas (1988,139) emphasized the meaning of communicative action wherein:

> ...actors are not at the same time taking part in interactions through which they develop, confirm and renew their memberships in social groups and their own identities. Communicative actions are not processes of interpretation in which cultural knowledge is "tested against the world," they are at the same time processes of social integration and of socialization.

Undoubtedly enough, communicating with each other in organizational context would assume the necessity of knowing and understanding through consensus building. Almost entirely, the value of communicative action is to assimilate continuously each other's notion of attaining comprehensive goals. Habermas in this context is speaking of rational and authentic action towards the attainment of goal through communicative understanding. Labor and management should put up necessary means to attain communicative actions. Only then would that understanding be realized. If they are really to guarantee an essential and permanent community among individuals, they must be based on comprehending and understanding the other (Lind 1985, 262).

Aligning and achieving goals

Authentic collective consciousness that presupposes the cooperation of labor and management is primarily the stepping stone for aligning and achieving organizational goals. The goal should carry out and maintain individual or group (or team) development until it ushers the development of the organization. Alignment of goals in this sequence pacifies contradiction of goals. First and foremost, the individual must know how to be creative in his productive performance. It is like in this regard a creative emancipation of labor. Positively speaking, conflict solution intervention is nonetheless the realization that open-communication, understanding of conflict, and goal-oriented actions are the paragon of human creativity and productivity. Not only that, this creativity makes things for the better man's cognizance of communal action towards achievement and actualization. Again, Marcuse (1991,101) attests that:

> In its idea of pure humanity, affirmative culture took up the historical demand for the general liberation of the individual. If we consider mankind as we know it according to the laws which it embodies, we find nothing higher in man than humanity. This concept is meant to comprise everything that is directed toward man's noble education to reason and freedom... to exercise his powers and acquire a more beautiful and freer enjoyment of life. The highest point which man can attain is a community of free and rational persons in which each has the same opportunity to unfold and fulfill all of his powers.

External catalyst and personnel specialist

The requisite of having an external catalyst is very important in this stage. The critical diagnosis of the general problems existing in the organization would not be complete without someone looking, assessing, evaluating, and facilitating the change effort.

The catalyst must immerse himself/herself in the organization. Interactive communication with all members or representatives in the organization is a thing to be considered. Changing the culture or altering the core-ideology of the organization needs to be weighed in so far as the merit and demerit it might entail. In formal organization development, the presence of an organization development (OD) consultant is vital. However, reconstructing the basic ideas concerning organization development demands the fact that what remains essential and always permeating is the collaborative action of labor and management. The external catalyst only serves as secondary to this end.

The role of the external catalyst is to indoctrinate the essentiality of humanism using a Marxist approach. He must enjoy complete autonomy against the pervasive power relations in the organization being subject for rational change. He stands in the middle when a tough situation occurs between labor and management, in this way serving as arbitrator of the two contending and complimenting forces. He commands respect and holds the echelon of an idealistic leader yet makes a point to meet what is realistic in the end. An external catalyst is a visionary leader capable of yielding affirmative actions among and between organizational collaborators by reforming the organization not entirely resting on his mere hands but absolutely through inculcating the unified and collective consciousness of labor and management.

> OD consultant needs to give out clear messages—that is, the consultant's words and apparent feeling needs to be congruent. The consultant also needs to check on meanings, to suggest optional methods of solving problems, to encourage and support, to give feedback in constructive ways and to accept feedback, to help formulate issues, and to provide a spirit of inquiry. (French and Bell 1995, 280)

However, Michael Armstrong (1996, 276) suggests that in the organization the personnel specialist has the sole function to administer change process. This is part of the corporate internal process. The personnel specialist is quite different from an external catalyst or consultant. The former has already a full grasp of the problems existing in the organization. He belongs in the system and has access to employees' overall sentiments. Personnel specialist is constantly involved in change management process and it could be argued that his/her role as change agent is one of the most important contributions to organizational effectiveness. He is the intermediary between top management and labor and thus it is his responsibility to bridge the widening gaps. Stephen Covey (1989, 207) asserts the need to have a healthy relationship in the company.

> Creating unity necessary to run an effective business or a family...requires great personal strength and courage. No amount of technical administrative skill in laboring for the masses can make up for lack of mobility of personal character in developing relationship. It is at a very essential, one-on-one level, that we live the primary laws of love and life.

Every person in the organization expresses his/her will and personal dedication is properly recognized. It is sealed with mutual respect and understanding. If this is so, human dignity in corporate organizations will be highly regarded and valued by everyone.

Most importantly, the personnel specialist or internal catalyst must be able to make intended changes in the organizations. He must convey the message about the whole process of change management. Without such attempt to clearly disseminate what is being implemented everybody will be confused and be noncommittal.

Labor participation and empowerment

The orthodox Marxist tenet emphasizes the "dictatorship of the proletariat" over the petty regime of the bourgeoisie expressed by Marx in his theories and Vladimir Ilyich Lenin in his revolutionary praxis in Russia. This kind of revolution is typified by overthrowing the bourgeois. Nevertheless, critics' polemical discourses on orthodox Marxism refute the valid praxis of armed struggle to seize back power for the masses. That course of radical action will only create more disparity between two contending classes. It will bring much havoc and chaos in the society. The collapse of communism in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe mirrors the many failures of orthodox Marxism.

There is a need therefore to modify "the dictatorship of the proletariat" in a modern context. The most important principle is to highlight man as the absolute subject in society and in corporate organizations. Human resource should be seen as the most important

resource of all corporate organizations. Furthermore, there is a management theory that exemplifies the collaborative individualism as a management ideology. Like Gramsci's collaboration of the intellectuals and the masses, collaborative individualism is the dominant culture of network organizations that "stresses the need for individuals to work together with others toward a common vision and mission. But it also stresses their emancipation, their freedom from groups, organizations and social institutions (Limerick and Cunnington 1993, 113). A change of human activity expresses one's autonomy and creativity. It has something to do with liberating the personality from a mechanical drudgery. This kind of human activity will usher labor participation and empowerment, which everyone in the organization conforms with. R. E. Kelly (1985, 8) clearly envisions new workers with changed human activity and attitudes:

> These new workers are the gold collar workers, and they hold the key to the future.... Perhaps the most significant difference (between them and white collar and blue collar workers) pertains to the nature of their work and the freedom and flexibility with which they conduct it. They engage in complex problem solving, not bureaucratic drudgery or mechanical routine. They are imaginative and original, not docile and obedient. Their work is challenging, not repetitious, and occurs in an uncertain environment in which results are rarely predictable and quantifiable.

CONCLUSION

It is not impossible to see in the future how labor consciousness will triumph amidst all the bickering banter of trends and strategies for organizational effectiveness. Indeed, the collaborative prowess of labor and management will yield tremendous insights in facing the next millennium. However, we need to consider the conditions that prevail which in effect also hamper the aim to realize positive results. Indeed, it may be through critical analysis that we can value the relevance of humanism in the corporate world.

A labor-oriented paradigm is not for labor groups only, as this paper speaks of mutual cooperation between employees and employers. This paradigm elucidates a purposive cause to understand the other better than what has been in the past. In this respect, corporate organizations are seen before as distinct entities separated from its members. The hierarchical dimension of the power structure indicates an impersonal approach to the human resource. The labor force is considered as one of the productive factors in the organizations' life aside from capital, land, and entrepreneurship. More often than not, labor is included as one of the companies' variable costs. This only shows the repressive stigma that labor equals production and obviously without it any company will not survive.

A labor-oriented paradigm is a mindset for a constructive revolution. The study used Marx to better understand the concept of alienation, emancipation, and proletarian revolt. In this perspective such concepts were applied directly to the current situations in the corporate organizations. Indeed, Marx is much more relevant as far as this study goes. Herbert Marcuse, on the other hand, criticizes advanced industrial society for its reliance on technical rationality. He envisions a society, institutions, or organization to be free from the shackle of technology and mechanization. Man's imaginative and creative personality must outdo this new kind of domination. In the final analysis, he endorses a revolution from within: the psyche. Lastly,

Gramsci pronounces the collaboration of the intellectuals and the masses or the management and employees in the context of this study. The organization must be the place for continuous education and emancipation of people. This revolution, on the other hand, accentuates the coming together of two classes for the common good.

Therefore, it is feasible in this context to relate Marxist humanism, for it applies to the view of making labor and management work for a common goal. The emphasis is on individual development towards the overall development of the organization. Change does not come from thin air, nor does it come from a delivery package. The essence of change itself comes from the individual. The existential experience of man ushers him to view life in general. Thus, even in corporate organizations, the human resources as both management and employees are more important than mere acquisition of profits, dividends, and gains.

In revolutionizing the organizations, any techniques, processes, or strategies will fail without actualizing the individuals and realizing their freedom. With these contentions, humanistic Marxism entails a viable principle for organization change and development. As Limerick and Cunnington (1993, 229) simply puts it: "One of the words deeply associated with the new organization is emancipation... It is built around those who are freed from the paternalistic control of the hierarchy."

NOTES

1. According to Frederick Coplestone (1962, 108), Protagoras, a Greek philosopher, is known for his statement that man is the "measure of all things."

2. This paraphrase refers to the idea of Karl Marx on alienation and repression reflective in the philosophy of Herbert Marcuse (1991).

3. The strategies outlined in this paper are patterned after Richard Beckhard's (1969) OD strategies and common knowledge practices which are discussed and recontextualized here using a humanistic Marxist lens.

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Submitted: 22 June 2013; revised: 19 February 2014

Φιλοσοφια
Volume 15, 2:2014

ST. THOMAS AND RORTY: IS CONVERSATION POSSIBLE?

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Although he did not lengthily critique St. Thomas's philosophy, Richard Rorty tagged him along with Plato as a foundationalist thinker, *i.e., someone who is preoccupied with underlying principles or ultimate standards of truth. It is unfortunate, however, that Rorty's sweeping critique is obviously based on superficial and inadequate reading of the Dominican saint. Marie-Dominique Chenu, a less known yet very serious Thomist scholar, has shown that the mode of argumentation in the thought of St. Thomas has an underlying conversational goal. In other words, St.Thomas's method of rational inquiry is not divisive but collaborative which is highlighted by the effort to reconcile initially opposing views by means of the intellectual tool of distinction, a tool which Rorty himself employed in dealing with criticisms hurled against his apparently nihilistic neopragmatic thought. St. Thomas consistently employed the tool of distinction* in disputatio, *or argumentation with the goal of pursuing collaboration with different thinkers whether they are Christians or Muslims, pagans or believers, in the pursuit of truth.*

INTRODUCTION

In his encyclical *Fides et ratio*, the late Pope John Paul II (1998, #91 and #55) has observed that "our age has been termed by some thinkers the age of 'postmodernity'." He expressed alarm that this is a nihilistic movement insofar as it advocates a philosophy of life devoid of all meaning, of certitude, and of lasting values. In fact, one could find in the early part of this encyclical some noticeable references to postmodernist philosophy with related observations, namely, that "...some philosophers have abandoned the search for truth in itself..." and that there is a "...deep-seated distrust of reason which has surfaced in the most recent development of much of philosophical research, to the point where there is talk at times of 'the end of metaphysics'."

In the face of what he deemed as the nihilistic thinking of postmodernist philosophy, the late Pope John Paul II (1998, #106) has appealed to all Christian thinkers, namely, theologians and philosophers alike, to courageously recover metaphysical truth and authentic wisdom. With respect to this crucial task of the intellectual leaders of the Church, the pope (1998, #44) also saw the continuing value of theological and philosophical

teachings of St.Thomas whom he considered as deserving to be called an "apostle of the truth" (*cf.* Pope Paul VI 1974, 8). Giving esteem to the thought of St.Thomas as a model for the renewal of philosophical inquiries on being and truth, the late Pope John Paul II (1998, #s 43 and 78) deemed it timely to insist on the study of his works.

Against this background of the call of the late Pope John Paul II not only to renew interest in the study of philosophy, especially the Christian tradition of philosophical speculation, but also to confront the challenges of postmodernist thought, how could the Thomist respond to this task? "What are the basic possible types of relationship between Thomistic philosophy and the other main philosophical currents today?" Norris Clarke (1992, 97-98), a contemporary American Neo-Thomist, suggested four ways, namely: (1) peaceful but competitive co-existence, (2) positive complementarity and collaboration, (3) border disputes, and (4) total warfare. What I would like to explore and to examine is the possibility of complementarity and collaboration between St.Thomas and Richard Rorty whose "postmodernist"[1] philosophy has recently excited my other field of scholarship although the philosophical theology of the former is the principal area of my research interest.

CONVERSATIONAL VS. THOMISTIC PHILOSOPHY

If we rely on Rorty's own claims, it seems impossible to hold a conversation between him and St.Thomas. For, he (1979, 317; see also 1998, 171-85) categorically identifies himself as an antifoundationalist thinker while he classifies the latter, together with Plato and Immanuel Kant, as foundationalist philosophers. He (1979, 3-4, 7, 131-32, 138-39, 377; see also 1998, 171-80; 1982, xv) tells us that philosophy is foundational in the sense of providing the underlying principles or justifications for all claims to truth by science, morality, religion, and by the other areas of culture. In this connection, when he (1979, 392 and 9) alleges that the philosopher's "...voice always has an overriding claim on the attention of the other participants in the conversation," or refers to philosophy as an "all-encompassing discipline" and as providing "The one right description" (1989, 40) in the understanding of human existence, these observations express his radical perception that the voice of foundational thought dominates and controls discourse. And when he (1979, 377) further claims that there are "...attempts to close off conversation by proposals for universal commensuration..." he is convinced of the necessary connection between the prescription of universal criteria and the impossibility of conversation. In concrete terms, his position could be seen as an articulation of the continuing attempt of one culture, in particular the Western culture, to dominate the rest of global cultures.[2]

Since Rorty is convinced that the preoccupation of foundationalist thinkers with universal principles and rational standards in the validation of knowledge-claims is a hindrance to conversation, he must equally accuse them, including St.Thomas, of proclaiming their position as occupying an unsurpassable supremacy and of demanding unconditional conformity of all other participants in the debate to this allegedly superior view. Let us point out, however, that this major allegation against St.Thomas and other foundationalist philosophers as "enemies of conversation" might be viewed as gratuitous by scholars of the so-called foundational philosophies since it is not adequately supported by what Rorty (1989, 8 and 49) himself steadfastly refuses to offer: rational arguments.

On the other hand, Rorty (1979, 318-19, 372,378, 389-94) proposes the thinking of philosophy as conversational. But what is his view of "conversation" which could not be

reconciled with what he identifies as foundationalist thinking such as the metaphysical thought of St.Thomas? Let us initially point out that Rorty acknowledges his adherence and allegiance to Habermas's key notion of "communicative reason" which he redescribes in terms of "incommensurable conversation" or a philosophical discourse which does not depend at all on rational norms. And although he (1989, 67) parts ways with Habermas (1990, 20; cf. Rorty 1979, 317) due to the latter's insistence on the rationality and universality of communication and on the role of the philosopher as the "guardian of rationality," Rorty (1989, 67; see also 2001, 153) consistently disagrees with the criticism that his thought bears major differences from the philosophical views of Habermas.

With his rejection of argumentation and rational discourse, we find Rorty (1989, 52, 67, and 84) associating "conversation" with "free and open encounter" or with "undistorted communication," or with "freedom from domination." But in view of his refusal to link his own version of philosophical conversation with norms of reason it might be futile to ask Rorty for guidelines in order to determine what constitutes domination-free and undistorted conversation. In fact, he confesses that there is scarcely anything to be added about undistorted and free discussion. Nonetheless, he notes that this sort of domination-free discourse could arise in a political environment where democratic institutions are in place.

Against this background, what are the chances of conversation between Rorty and St.Thomas?

POSSIBILITY OF CONVERSATION

In exploring their teachings, I believe that the following are possible areas of conversation between Rorty and Aquinas: St.Thomas's voice in conversation, conversation in argumentation, the role of the method of distinction in conversation, and conversational rationality.

Aquinas's voice in conversation

Rorty (1979, 391) himself acknowledges that Plato has started the conversation in philosophy which has attracted many participants from various historical epochs. And, although he endorses the continuation of this conversation, Rorty makes a distinction between philosophy as simply one of the voices in the conversation and philosophy as traditionally viewed, i.e., as the leading exponent of rational investigation.

Now, if philosophy could participate in a "domination-free conversation," Rorty demands that it should undergo a metamorphosis in its image. In other words, it must shed off its foundational identity by abandoning any inquiry into such Platonic notions like being, truth, and the good whose examination has dominated mainstream Western philosophy. Hence, Rorty suggests a radical shift in the tradition of conversation which has so far followed the path of argumentation.

Now, this distinction that Rorty makes on two opposing identities of philosophy is significant since it will enable us to see whether St.Thomas could not participate in a conversation or he could be considered as one of the various voices. In this connection, we need to confront Rorty's allegation that Aquinas is a foundationalist philosopher. Let us initially point out that St.Thomas (1964, I-II, 94, 2; I, 2, 1; *cf.* I, 79, 8; 79, 9; I, 79, 12; I-II, 57, 2; I-II, 66, 5 ad 4) himself has spoken of *principia per se nota*, namely, either the *principia*

prima demonstrationum of theoretical reason or the *prima praecepta legis naturalis* of practical reason. And he (1964, I-II, 94, 2; see also I-II, 57, 2; 57, 2 ad 1; 66, 5 ad 4) categorically declared in the same place that these first principles of demonstration and the first precepts of the natural law ground all the other principles both of theoretical reason and of practical reason, respectively. Furthermore, what appears to be a telling indication of the foundational character of St.Thomas's thought is his position in his treatise on virtues that wisdom, which deals on the ultimate and highest principles, judges all the sciences.

I think that Rorty does not misread St.Thomas if his conviction that the latter is a foundational thinker refers only to the abovementioned teaching on the *principia per se nota* which serves as ultimate grounds of knowledge through demonstration. But it would be to read more to attribute to St.Thomas the pejorative connotation of foundational thinking as involving the "overriding domination" of philosophical knowledge over all other areas of thinking. For when Aquinas taught that wisdom "judges all knowledge by means of first principles" this view could be given an appropriate reading within the theme in relation to which it has been raised in many occasions (see Pegis 1945, vols. I-II). Let us now dwell on this point.

St.Thomas's (1964, I-II, 57, 2) discussion of the so-called *principia per se nota* or the self-evident first principles is, I think, best examined in his treatise on the virtues of the theoretical intellect. We learn here that truth is either known through itself (*per se notum*) or through another (*notum per aliud*). Those truths that are known through themselves or immediately known by the intellect are considered as first principles ("Something cannot simultaneously be existent and non-existent," "A whole is greater than any of its parts," etc.) while those truths that are known through another by means of rational inquiry are viewed as conclusions. Now, in considering these *per se nota* truths as universal first principles, it was very far from the mind of St.Thomas to "attempt to close off conversation," and much less to dictate his knowledge claim on his counterpart thinkers or on the other voices of conversation. For the affirmation of the universality of the *principia per se nota* was a declaration of Aquinas that there are certain truths which the human mind easily understands. This insight, in fact, is not original to him but he (1964, I-II, 94, 2) learned it through his "conversation" with Aristotle and Anicius Boethius. Hence our review in this section of St.Thomas's teachings on *principia per se nota* discloses to us, at least, that the saint did not exclusively consider the said principles as normative standards of knowledge claims.

In fact, the texts which have been consulted above indicate that what was repeatedly referred to by Aquinas is the character of these first principles as "truths immediately understood by the human intellect." Now, what is significant about this view of the saint is that it is an expression of his great confidence in the capacity of the human mind to know the truth. And he proclaimed this confidence on behalf of all men. And yet this confidence is balanced by his equally unequivocal teaching that there are also many truths that are not immediately and easily understood by the human mind but are known through the difficult and long process of rational investigation. And it is in relation to these truths whether pertinent to the sciences or to wisdom that conversation is necessary. A showcase of conversation already practiced by Aquinas (1957, I, ch. 7, # 1; *cf.* 1964, I 1,1 and I-II, 66, 5 ad 3) took the form of his advocacy of the dialogue between reason and faith in connection with the most difficult yet the most important truths for man, namely, the truths about God.

Our reflection then on St.Thomas's teachings on *principia per se nota*, or, what are sometimes referred to as universal principles, should not impress on us upon careful study

that they entail a declaration of a dominant position or an overriding voice by the philosophical theologian. Aquinas himself has clearly recognized that science and wisdom, both of which refer to difficult attempts to gain truth, depend on collaboration or conversation either with their living colleagues or with the great thinkers of the past through their works. In this sense, there is also a definite awareness that his individual effort, including those of his critics, constitute a single voice in the collaborative project of domination-free pursuit of truth. Hence to speak of wisdom is not only to refer to ultimate principles whose true character as *principia per se nota* should not be overlooked but also to implicit reference to the call for collaboration especially in the effort to know the highest truth.

This present reference to truths which are not *per se nota* but known through rational inquiry leads us to the next point which expresses our next claim that St.Thomas has engaged in conversation in spite of the appearance of inquiry and argumentation.

Conversation in argumentation

Let us at the outset point out that St.Thomas's advocacy of conversation in thinking is illustrated by his own life of research and scholarship. His writings clearly portray the dominant trait of his thought as tantamount to what Rorty (1979, 317-18) considers as the appropriate role of the philosopher today, i.e., as a "Socratic intermediary" or an advocate of philosophy as conversation. In a sense, his thought could be viewed as partaking of the character of Socratic dialogue. We may initially note in support of the above thesis that St.Thomas's background as a believer in God did not hinder him from opening his mind to pagan and ancient Greek thinkers like Plato and Aristotle. Furthermore, we may refer to his extensive researches on the thoughts of certain Muslim and Jewish philosophical thinkers as a stronger demonstration of his disposition for nondiscriminating dialogue in thinking. And his unbiased disposition has also guided St.Thomas in his collaboration with other groups of thinkers even if they happen to be religious writers like the Fathers of the Church or philosophical thinkers of the pre-Medieval period like Boethius and Pseudo-Dionysius.

If we turn our attention now to his major writings we might initially get the impression that his mode of thinking has no room for conversation. If one were to look only at the literary structure of the *summas* and the *quaestiones disputatae* one might initially think that the style of writing is an embodiment of an argumentative rationality. In reading the *Summa theologiae*, for instance, it might surprise the modern reader that it "...is not made up of chapters, but of articles" (see Chenu 1964, 93). And the structure of the article is such that there is an appearance of a debate between St. Thomas and other thinkers. This is so because the article begins with a question which is immediately followed by the usual number of three objections, then by the main body of explanation, and ends with the replies to the objections (see Pegis 1945, I-II). Hence, this main work of St. Thomas could be misconstrued as evidence that the saint was the foremost advocate of intellectual confrontation rather than of conversation.

However, in his excellent introduction to the thought of St. Thomas, Marie-Dominique Chenu (1964, 94-95) carefully clarified that the medieval notion of "objection" as reflected in most works of the saint should not be confused with the modern understanding of the same notion. The modern conception of "objection" refers to the medieval notion of *obviatio* which signifies resistance against a contrary argument. "The medieval 'objection,' on the contrary, was in reference to the open quest of a problem's intelligibility, *in-ducere rationes*."

Objectio as *inducere rationes* or "to bring in reasons" is not aimed at a plain rejection of a contrary position. The pro and con arguments are not intended to oppose one another but, in spite of their apparent opposition, are united in the pursuit of a satisfactory clarification of the issue in question. St. Thomas's mode of thinking in the summas and even in the *quaestiones disputatae* is neither designed nor is it focused on the dismissal of any contrary position. What we notice in the said works is that he frequently employed the tool of distinction not only to clarify but also to point out the contribution of his counterpart thinker in the pursuit of truth. In fact, his own experience as a classroom teacher has demonstrated his dialogical disposition to other points of view even if they are not consonant with his own position.[3]

I think that Rorty should reassess his opposition to rational inquiry and argumentation. For argumentation and conversation need not exclude one another. In fact, he (see 1991b, 39) impresses on us that it is part of "conversational disposition" that we "...listen to as many suggestions and *arguments*..." clearly suggesting that doctrinal disputes between thinkers is not devoid of the intellectual trait of openness. On the other hand, we have seen above that St.Thomas's method of rational inquiry is not divisive but collaborative which is highlighted by the effort to reconcile initially opposing views by means of the intellectual tool of distinction. And, as we shall see, Rorty himself makes use of this tool of distinction in many occasions. But, at present, it is important to note that he himself is frequently engaged in doctrinal disputes with his critics. To me, this is at least evident in a book written in his honor and whose subtitle, "Critical dialogues" (Fertenstein and Thompson 2001), buttresses my abovementioned claim of the blending of conversation and argumentation. Out of common curiosity, one might ask whether Rorty in his response to all the essays, both critical and sympathetic, is engaged in conversation with the authors in the sense of what he calls "domination-free communication," or is simply argumentative in defense of his views.

While it is plausible to assume that Rorty would consider himself to take the path of conversation in his discourses it is also evident in his works, including the above-mentioned book on "critical discourses," that he cannot completely set aside an argumentative posture if only to defend and clarify his iconoclastic viewpoints. For instance, it is a fact that his first major work, *Philosophy and the mirror of nature*, has stirred probably unparalleled number of reviews (see Fertenstein and Thompson 2001, 1) ranging from the relatively critical to the polemical. And his subsequent writings demonstrate, to a great extent, his efforts not only to further clarify but also to defend his very controversial positions.[4] But one could also observe in the same works his frequent use of the tool of distinction for the said purposes. This, I believe, is another vital point which could be explored in order to open another area of possible conversation and collaboration between him and St.Thomas.

METHOD OF DISTINCTION AS A MODE OF CONVERSATION

It is unfortunate that Chenu (1964, 173-76), who provided us great assistance in our understanding of the mode of thinking of St.Thomas, failed to point out any dialogical value in the rational tool of distinction. There is always the risk of viewing this method as nothing but a part of rational analysis which tends to fragment the unity and wholeness of things for the sake of gaining precision of meaning. I think, however, that the texts do not always point to this goal of thinking. In fact, in an earlier section of his book where he examined how

St.Thomas has constructed his thoughts through the literary form of an article, Chenu (1964, 95) himself made the following insightful observation:

> The master's answer to those of the proposed arguments that, in one part (sometimes in both parts) of the alternative, do not agree with the position he has just stated are usually *given in the form of a distinction, since rarely is the opposing position simply rejected.* Rather *the master marks off upon what share of truth this position is founded.*

It is clear in this passage that Chenu has come up with an interpretation of the thought construction of St.Thomas which, I think, is tantamount to an affirmation not of the traditional link between the method of distinction and confrontational argumentation but rather of a connection between the method of distinction and collaboration. The method of distinction as employed by Aquinas does not aim primarily to secure the most precise meaning of a notion under consideration. Now, if Chenu's abovementioned reading of the texts of Aquinas is accurate, it helps us bring out the more important role of this rational tool as infused by the saint: to recognize, to affirm, and even to support the valuable contribution of one's counterpart thinker in the *disputatio*. Most of all, it discloses an exemplary disposition of St.Thomas if a *disputatio* is properly viewed as an opportunity for collaboration to understand truths which are not *per se nota*. This disposition is none other than the honest desire to call upon the other thinker for cooperation rather than to compete with his intellectual strength in argumentation.

Chenu's undeveloped reference to the link between the method of distinction and collaboration in inquiry into truths which are not self-evident can be exploited by turning to the texts of St.Thomas (1964, I, 2, 1). A good example is his use of this rational tool particularly on the position of St.Anselm that the proposition on God's existence is a self-evident truth or *per se notum*.[5] A purely analytical reading of the distinction between what is "self-evident in itself and to us" and what is "evident in itself but not to us" might impress on us that St.Thomas (1964, I, 84, 5) was simply concerned to show the failure of St. Anselm to unearth the nuances of the notion of *per se notum*. But, in following and exploiting Chenu's study, we may view St.Thomas's employment of the method of distinction as equally involving his personal disposition to try to reconcile his position with the contrary view. In view of this personal disposition, he was able to establish the relative validity of St.Anselm's major insight that divine existence is self-evident if it is "considered in itself." And, in a sense, we could say that he even supported St.Anselm by pointing out that his position is tantamount to an affirmation of probably the most profound metaphysical insight: that God's essence is to exist.

It is paradoxical that it is in the context of *disputatio* that we could discern and draw the spirit of dialogue and collaboration as the true disposition of St.Thomas in spite of the argumentative format of the construction of his thoughts. We only need to recall our observation above that it is in connection with truths which could only be known through rational investigation because they are not *per se nota* that Aquinas advocated and promoted the conversational or social character of knowledge. And the *Summa theologiae* clearly exemplifies his constant collaboration or conversation both with theologians and philosophers.

Now, Rorty in many occasions also makes use of the method of distinction in his various writings as he clarifies or defends his views, beliefs, and convictions against his critics, and even reconciles them with their contrary views. For instance, he (1982, xiv-xvii)

makes a distinction in an earlier work between the traditional, specialized, and foundationalist sense of philosophy associated with Plato and Kant and what is equivalent to the pragmatic sense which entails the rejection of the notions of Truth, Goodness, and Rationality. In other works, he (1998, 6-7, 71-72, 186-89; 1982, 49, 52, 84; 1991b, 35-37) also distinguishes the different senses by which terms like culture, rationality, objectivity, criteria, and method could be used.

Our main interest, however, at this stage is to explore Rorty's employment of the tool of distinction insofar as it involves attempts on his part to establish some agreement between him and the thinkers with whom he is presumably engaged in conversation. This concern brings us to the fourth possible area of dialogue between him and St.Thomas.

CONVERSATIONAL RATIONALITY

What is equally promising in our attempt to explore the possibility of conversation between Rorty and Aquinas is the former's acknowledgment that the notion of reason or rationality has other meanings than the usual meaning that he consistently tries to debunk. If he (1979, 7, 271-72, 317) seeks to weaken our continuing trust in the image of the traditional philosopher as "the guardian of rationality" it is mainly because Rorty (1991b, 36; 1989, 49) considers his rationality as foundational, as normative or methodical, i.e., as imposing absolute criteria. He interprets this sort of rationality, as we have already noted, as radically obstructing conversation.

However, Rorty (1991b, 37; italics supplied) clarifies by means of his distinction of the different senses of rationality that there is, what we may call, "conversational rationality." In his work, *Objectivity, relativism, and truth*, he speaks not only of methodical or criteria-prescriptive rationality but also of rationality as referring to "...*a set of moral virtues*: tolerance, respect for the opinions of those around one, willingness to listen, reliance on persuasion rather than force." And he (1991b, 39; *cf.* Aquinas 1964, I-II, 60, 1) immediately expresses in the same place, his rejection of Thomistic reason seen as dominating and controlling these moral virtues. In his other work, *Truth and progress*, he (1998, 186-87) distinguishes three senses of rationality and, if we focus on the second sense of rationality as involving tolerance and persuasion, then Rorty is clearly faithful to the meaning of conversational rationality that we noted in the former work.

We may view this fourth point as an extension of our elaboration of the third point namely, on the connection between the rational tool of distinction and what Rorty calls "conversation." And what is initially significant in linking this fourth area of conversation to the third point is that it supports our position that we can see similar effort in both St.Thomas and Rorty to reconcile their positions with their critics through the method of distinction. But far more significant is Rorty's observation which appears to reaffirm the vital role of personal disposition, we already mentioned, in conversation. I am referring here to his description of nonmethodical and conversational rationality in terms of what he calls "moral virtues" such as persuasion, tolerance, respect for others' opinion, and willingness to listen. We can see in this meaning of rationality a very positive development in Rorty's advocacy and promotion of conversation. For this affirmation and preference of rationality in terms of "moral virtues" over methodical rationality impresses on us that what is probably paramount for Rorty when one is engaged in "reasonable"[6] conversation are the abovementioned personal moral qualities rather than the argumentative skills of the

individuals involved. Hence, in coming up with this new meaning of rationality, Rorty certainly views conversation as involving a certain level of "intersubjectivity,"[7] which should be generated and sustained by what Rorty prefers to call "moral virtues" or what I view as personal moral traits. In this sense, conversation is not only a case of "domination-free communication" but it is also an occasion of interpersonal interaction.

Rorty's redescription of rationality as consisting of certain "moral virtues," together with his rejection of the regulative role of reason, leads us to the consideration now of St.Thomas's thoughts on rationality in the context of his teachings on virtues. It is initially relevant to recall, following St.Thomas's teachings, that to pursue truth and to engage in *disputatio* do not necessarily involve the domination of the opposing thinkers (see Rorty 1998, 7-10).

Now, if we turn to his treatise on virtues, St.Thomas (1964, I-II, 63, 2; 64, 1-3; 65, 1) has given us a portrait of reason as, on the one hand, occupying a principal position and ,on the other hand, as dependent on other faculties of man. It is paradoxical that even in its role as the normative principle of good actions reason could not fulfill such role independently but it is rather tied up with the habits of good will or with moral virtues.[8] What we see here is a clear affirmation of the interconnection or mutual dependence between reason and the rationally guided faculties of desire and emotions. But the key clarification here, against the background of Rorty's allegation against Thomistic conception of reason, is that reason in the ethical domain is both directive and subordinate.

In fact, St.Thomas (1964, I-II, 58, 2) further clarified that the relation between reason and the nonrational faculties is unlike the relation between the soul and the body. Adopting the position of Aristotle, he used the metaphor of "despotic rule" to describe the absolute control of the soul over the body while he clarified the relation of reason to the faculties of desire through the metaphor of "political rule." In other words, since it is indispensable to the meaning of "political rule" that the governed citizens are free and that they even have the right to oppose the ruler, we have a clear illustration of the "political character" of the regulative activity of reason in the ethical sphere. It should follow then from this analogy that St.Thomas could be said to have provided us here with a nondominating portrait of reason. As a corollary, we may attribute the following view to St.Thomas, namely, that reason, *sui generis*, cannot assume a dominant or dictatorial posture.

What we tried to establish above is that St.Thomas never conceived of reason as engaged in domination in its activity of regulation. In this sense, it could be said to be in principle consonant with Rorty's project of domination-free discussion in spite of the latter's misgivings about regulative reason. But what we have achieved so far is to clear up the position of St.Thomas on the regulative task of ethical reason. Let us further attempt to show in this next stage of our exploratory study whether, apart from avoiding the negative role of obstruction of conversation, Thomistic rationality could contribute positively not only to the possibility but also to the promotion of conversation in civilized society which, for Rorty (1991b, 37), could remain stable and secure only if the rationality of moral virtues affect the relationship of its members.

Let us begin with a background restudy of St.Thomas's (1964, I-II, 56, 3) teachings on the relation between theoretical reason and ethical or practical reason in terms of the interconnection between the intellectual virtues and moral virtues in order to bring out his positive views on the conversation of citizens in the society. A principal lesson in this treatise is that the moral virtues are more important to acquire as personal traits than the

intellectual virtues. In other words, although it is beneficial both to the individual and to the community to acquire excellence in science or in wisdom, and to have skills in practical art or literary art these are not decisive in the conversational progress of society unless the members are also good men. In fact, since there is permanent risk of abuse associated with the virtues of theoretical reason, the moral virtues of ethical reason are necessary to forestall the misuse of the said excellent abilities. It is a noteworthy insight, then, of our review here of Thomistic rationality in his treatise on virtues that theoretical reason, which is commonly employed to examine metaphysical truths, is subordinate to ethical reason in order to have direction towards the good of society.

Now, I think that a much better project of conversation in society than the one proposed by Rorty is St.Thomas's (1938, I, ch. 14) advocacy of what we may call as "solidarity in goodness." This project is none other than the very goal of the members of society to lead a morally virtuous life. In this connection, we could dwell now on the collaboration of theoretical reason and ethical reason through their respective cultivation of intellectual virtues and moral virtues. This collaboration is exemplified primarily when ethical reason actually guides and directs the activities of theoretical reason (see St. Thomas 1964, I-II, 57, 1). In other words, St.Thomas's teachings on the integration of intellectual virtues and moral virtues constitute his articulation of the life of men in society who are moved by good will in sharing their superior intelligence and acquired skills, i.e., either as lawyers, medical doctors, engineers, or as teachers to their fellowmen.

In the context of conversation, to do good to others is definitely more than being tolerant, or persuasive, or even respectful of the opinion of others. If we wish to enrich the meaning of conversation, it must transcend having only those traits that are necessary for the so-called "free and open communication" of views and convictions. For instance, to be just or to be generous is a case of benevolent sharing of one's outstanding talents or acquired superior skills. And yet it is also, perhaps it is more, an implicit invitation to the beneficiary to engage in mutual goodwill, in a continuing call for moral conversation. In this sense, the promotion of conversation in society can move to the direction of solidarity in goodness initially among certain sectors in society,[9] and eventually to more groups and communities nationwide. I think that this elevation of the meaning of conversation can support and enhance what, in the end, Rorty envisions not only among thinkers but for all mankind.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Against the background of the late Pope John Paul II's alarm over the postmodernist threat to Catholic thought and his corresponding appeal to return to the thought of St.Thomas, I chose one of the four approaches recommended by W. Norris Clarke, namely, to explore possible collaboration and complementarity between the Dominican saint and Rorty. My present study has, so far, focused on four possible areas of "conversation" between the two thinkers, namely, (1) the voice of Aquinas as a participant in conversation, (2) the reality of conversation *in disputatio*, (3) a new reading of the rational tool of distinction as a mode of conversation, and (4) the possibility of complementarity between Thomistic rationality and conversational rationality.

Now, our review of certain treatises of St.Thomas, together with consultation of Thomist scholars against the background of the possibility of his conversation with Rorty, leads us to insightful disclosures. The first is that the reference of St.Thomas to the *principia per se*

nota or universal first principles is not so much an affirmation of universal criteria to be imposed on knowers of truth but a declaration of confidence in the capacity of the human mind to immediately grasp certain truths. Second, collaboration or cooperation is necessary in the case of truths that are *nota per alia* or truths which are difficult to gain as in the case of the sciences and wisdom. This indicates that Aquinas has also affirmed the limitation of human reason in its individual condition to attain either science or wisdom. Third, conversation in the sense of collaboration is not mutually exclusive with argumentation. For, against the background of the limited capacity of individual reason and this is true also to the rational faculty of the Angelic Doctor, St.Thomas has constantly consulted many thinkers even if they are pagan or Muslim philosophers, including those thinkers with views contrary to his teachings for the sake of gaining clarity on difficult ethical and metaphysical topics. Fourth, we may highlight the paradox of the rational tool of distinction: on the one hand, it ordinarily gives the impression of establishing a gap between the contenders in a *disputatio* but, on the other hand, it could be shown to possess the unexposed greater dialogical value, or an open-minded effort to acknowledge the contribution of the other party in conversation in the struggle to gain understanding of the more difficult but important truths. Fifth, St.Thomas's treatise on virtues reveals the nondominant in spite of the regulative and directive function of human reason in its ethical or practical function. And finally, we reinterpreted St.Thomas's claim on the goal of human society to pursue a life of moral virtues as a better expression of conversation. A truly stable society entails the solidarity in goodness of its members.

It is not unlikely that Rorty may consider most, if not all, of my claims as implausible in relation to his vision of a less ambitious conversation of mankind. Nonetheless, I must declare that it is to his great credit that the theme of conversation which he advocates unrelentingly already constitutes a great virtue which all thinkers should aim to gain as a personal trait whether or not they could theoretically agree with one another. I am convinced that he and St.Thomas equally value solidarity or relative communion among men even if they have diverse beliefs and philosophical convictions. It is in this context that I find lasting merit with the following observation that Rorty (1979, 378) consistently raises: "to see keeping a conversation going as a sufficient aim of philosophy, to see wisdom as consisting in the ability to sustain a conversation...."

NOTES

1. Although he eventually avoids referring to his thought as postmodern, Rorty (1991a, II, 1) admits that he has "...sometimes used 'postmodern' [him]self, in the rather narrow sense defined by Jean-François Lyotard (1984) as 'distrust of metanarratives'."

2. We may use as an illustration the accusation of another American writer, Samuel Huntington (1996, 183-206), who claims in his best-selling though controversial book that "Western universalism," or the imperialistic imposition of Western culture and values on non-Western societies, is one of the main causes of global conflicts.

3. A report of classroom incident involving Brother Thomas, as a young instructor, and Brother John of Pizano, of the Order of the Friars Minor, who attended his *disputatio* session in Paris took note of the latter's use of hostile language in expressing his opposing view to which the young Dominican brother patiently listened and even employed the "language of humility" in his reply (see Chenu 1964, 89, fn. 19).

4. See in particular Rorty's (1998, 153-57) response to Richard Shusterman. See also his (1998, 171-75) response to Norman Geras. His (1998, 67-76) argumentative stance is also clear in an essay in another work on John Searle's realism and relativism.

5. See St. Thomas (1964, I, 2, 1). Another pertinent example is St.Thomas's (1964, I, 84, 5) use of the tool of distinction to reconcile his position with the view of St.Augustine on the notion of divine illumination.

6. This is his preferred sense of the term "rational" insofar as he (1991b, 37) is still willing to use it.

7. Rorty (1998, 6-7, 72; 1979, 188) asserts in more than one occasion that "intersubjectivity" should be the appropriate meaning of objectivity and the source of authority in knowledge claims during conversation.

8. St.Thomas (1964, I-II, 58, 4-5) categorically taught that the key virtue of the practical intellect, namely *prudence*, could not be gained unless one also has moral virtues of the will and emotions such as justice, courage, and moderation. The reverse also holds true.

9. In our country, for instance, *Gawad Kalinga* (literal translation: "to bestow care") could be considered as a noteworthy example of this moral conversation or solidarity in goodness. The students and faculty of Ateneo de Manila University, through its Jesuit president, has linked with business professionals to build low-cost housing for thousands of very poor Filipino families. *Gawad Kalinga* has become a nationwide project of moral conversation between educators, students, professionals, and the marginalized families.

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Submitted: 14 February 2012; revised:2 February 2014

Φιλοσοφια
Volume 15, 2:2014

JÜRGEN HABERMAS ON THE VALUE OF RELIGION

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Civilization is now more than ever bombarded with the rapid innovation and technological development of all nations, which threatens to dislodge religious and moral traditions. Jürgen Habermas, a staunch defender of Critical Theory, has a very distinct philosophical position that theology is bound to come to grips with it. Theologians would argue that moral life with its wide range of exclusions and virtues is of necessity grounded in a God, who is a transcendent entity. Failing such grounding, humanity is susceptible to secular relativism that, by its very nature, weakens the moral fabric of society. What is the role of religion in postmodernist society?

This article is a critical meta-analysis of what Habermas has to say on the matter. This article thus provides a critique of Habermas's views on religion and the role of religion particularly in the public sphere. It is noticeable that Habermas has a different view with Immanuel Kant in that religion is not philosophical in nature, but rather involves a very unique and private matter of faith in a God.

INTRODUCTION

Jürgen Habermas, renowned atheist of the post-Marxist left, a socio-political theorist, and Germany's most influential living philosopher, has much to say concerning the cultural legacy of Christianity. As he says (2002, 148-49):

> For the normative self-understanding of modernity, Christianity has functioned as more than just a precursor or catalyst. Universalistic egalitarianism, from which sprang the ideals of freedom and a collective life in solidarity, the autonomous conduct of life and emancipation, the individual morality of conscience, human rights and democracy, is the direct legacy of the Judaic ethic of justice and the Christian ethic of love. This legacy, substantially unchanged, has been the object of a continual critical reappropriation and reinterpretation. Up to this very day there is no alternative to it. And in light of the current challenges of a post-national constellation, we must draw sustenance now, as in the past, from this substance. Everything else is idle postmodern[1] talk.

Habermas (2004, 46-47), in a paper "The pre-political foundations of the democratic constitutional state?" begins by stating that there is no neutral basis upon which any society can be built. Every society is founded on some type of either religious or ethical basis.

He defines religion along the lines of traditional worldviews or robust traditions that introduce certain claims to truth which are based on, for example, moral principles and cosmological ideas about human salvation that are not easily accessible to people who doubt them. Religion is thus an authoritative bonder of peoples and society in general as well as a source of meaning for individuals/groups. It does, however, tend to support certain interests and often clashes with scientific reason and diverse ethical and cultural standpoints.

Habermas, a firm believer in the notion of rationally formed moral values, also asserts that social behaviour which was not in line with his idea of democratic reform has irrational causes. Critical Theory, as Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno (2003, 94-137) elaborate in *Dialectic of enlightenment*, is a conflict of ideas which concerns the ultimate foundation of what they describe as *"social domination,"* whereas what is sought is emancipation and freedom. This approach was based on Marxism and was an amalgam of philosophical and social-scientific techniques. As a member of the Frankfurt School of critical theory, along with *inter alia,* Adorno, Herbert Marcuse and Walter Benjamin, Habermas does not believe in value neutrality. He (1981, 38-39) believes that modernity is an "unfinished project" with many flaws and demanding attention. Where there is a structured pursuit of knowledge or *Wissenschaften,* which does not expose bourgeois exploitation of public opinion, it is to be rejected. His didactic approach to evaluating facts is not however informed by a universally accepted typology of reasoning or even liberalism for that matter. He is opposed to independent thinking and believes that the notion of an incarnate divine power unavoidably involves heteronomy, and this idea is diametrically opposed to the modern concept of human autonomy. Any dogmatic in the contemporary perspective must, therefore, be atheistic in nature. Habermas (2002, 160) reflects: "[A] philosophy that oversteps the bounds of methodological atheism loses its philosophical seriousness."

Horkheimer and Adorno (2003, 66-67) explained that "moral teachings of the Enlightenment bear witness to the hopelessness of attempting to replace enfeebled religion by an intellectual motive for enduring within society when material interest no longer suffices..." Habermas promoted enlightenment reason and inhabited a postmetaphysical contemporaneity. Within this he dissects the discursive space occupied by religion and philosophy metaphysically.

Habermas is positive on the issue of religion in its Judaeo-Christian tradition, for purely utilitarian reasons. To him, whether it is truth or fallacy is irrelevant, what is important is the social usefulness of religion. Religion is in a sense a cement which binds society morally. Such a notion depends on the belief of people in a supernatural being called God. If people do not believe in God, the utility of religion ceases. Habermas also believes that transcendence[2] emanates from "within" our language and from the world that is unique for every person. He (2002, 108) states: "Postmetaphysical thought differs from religion in that it recovers the meaning of the unconditional [i.e., the non-contingent, the transcendent] without recourse to God or an Absolute."

Habermas has generally promoted neo-Marxist theories in his philosophies. In recent times, however, his stance on religion *per se* has undergone a series of changes. Up until the

early 1980s, he considered religion to be a tool which estranged people and allowed them to be controlled by those who were more powerful. He believed that religion would vanish as society became more fixed on a communicative rationality in which there would be no place for traditional irrational fantasies, such as belief in a transcendent God. From about 1986-2000, Habermas only considered religion from a sociological point of view and he paid scant attention to the positive and formative role of religion in both the private and public domains and he was careful not to promote this earlier belief. He did, however, state that the public sphere should be exclusively dominated by rationality and religious matters and should be kept private. In essence, he was promoting the idea that the public sphere should steer clear of religious considerations that would taint it. Since the 1990s, however, Habermas has been asserting that religion has a role to play in the public sphere and should not only be a private matter. The rapidly globalizing world which is a postmaterialistic society requires the moral guidance that religion can offer. Habermas pays tribute to the Judaeo-Christian Biblical religions for having driven out belief in magic and for having created the foundations upon which individual freedom and rights stand.

Habermas in a 2007 publication, *The dialectics of secularization*, had a discussion with then Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger (Pope Benedict XVI). Habermas expressed the opinion that Christianity was the spreader of a worldwide classlessness and was also open to reason. Christianity was, therefore, still providing the moral substance in which democracy operates. Habermas concedes that religious traditions have a great deal to teach people, and this is something which reason alone does not make provisions for. Religions keep the contextual interpretations of redemption, of "salvitic exodus from a life that is experienced as empty of salvation" (Habermas and Ratzinger 2007, 43). It is critical for a secular society to learn to make contextual interpretations which are "the substance of Biblical concepts accessible to a general public that also includes those who have other faiths and those who have none" (Habermas and Ratzinger 2007, 43). Habermas purports that secular reason and Christianity need to learn from one another. He goes so far as to maintain that Christianity, as a promoter of the ideal of universal egalitarianism and an openness to reason, provides the vital moral substance which democracy requires to flourish.

Jürgen Habermas's plan is to maintain moral points of view, which must be protected against moral relativism and instrumental reason. This must, however, be achieved without turning to a God who cannot be authenticated but who is believed in as a faith act. Philosophy does not provide cogent reasons for people to act morally. It is each person's upbringing, personal relationships, and norms and values that were taught from an early age which makes us moral or immoral. Religion does play a role but is not required for moral action to be a norm. Metaphysical thought is incapable of validation or redeeming its truth claims, and should therefore be seen as a thing apart from philosophy. Metaphysical belief in God may be inspirational and promote ethical conduct but despite this ability, it cannot rationally prove that it is the truth. In this debate, the issue of transcendence or reference to a metaphysical God is highly significant. It is God's transcendence which makes Him fundamentally unique to anything else. This is what makes people seek to transcend physical existence through reason and meditation for example. They seek to face the transcendent reality of God. Habermas believes that there can still be transcendence without belief in a metaphysical God.

Habermas (2001, 109) sees the boundaries between material and spiritual reasons as flexible and he believes in the "continued existence of religious communities within a

continually secularizing society." It is important to Habermas (2003, 113) that religion be engaged with; however, "the reasonable attitude of keeping one's distance from religion without closing one's mind to the perspective it offers." There needs to be a comprehension of all religiously based descriptions of reality as present and existing in conjunction with secular descriptions of reality. This is what should be happening in today's multicultural and multireligious global society. Habermas (2007, 46) writes:

> The expression "postsecular" does more than give public recognition to religious fellowships in view of the functional contribution they make to the reproduction of motivations and attitudes that are societally desirable. The public awareness of a postsecular society also reflects a normative insight that has consequences for the political dealings of unbelieving citizens with believing citizens. In the postsecular society, there is an increasing consensus that certain phases of the "modernization of the public consciousness" involve the assimilation and the reflexive transformation of both religious and secular mentalities. If both sides agree to understand the secularization of society as a complementary learning process, then they will also have cognitive reasons to take seriously each other's contributions to controversial subjects in the public debate.

Habermas acknowledges that all religious descriptions of reality are in fact alternative forms of rationality. They are thus independent types of rationality which the secular societal discourse has to relate to as abstract phenomena. But they are also types of rationality which demand reverence by virtue of their function as accountable inputs in societal discourse. In his rationalist thesis, the pragmatic meaning of any utterance depends on whether or not it is valid, i.e., that there are reasons presented by a speaker that bring consensus. Given that the meanings of utterances and propositions are all public or shared, since meaning depends on reasons that are also publicly shared, all religious teachings and practices are entrenched in the lifeworld of people. Consequently, the role of religion is different from the role of philosophy. Religion is still indispensable to humanity. However, religion still requires thorough scrutiny but this should be in an acceptable manner so that it will build societal bonds rather than be divisive. Theologians commonly espouse a moral life which is bounded by virtues and prohibitions and believe that this must be grounded on the transcendent metaphysical God. If this is not the case, humanity will become the victim of a worldly relativism that will serve to chip away at all moral and ethical considerations. Habermas believes that people do not need God in their lives in order to be moral beings. This belief places him in a diametrically opposed position to Horkheimer (2003, 18), his teacher, who wrote the *Dialectic of enlightenment*. In this work, Horkheimer argues that "there cannot be truth without an absolute, without a world-transcending power 'in which truth is sublated'."

Habermas expresses the opinion that the world is indebted to religious traditions. He acknowledges that important notions like freedom, equality, and liberty have a religious origin and that this origin continues to inform our understanding of these concepts.

In the work *Between naturalism and religion*, Habermas (2008) discusses what would need to happen which would allow religion to assume its fair place in public discourse. Religious arguments are acceptable in the public sphere if they are not expecting exceptional

treatment to be applied towards them. He is not, however, suggesting that religious people should come up with secular formulations for their religion-based viewpoints. Given that the state does not consider religion to be irrational, the public sphere cannot be shut off for any "secular" goal. Religious people "should therefore also be allowed to express and justify their convictions in a religious language even when they cannot find secular 'translations' for them" (Habermas 2008, 12-13). People who are religious should communicate or cloak their attitudes, wishes, as well as needs in religious language without being in a sense prejudged as inept for not being able to provide a coherent secular motivation. However, once a religious person has expressed himself in what are religious terms, it will be the job of someone else to "translate" the argument into nonreligious terms. Essentially then, according to Habermas, a "translation" into secular language is required. Habermas (2008, 12) adds that secular citizens be open-minded enough to accept any possible truth content of what they are asked to consider and should enter into respectful dialogues from which religious reasons may emerge in the transformed appearance of commonly accessible arguments. Religious cannot and should not be divorced from public rhetoric. He seeks an "epistemic stance" to be taken towards all non-Christian or Judaistic religions and calls for a self-reflexive perspective on all doctrines. The validity of scientific knowledge cannot be undervalued and secular reasons are important for humanity.

Where religious claims are made and no translation is presented, it becomes problematic because it keeps those outside of that religion from adequately questioning, asserting, or expressing themselves on the issues at hand. Dialogue thus ceases as people then start "talking past each other" (Habermas 2008, 12). Habermas seeks a situation where all religious people should "develop an epistemic stance" that provides for religious arguments to be more well suited to the public arena. Where there is exclusivity in religious thinking and views, this is not ideal in a public debate. Habermas (2008, 13) states:

> Religious citizens must develop an epistemic stance toward other religions and worldviews that they encounter within a universe of discourse hitherto occupied only by their own religion...Furthermore, religious citizens must develop an epistemic stance toward the internal logic of secular knowledge and toward the institutionalized monopoly on knowledge on modern scientific experts...Finally, religious citizens must develop an epistemic stance toward the priority that secular reasons also enjoy in the political arena.

Religious people from all religions need to be able to deal with the plurality of religions and worldviews and be tolerant of one another. Habermas's very formal pragmatics accomplishes the task of a theoretical underpinning for his theory of communicative action as a critical social theory, and it thus contributes to problems relating to truth, action and ultimately meaning in a postmodernist universe in which problems of value judgements need to be circumvented. People should thus adopt a sceptical attitude to grand narratives as sources of solutions to problems. Postmetaphysical thinking is needed.

EXTREMES ON TRANSECENDENCE

In Orthodoxy, which is the oldest Christian denomination, the Triune Godhead transcends through His being, all of humanity. This is due to the belief that God transcends

all because He is uncreated and everything else is created. What humanity says about God is limited and conditioned by humanity's created existence. God is limitless in what Orthodoxy calls an *Apophatic* approach. God is above all human concepts of what is termed the Good. God is not good but "above good" (*Hyperagathos*). Despite such an *Apophatic* approach, which is essentially mystical and transcends all human thought, concrete things can still be stated. The New Testament bears witness to this way in which faith is to be understood and through which ethics are applied in daily living. There is a conditioned character in this positive language which must be used if humanity is to be saved according to God's plan. Theological language terms this positive approach as *kataphatic*. God who is transecendent, is the good itself (*autagathos*). Since people are created in God's image, they are related to the goodness of God and goodness in their lives is reflective of Divine goodness (Harakas 1992, 33-45).

In the New Age Movement, which is a widely divergent, non-Christian belief system, humanity must be replaced by Eastern spirituality that sees humanity as one with all existence. God is not transcendent but is part of a very impersonal cosmic reality or energy field that humanity must tap into. By expanding the human mind, individuals can regain their link with "God."

THE "PROJECT" OF MODERNITY

Habermas states that humanity is in a state of modernity which is an "unfinished project": "Without ontological anchoring, the concept of truth is...no longer an idea but merely a weapon in the struggle of life" (Habermas 2002, 103). However, a discourse on rationality is like accepting of an idea of truth that is somehow testable in an inner-worldly manner. Moral truth merely becomes an instrument which serves the interests of certain human beings or even a "weapon" which serves the interests of an "elite" group against another "inferior" group. God is useful in that mankind can use religion as a moral compass since the central problem is how people find ways to "sustain a moral community in the face of rampant individualism." He (2003,51-58) continues:

> ...in communicative action we orient ourselves to validity claims that we can raise only as a matter of fact in the context of our language, of our form of life, whereas the redeemability implicity co-posited points beyond the provinciality of the given historical context.

Habermas still seeks the pursuit of Enlightenment ideals and does not want modernity to be abandoned and does not consider reason to be an enemy. He defends the idea of consensus which many postmodernists[2] have attacked. A pragmatic approach is required to solve socio-political problems and religion has a role to play in this regard (Cooke 2007, 224-38). Habermas's (1992a, 5-9) conception of modernity is vigorous because he from time-to-time *speaks* of the "dialectic of rationalisation" and also refers to the "ambivalent content of cultural and social modernity" (Habermas 1987), and yet, despite such utterances, does not take for granted any basic dialectic or ambivalence. In his view, modernity is an unfinished *project* since he views it as a cultural movement which has developed in response to various problems thrown up by the processes of modernization. The main obstacle is to discover a way to reconnect the specific knowledge set free by the

enlightenment process. This should be with common sense and, as Finlayson (2005, 2) says:

> ...everyday life-processes, to harness its potential for good by tying it back into the lifeworld and the common interest. This conception of modernity places what Habermas calls "post-metaphysical" philosophy, the task of which, he contends, is to be stand-in and interpreter for the specialized sciences, at the very centre of modern life and its challenges.

The problems of the modern project have not yet been solved, hence it is "unfinished." The process of modernization cannot be halted as for humanity to stay in an unchanging mode of operation would be worse. "Habermas suspects that the adventitious trumpeting of the end of modernity throws out the baby (the humanitarian ideals) of enlightenment along with the bathwater (the growth of instrumental rationality and the belief in the social benefits of technological and scientific development)" (Finlayson 2005, 3-5). It is irrational to have relativism and contextualism but the lessons of modernity, such as an increase in knowledge and greater human freedom are important. To bring the project of modernity to fruition, we need to critically consider and adopt the cultural, technological, as well as economic possibilities of the twenty-first century world in the light of material humanitarian principles. Society cannot disregard human influences and as such must work together with modernity and seek ways to ease the shift of society to become postconventional. In such a situation, people will invariably synchronize their actions and institute a workable social order on the basis of universal moral principles based on religion and laws that are legally recognized (Finlayson 2000, 169-84). Habermas pays a great deal of attention to the role and locus of religion in the public sphere (Lafont 2007, 127-50). His apparent turnaround is surprising given that he has for years espoused a highly secular and agnostic approach to all matters pertaining to religion.

PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION

Habermas (1989, 156) states:

> In our context, it is...a relevant circumstance that practical philosophy, on the basis of a methodological atheism, has recovered truths of religious salvation and revelation and included them in its own arguments...In this discourse only "public" reasons count, that is, only such that can be in principle convincing beyond the bounds of a particular religious community.

For Habermas, philosophy should not attack religion as an irrational belief, but should rather engage in debate and rational discourse with it. Religion which clashes with bourgeois secular society poses a serious challenge to the liberal democratic state. This challenge hinges on the conditions imposed by religion in which people can mutually respect one another and from which basic legal and ethical norms can be derived. He (1992a, 141) does state that religion and philosophy have different roles:

> On the premises of postmetaphysical thought, philosophy cannot provide a substitute for the consolation whereby religion invests unavoidable suffering

> and unrecompensed injustice, the contingencies of need, loneliness, sickness, and death, with new significance and teaches us to bear them. But even today philosophy can explicate the moral point of view from which we can judge something impartially as just or unjust; to this extent, communicative reason is by no means equally indifferent to morality and immorality. However, it is altogether a different matter to provide a motivating response to the question of why we should follow our moral insights or why we should be moral at all. In this respect, it may perhaps be said that to seek to salvage an unconditional meaning without God is a futile undertaking, for it belongs to the peculiar dignity of philosophy to maintain adamantly that no validity claim can have cognitive import unless it is vindicated before the tribunal of justificatory discourse.

Habermas acknowledges that philosophy in the tradition of the Enlightenment owes a great deal to religious tradition for a wide range of orientations, particularly ethics. Philosophy is what validates claims of truth and may lead to an understanding of what is considered to be a moral standpoint. Habermas vacillates between two notions and asserts a middleground. Is it feasible to be rigorously philosophical, and simultaneously in sync with religious emotional response? Do people impose a theological facade on their philosophical positions so as to recognize their grounding in religious traditions *or do they in essence* abandon religious traditions in order to remain philosophically precise? Habermas sees in Biblical religion the roots of modern individualism. This link persists today. He nonetheless espouses a more positive view of religion than was previously the case for mainly utilitarian reasons. To him, *religion, whether is true or not, is a socially useful tool.* Habermas (see Trautsch 2004, 195) concedes that the realm of faith has some autonomy in that it does contradict reason. Habermas (2006a, 17) suggests that "Only the participants and their religious organizations can resolve the question of whether 'modernized' (i.e., translated) faith is still the 'true' faith." Thus inasmuch as religious reasons can be translated, they might comprise of ethics as opposed to religion. He thus denies the independence of religion in that it contradicts reason. Religious and philosophical thought differ widely on the question of the justification of truth and on the acceptance of authority.

Philosophy continues to insist on the variances between religious certainty and scientific knowledge, and will consequently not accept religious grounds for either law or ethics. The philosophy of religion requires a wider conception of translation that includes what is argumentative and secular. The translated result must, however, be compatible with the Moral Law and be universally transmissible or shareable. Habermas (2002, 74) asserts that the "Philosophical discourses can be recognized by the fact that they stop short of the rhetoric of fate and promised salvation." He (see Trautsch 2004, 195) also states that any philosophy which "wants to offer consolation ...is not philosophy anymore." Habermasian Critical Theory seeks to simultaneously deconstruct and construct concepts such as truth and freedom along normative lines. Only in this way can communicative reason flourish in the public sphere.

Habermas's theory about the opaque core of religion refers to what is revealed faith. This relies on an idea of the revealed as something which is very obscure rather than transparent. The obscure core may refer to that which transcends reason altogether, such as, God's grace and even revelation. This could even break with reason or ideas on morality. Habermas in his theory of communicative action and the discourse ethics that originates from it, does make use of the idea of transcendence.

He believes that transcendence is obtainable in human life although for him it is totally grounded in human language and communicative actions. Habermas supports the notion that there is a permanent coexistence of both religious and secular convictions, but in this finite material reason is subject to conditions which might lead it to go astray. Man is fallible in that people must accept the possibility that religious conviction may also be true to an extent (Schmidt 2005, 41-44). Religion is thus a source of truth that can be an important resource for humanity since its truths may be partly transformed into discursive arguments.

THE HABERMASIAN PUBLIC SPHERE

Habermas's apparent new attention to religion is based on the political role of religion in contemporary society. In terms of the theory of communicative rationality Habermas is mainly concerned with the rational possibilities of religion as it adds to constitutional democracy and promotes a truly democratic public spirit. Habermas's (1992a) primary concern is the contribution that religion can make to mould public opinion and resolve. If we are to comprehend the role of religion in the (political) public sphere, we have to understand the critical difference that Habermas (2008, 131) makes between the "wild" and the formal political public sphere. The "wild" political public sphere refers to the informal public sphere where there are informal streams of public communication. By way of contrast, the formal public sphere is somewhat institutionalized and thus form part of the structure of society and is the domain of political entities.

To Habermas religion has always been considered to be an important source of morality and a moral compass for society (Enns 2007, 6). He stated categorically in the 1980s, that religion would lose its value as rationalization intensified and hence society would not need religion. Morality and ethical decision making would be grounded on reason alone (Habermas 1982, 260-88). Today, however, Habermas has been somewhat forced to revise his ideas on the role of religion in society. This is mainly due to the fact that religion and cultural diversity still play a huge role in the public sphere. Religion is here to stay and neither modernization or rationalization will dislodge it. In any event, religion is an important source of morality which strengthens the weaker groupings in society who would be otherwise somewhat marginalized (Habermas 2008, 153-56). Habermas does not, however, fully accept the role of religion in the public sphere and he argues that religion should only be allowed to participate in important opinion and will-formation in the public sphere if it satisfies certain conditions. Primarily religious consciousness has to be converted to satisfy the cognitive challenges inherent in a highly liberal and post-secular society. People who purport to be religious should admit that their particular worldview is not the only worldview that exists.

They must demonstrate important cognitive conditions and conforming epistemic attitudes before they should be allowed to participate in the public sphere from their religious vantage point. They must also make a distinction between their roles as a member of a religious community and as a political citizen. Critically, religious notions must be decoded into a secular language that is a "publicly intelligible language" (Habermas 2008, 111). Thus, people should not uncritically simply accept the metaphysical truth claims of Judaeo Christianity. Neither should they express their standpoints in metaphysical terminology as this tends to make any religious experience a plain reference devoid of truth. In such situations, emotions rule and logic and argument confuse what would otherwise be meaningful thought processes, debate, and communication. If philosophers are to be engaged in meaningful

communication, metaphysical terms must be in a sense "translated" so as to produce truth claims that may be validated by a community that communicates. The problem with diverse religious worldviews is that they are eclectic and specific in their own worldview and not in any way universalist or all-encompassing (Adams 2006, 92).

Habermas says that religious reasons need translation. This, however, is not isolated as any metaphysical argument or all-inclusive worldview requires translation, and not only religion (Myskja 2008). Habermas (2006b, 8-11, 13-17) is predominantly focused on the obscure core of infallible revelatory truth, the truth content, cognition, semantic potential, and doctrine of Christianity. Habermas (2002, 1-22) believes that while religion cannot be totally translated into reason-giving, it is still possible, within reason, to translate religious language. As he (2002, 11) says:

> Whereas citizens of faith may make public contributions in their own religious language only subject to the provision that these get translated, the secular citizens must open their minds to the possible truth content of those presentations and enter into dialogues from which religious reason then might well emerge in the transformed guise of general accessible arguments.

Habermas (2002, 77, 163) also makes a reference to what he terms a "methodical atheism," where theological or metaphysical claims are subject to the rules of communicative action for either their validation or redemption. Habermas quotes the Danish theologian, Jens Glebe-Moller, and states that methodical atheism is not stating that there is "no thinking about God or that the thought of God is emptied of all content." What it is saying is that in the current world, metaphysical language has lost its cohesiveness and is therefore somewhat demythologized, and must deliver on its truth claims. If it fails in this task it will be superceded by postmetaphysical rationale. Truth claims must be justified, failing which metaphysical solutions to real twenty-first century problems will be utterly rejected. It is time for a postmetaphysical mentality. By this he means a type of experiment in radical demythologization where the outcomes remain open. He asserts that any philosophy or theology that does not submit to such rules, is bound to lose its philosophical seriousness. This is the only manner through which philosophers can conceivably take theology seriously. He thus insists on the difference between theological and philosophical modes of discourse since as a reflection on faith, theology should preserve its basis in religious experiences and rituals. He (2002, 162) does not seek to dismiss faith and theological reflection but provides it with "indispensable potentials for meanings are preserved in religious language." He expects that philosophers will satisfy themselves with a "transcendence from within" which is given with the diverse context-transcending forces of claims to truth and moral correctness. The Christian conception of human beings as created in the image of God has been very important for moral-political theory in the West where religious ideas were translated into the secular view of persons as being equal in human dignity and deserving unconditional respect (Habermas 2002, 12-29).

The relationship between religious and secular modes of thought proceeds directly into Habermas's (2006b, 114-48) position in his *Religion in the public sphere,* which concern with the relationship between religion and public reasons. It is the duty of religious citizens to translate their religiously founded claims into secular and publicly accessible reasons. Habermas's (2006b, 127) conception of religion is very clear in *Religion in the public sphere*:

In short, postmetaphysical thought is prepared to learn from religion, but remains agnostic in the process. It insists on the difference between the certainties of faith, on the one hand, and validity claims that can be publicly criticized, on the other; but it refrains from the rationalist presumption that it can itself decide what part of the religious doctrines is rational and what part irrational. . . . At best, philosophy circles the opaque core of religious experience when reflecting on the intrinsic meaning of faith. This core must remain so abysmally alien to discursive thought as does the core of aesthetic experience, which can likewise only be circled but not penetrated by philosophical reflection.

Habermas thus espouses two alternatives to religion. The first relates to public criticizable validity claims and the second does not. These two alternatives respectively reflect faith and knowledge. But justice cannot be done to religion without assessing truth claims within it. Roe Fremstedal (2006, 88) asks, "Is it not under the condition that religion concerns how we live our lives that it is rendered meaningful at all?"

Habermas highlights the semantic *content* of religion and hardly ever speaks of religious *forms*. He (Harrington 2007a, 547-48) says:

> ...almost always of message, rarely of medium. Religious message offers potential for discursive redemption, but religious form, it seems, is peripheral and inessential. This seems entirely to leave out of consideration the non-discursive or semi-discursive aspects of religious life, bound up with ritualized action and gesture, music, song, visual representation, and the sensuous space and event of worship. None of these elements play any accountable role in the programme. It would seem that a purely language-analytic, propositional-theoretic account of the sensory resources of religious life cannot do justice to the sensuous, experimental and emotional dimension of religious life that are so important for religious expression and articulation.

In 1981 Habermas published *The theory of communicative action*, which was an endorsement of reason and logic as the basis of public life in any democracy. His theory begins with the development of a postmetaphysical world. He asserts that in past historical eras, any justification for classical ethics was founded on embracing metaphysical or spiritual belief systems that presented a philosophical definition of what constituted the "good life." In today's world, we find "...a pluralism of individual life styles and collective forms of life" and a corresponding "multiplicity of ideas of the good life" (Habermas 1993, 122).

Habermas distinguishes the core of religion as one which does not concern validity claims that can be publicly criticized (Habermas 2006a, 18-25). In his introduction to *The theory of communicative action*, there is an internal linkage between the questions of meaning and validity. He (see Harrington 2007a, 549) claims that "a social-scientist observer cannot understand the meaning of a spoken utterance of action without taking up a normative position on its validity or rationality." Despite this statement, he deviates from this approach in his examination of religion. Especially his methodological atheism is at variance with his statement. He (2002, 164) also tends, in a sense, to break religion down into something which is founded on a "revealed Word." He makes a clear distinction between argumentative discourse and revelation. Philosophy does not find suitable what is talked about in religious discourse *as* religious experiences (*Erfahrungen*). These experiences can only be put down to a philosophical experience and only if experiences are identified by utilizing descriptions

that are not borrowed from religious traditions (Habermas 1988a, 3-4). Any descriptions need to emanate from the world of argumentative discourse that is separate from any revelation (Habermas 2002, 122).

Habermas (1979, 3) has noted three types of universal validity claims for understanding which are present in all communication. Firstly, there is the claim to the truthfulness of what is uttered. Secondly, there is the normative rightness of the speech act in any given context. Thirdly, the sincerity of the speaker is important (1988a). Only one claim is explicitly highlighted in any communicative exchange. The other two remain implicit presuppositions of understanding which underlies the speech. He envisages reason not merely as an argumentative notion but also as one that transcends reason-giving. Concerning religious traditions, Habermas (2006b, 19) states: "Philosophy...receives innovative stimulation if it succeeds in liberating the cognitive substance from its dogmatic encapsulation in the melting pot of rational discourse."

Religiously entrenched existential convictions, by their nature, avoid the kind of unconditional discursive deliberation (*vorbehaltloser diskursiver Erörtung*) which other ethical orientations and world views, such as the secular "concepts of the good" (*weltliche «Konzeptionen des Guten»*), depict themselves (Habermas 2006b, 9). In Habermas's (2006a, 47-52) opinion, religious traditions have a uniquely special authority to articulate ethical instincts, and if humanity excludes religion from the public sphere, this could result in the alienating of people from the key resources for the formation of meaning and identity. Habermas (2002, 77) allies reason with public reason-giving and states that religious discourse should be construed by "virtue of its argumentation alone." The means that religion provides for the formation of meaning are not yet exhausted *(unabgegoltenen)* and religion possesses great potential for inspiring public reflection. If religion is left out of discussion there is a strong possibility that arguments will not be considered. Practical reason can learn from the influence of communication that is evident in religion (Habermas 2005, 251). Religion thus has a role to play as it possesses truths which can be philosophically interpreted (Joas 2009, 123-25) and justified. Habermas's hypothesises that believers and nonbelievers are involved in what is a complementary learning process in which both can learn from each other. As a cooperative learning process, translation will place huge demands on both sides. The nonbeliever must approach religion as a possible fountain of meaning, as something which possesses original truths about human existence that remain relevant for the whole spectrum of humanity, and believers must strive to find publicly accessible arguments so that meaningful dialogue can take place. Habermas's thesis is based on actions aimed at understanding, and this also connects with validity of religious truths (Habermas 2007).

Habermas supports the idea that religion be rationally appraised but his methodological atheism appears to be at odds with this notion. Harrington (2007a, 550) comments on Habermas:

> Even venturing to think about whether religion is rationally acceptable is here made subordinate to a prior choice for a methodological strategy ...Methodological atheism is thus already a suspension of the very idea of the appeal and attraction of investigating religion for its content of truth...In Habermas's recent work, critical evaluation of religious contents is no longer pursued substantially but only indirectly or "methodologically." Should not an authentic engagement be open to taking on more risks than this?

Harrington (2007a, 551-52) goes on:

> Could it not be that Habermas transfers too much from the political relation of the religious and the secular to the existential relation to the philosophical and theological? What seems troubling is his appeal to pluralism and tolerance under the democratic state of law as a framework for our understanding of a conflict that might be conceptually more primordial than this. If so, the worry is that the style of his argumentation may be predisposing it to a particular outcome.

CONCLUSION

Despite the shortfall of religion as no longer serving as a unifying worldview, it still remains asan essential part of contemporary life. To Habermas, philosophy is dependent on religion in that religion provides meaning and content that is otherwise lacking in post-metaphysical philosophy. Any religious standpoint is able to be maintained as long as it is found to be justified through discourse and argumentation which is rigorous. Habermas claims that any speech act must make three validity claims before it is deemed to be truthful. The three claims are a validity claim to truth, a validity claim to rightness, and a validity claim to truthfulness. Such claims are important in that they are generally intelligible and allow the speaker to be understood. Meaningful discourse results in which no presuppositions are made and useful and important speech results allow others to believe what is said is indeed truthful and right. Speakers must justify what they say and thus use validity claims to provide appropriate reasons. In any speech act all three validity claims are required (Finlayson 2005, 52-53).

Habermas (see Trautsch 2004, 111) speaks of salvation and consolation in the face of the eventualities of life, which include loneliness, guilt, illness, and finally death. He says that people have no alternative but to live with these contingencies, predominantly without consolation. To Habermas, the battle in modernity is this necessity of having validitation, without a need to rely on past representations and it is necessary to avoid the error of founding arguments on premodern conjectural suppositions. Habermas tries to maintain reason as a guide to everyday life practice, and it is reason that will enhance the social learning capacity of society. Habermas believes that communicative discourse can be liberating, and his aim is to improve on the dialectic of enlightenment logic free from the restraints of the philosophies of perception. He believes that all Christians share a common tradition, and all ethical practices have their foundation in religious life (Habermas 1989, 43). Biblical texts provide inspiration for communicative rationality that is required for communicative action. This cannot be condensed to local contexts or it will become useless and not be applicable universally. Consequently, it may become morally relative. Whatever hypotheses may exist from religion, these need to be idealised to serve as standards for critique or even justification. Religion and the use of religious language are vital in obtaining meaning. It is clear that philosophy is not able to surpass religion in any way but all religious expression should, in any case, be secularized, and thus also be expressed in postmetaphysical terminology. This will allow for social cohesion or feelings of expression of union in society which are based on common interest. If this occurs a common moral base is more likely to exist (Habermas 1996, 4).

Habermas suggests that all religious arguments be permissible in public if and only if they are translatable into a secular language. The problem inherent in such a suggestion is that there is no formal requirement for secular citizens to study religious language. Habermas

states that religious types of illustration can contain a "built-in" cognitive content that is not diminished in any shape or form by secular translations. Dialogue is thus required in which secular and religious forms of thought mutually inform and benefit each other. It is clear that Habermas identifies two different ways of viewing religion *per se* and all religious discourse. He seeks to use the insights of religious worldviews under the auspices of postmetaphysical thought through a process of secularization. Habermas concludes that philosophy cannot solve our existential and ethical problems but private faith can and that religion thus plays an important role in ethical conduct promotion. He (2006b, 6) says, "True belief is not only a doctrine, believed content, but a source of energy that the person who has a faith taps performatively and thus nurtures his or her entire life." In this sense, he makes a reference to St. Augustine's distinction between faith which is believed and faith by which people actually believe. Essentially, this is the difference between the intended content of faith and the actual act of belief. In his view, public reasons count more than anything else; consequently, reasons that have authority and are convincing beyond the boundaries of any particular religious persuasion are critical in a postmodernistic and postmetaphysical world.

Human attempts at creating truth claims assumes that a communication community exists that transcends our unique individual interests and even local conversation. Habermas (2006a, 108) states:

> ...we orient ourselves to validity claims that we can raise only as a matter of fact in the context of our language, of our form of life, whereas the redeemability implicitly co-posited points beyond the provinciality of the given historical context. Whoever employs a language with a view to reaching understanding lays himself open to a transcendence from within.

Habermas has in the last ten years changed his views on religion and this shift has been seriously attacked. His conceptual framework on religion seems very narrow and his ideals are highly rational. Harrington (2007a, 39) has considered Habermasian ideas on religion and concludes:

> One might say that in its will to "include the other," Habermas's thinking about religion has a paradoxical tendency to perform the thing it most seeks to avoid, namely to exclude the "Other" or to exclude otherness. Its problem is that precisely in its will to universal accommodation, it may only end by immunizing itself against a challenge from something more profoundly outside of itself. Only when his thinking regains a commitment to expose itself to something more one-sided, to something more dangerously particularistic, decisive or excessive "perhaps with the consequence of failing, disappointing or even antagonizing certain people or parties" only then, one might suggest, will it have a chance of acceding to the universality it so passionately desires.

Habermas also tends to concentrate on the rational aspects of religion and this is problematic since religion is much more than morality. His obsession with universal rationality makes him disregard fastidiousness, and the critical role of certain religious traditions. He also sees much out of the intended context. Nonetheless, he asks important questions for us to consider.

NOTES

1. Postmodernism is largely a reaction to the assumed certainty of scientific, or objective, efforts to explain reality. In essence, it stems from a recognition that reality is not simply mirrored in human understanding of it, but rather, is constructed as the mind tries to understand its own particular and personal reality.

2. In a religious context, transcendence means "beyond the world" in that God as revealed in the Holy Bible exists beyond the physical Cosmos of which He is the creator and is not an object of direct human experience or of scientific reason based on any evidence of the senses. The idea of transcendence does not apply only to God in his ultimate transcendence. The quality of being objectively real yet beyond immediate sensory experience applies to all human values and institutions. It could be described as the quality of any whole that is larger than the sum of its parts.

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Submitted: 28 August 2012; revised: 17 February 2014

Φιλοσοφια
Volume 15, 2:2014

BOOK REVIEW

C. Stephen Evans. *Kierkegaard: An introduction*

Cambridge: University Press, 2009, 206 pp.

In introducing this review, I would like to offer two personal comments. First, in my not infrequent visits to shops selling books old and new, I have noticed consistently over a period of many years a plethora of books by and about Søren Kierkegaard (1813-1855). The reason for this is confirmed in the first paragraph of Chapter I of *Kierkegaard: An introduction* by C. Stephen Evans (hereafter referred to as "the author"), University Professor of Philosophy and Humanities at Baylor University and author of five other books on Kierkegaard, two since 2003. The author says that while Kierkegaard was scarcely read even in his native country of Denmark, much less outside of Scandinavia, during his own lifetime of forty-two years, that has changed in the twentieth century: "...his works are today translated into all major world languages and his impact is strongly felt in Asia and Latin America as well as in Europe and North America" (1).

The second personal point is unquantifiable even for one capable of the proper procedures. Even with a minimal background in a defined area, a careful reader can intuitively detect a book or article written with an exceptional degree of understanding and clarity. Professor Evans's *Kierkegaard* is one of those books. Ordinarily, one would say at this point of development in Kierkegaard scholarship, "Who needs another introductory text?" Cambridge University Press thought that we do—and they made a good decision. The organization, clarification, and interrelationship of Kierkegaard's philosophical principles are highly commendable. His thought is related to principles of numerous other philosophers.

Kierkegaard: An introduction, in slightly over two hundred pages, has a brief "Preface," a "Chronology" pertaining primarily to his writings, eight chapters, an "Index," and a brief annotated bibliography entitled "For further reading: Some personal suggestions." In the "Preface" the author points out that he does not intend to "summarize" Kierkegaard's thought as a substitute for reading him," but to attempt "to remove some of the barriers to a genuine reading" of his writings (ix). He sees this as useful due to the cultural and philosophical differences between Kierkegaard's world and our own times. In regard to this discrepancy, he says later in the "Preface," "On my reading, Kierkegaard poses a sharp challenge to the dominant tradition of modern philosophy." He could have said "On *anyone's* reading...," because of "Kierkegaard's uniqueness as a thinker" and the fact that "his work does not not fit the standard philosophical mold" (x), phrases used by the author in explicating his further purpose in this book. He wishes "to treat Kierkegaard primarily as a philosopher, albeit a Christian thinker" (xi). How many major modern philosophers fit *that* mold? The book is not organized according to the contents of this philosopher's major works such as *Fear and trembling, Concluding unscientific*

postscript, and *The sickness unto death*. Rather, the author has chosen "to introduce Kierkegaard thematically, focusing on important concepts in his works," especially the three "stages" or "spheres" of existence, "a key set of concepts in Kierkegaard's writings" (ix). The aesthetic, ethical, and religious "stages" "provide an account of a path to authentic selfhood"; as "spheres," they "provide a description of three rival views of human existence and its meaning" (ix-x). The author proposes to give "full treatments of...[Kierkegaard's] epistemological, ethical, and metaphysical views" (x), employing in various chapters principles from selected Kierkegaardian writings.

Under the first heading in Chapter I, "Introduction: Kierkegaard's life and works," the author raises the question of whether Kierkegaard was a philosopher, a very important consideration in light of what certainly would be a negative response from postmodernist philosophers who would tend to see him as a Christian missionary—which he himself would not have disavowed (1-2). The author gives his own direct response to the question of whether the famous Dane was a philosopher, but also sees the complexity of the issue, saying that "It would be awkward to write an introduction to his philosophy if he were not, of course. Yet this question must be faced, because Kierkegaard was clearly doing something different than most professional philosophers today...[he] was not a philosopher in the usual academic sense." The author's preliminary conclusion is a suspicion that "uneasiness about Kierkegaard's status as a philosopher stems primarily from his self-professed religious aims rather than his unconventional way of doing philosophy" (2). In fact, Kierkegaard himself claims in *On my work as an author* that his "authorship, viewed as a *totality*, is religious from first to last." The claim is repeated in *The point of view for my work as an author*: "the whole of my authorship relates itself to Christianity" (11-12). Nevertheless, there are those who interpret him as a postmodernist—a view flatly rejected by the author of *Kierkegaard: An introduction*, who clarifies his own project in this book as an attempt "to give a reading of Kierkegaard's authorship as a whole in light of his declared intentions" (15).

Another preliminary yet fundamental question posed by the author is whether Kierkegaard's profoundly Christian religious posture, in which he wishes to "reintroduce Christianity into Christendom," is of any interest to non-Christians. His answer again is very direct—and positive: "The peculiar way Kierkegaard sees the predicament of Christianity in the modern world makes aspects of his thought interesting to those who have little or no interest in his own religious faith" (16). For Kierkegaard, "Evidence is not the ground of faith, and the lack of evidence cannot be the reason for the loss of faith." "Rather, faith has declined in contemporary Western culture because contemporary Westerners have become emotionally and imaginatively impoverished. We have ceased to care in the right ways about the right things" (17). This sounds not only anti-philosophical, but also anti-intellectual. However, we must bear in mind that "intellectual" and "evidence," as a result of the Enlightenment, have been linked inevitably in most circles to the empirical ways of the cultural sciences. Kierkegaard was combating David Hume, Immanuel Kant, and Charles Darwin, but not in terms of their own narrowing dimensions of rationality. In *Concluding unscientific postscript*, a pseudonymous work (by Johannes Climacus) endorsed by Kierkegaard (who listed himself as "editor"), it is maintained that "those of our time, because of so much knowledge, have forgotten what it is to *exist* and the meaning of *inwardness*." People have forgotten not only how to exist religiously, but of how to exist *humanly*. For Kierkegaard in the *Postscript*, "Christianity is

not primarily a set of doctrines (although it requires some particular beliefs), but a way of life, a way of answering questions that human existence poses." The author of *Kierkegaard: An introduction* concludes from this that his subject "is a genuine philosopher, and a philosopher of the first rank, because he has given a penetrating description and analysis of what human life is actually like, and how it is lived" (18). This is *not* linguistic analysis or postmodernism—but it tends to be more important to more human beings.

What is lived life really like, according to Kierkegaard? The answer to this question requires a summary of the rest of the book being reviewed—which cannot and need not be provided here, of course. However, the question in this context does lend itself to a few more basic remarks concerning Kierkegaard's general philosophical orientation and then some consideration of the three stages or spheres of existence already mentioned. Kierkegaard uses the terms "inwardness" and "subjectivity" interchangeably, and they are extremely significant in appreciating his philosophical project. They are not unrelated to "the unfinished, open-ended character of human existence." What does this mean? To Kierkegaard, it signifies both a substantial reality, the self, but necessarily a developing process: a process in which the self engages in becoming more truly and fully the self that one potentially is. This process of becoming one's true self is achieved gradually through personal choices. However, analyzing the process realistically makes evident the fact that "reflection by itself cannot determine a choice"; "*rational* deliberation has within it no principle of closure, no way of bringing the process of deliberation to an end" (20-21).

Although conscious reflection and reason cannot produce a decision about how to act in concrete matters, we do, in fact, make decisions and act on them. Is that being irrational? Kierkegaard says no; that is being *human*. That is how human existence is displayed. But, how does it happen? There must be something more to the human self and human deliberation than reason. What is it? The author interprets Kierkegaard as saying that "We can make choices because we have desires, hopes, fears, wishes, hates, and myriads of other 'interested' attitudes towards the possibilities that confront us.... The transition from possibility to actuality is a movement...a leap that is made possible by interestedness." The author sees Kierkegaard as insisting that "an understanding of human existence must include an understanding of what today would be termed our emotional lives" (21). For this the individual must develop "passion," a Kierkegaardian term for "a sustained, enduring emotion...that gives shape and direction to a person's life." The author of *Kierkegaard: An introduction* concludes that "Subjectivity or inwardness are simply Kierkegaardian terms for the *affective* dimension of human life that must take center stage if we are to understand human existence" (22) [emphasis added].

This issue is intricately connected with Kierkegaard's notion of truth, especially "truth as subjectivity." At the bottom of any notion of truth for Kierkegaard is his belief—and that is what it is—that human persons are created by God, upon whom they are dependent. However, this dependence is qualified by human freedom, a gift of God. Human fulfillment is to be chosen in a process freely directed toward a relationship with the creator God. The famous Kierkegaardian phrase, "Truth is subjectivity," "is not an endorsement of epistemological subjectivism or some form of relativism" (58). "His concern," the author informs us, "is really not with the adequacy of a philosophical theory, but with the question of what it means for a human being to *possess* the truth" [emphasis added]. The possession of truth refers to having that which enables one to *live*

life (59). While there is objective truth, as we have seen, "it is not enough to affirm the right propositions. The person must allow his or her beliefs to transform his or her life." According to Kierkegaard, "it is subjectivity, the inward emotions and passions that give shape to human lives and motivate human actions, that makes the difference" (61).

According to the author of *Kierkegaard: An introduction*, his subject is contesting "a philosophical tradition that would claim that we must settle our intellectual questions and then turn our attention to how to put our beliefs into practice." This represents an impossibility for him because intellectual doubts are always lurking: "If we demand intellectual certainty before we begin to live our convictions we will never live at all" (64). This raises the question of the interrelationship between faith and reason: Kierkegaard claims that "Reason alone does not take us very far; we live on the basis of faith or belief" (65). He would seem to concur with St. Augustine's dictum, "I believe in order to understand."

An outstanding example of a useful preparation for reading the primary sources is the author's analysis of the three stages and spheres of existence, for which the Dane is so famously known. Chapter 4 is devoted to the *aesthetic* life, Chapter 5 to the *ethical* life, and Chapter 6 to *religious* existence. Chapter 7 concerns Christianity, as such. (These four chapters constitute about 125 of the 206 pages in the book.) I would like to characterize the content of these chapters very briefly before noticing some other central features and concluding with remarks pertaining to Kierkegaard the *educator*.

The aesthetic existence represents the lowest form and features of those who live "in the moment," that is, attempting to satisfy as many present desires as possible (70-71). Although occasionally tending to be more intellectual and imaginative, the aesthete remains attached to external circumstances. As dimensions of human living, aesthetic existence evolves into ethical living—in the case of some. The wide variety of ethical forms of life is manifested in a "quest for identity" (90), a search for the meaningful coherence or unity of life, lived out in commitments and values "embodied in enduring passions" (91). Since "the ethical life is rooted in a person's relation to God as Creator" and achieving the "Good" is "the task the individual has been assigned by God" (115), why is this not living religiously rather than ethically?

According to the author's interpretation of Kierkegaard, the religious life in the most proper sense involves the search for eternal happiness. Secondly, while both the ethical and religious person believes in God, the former is very self-confident in that relationship while the latter, lacking such confidence, relies more upon God for developing and sustaining the relationship (116-17). The religious person is aware of the necessity of God's help in becoming the person God requires one to be (123). The quest for the God-relation into eternity (which *is* the religious life) is identified with (a) resignation, "a willingness to renounce the relative for the sake of the absolute" (125); (b) suffering, "dying to the self," depending completely upon God (128-29); and (c) guilt, the need "to hear the Christian Gospel of forgiveness" (138) due to the inevitable failure to rely upon God in achieving one's true self.

The author's attention to Kierkegaard's view of Christianity in Chapter 7 is developed in three sections. The chapter opens with the Danish philosopher's distinction between natural religion and Christianity: the former is a religion of "immanence" and the latter a religion of "transcendence." The transcendent character of Christianity is seen in the reliance of its adherents upon a revelation from God for awareness of meaning in life and direction in living impossible to obtain solely by natural reason (139). The second section

of the author's analysis of the meaning of Christianity is centered upon the Incarnation, the "Absolute Paradox," which is the focus of the content of Christian revelation for Kierkegaard. That God could become a human being, Kierkegaard considers neither nonsensical nor contrary to reason, but *above* reason. The Absolute Paradox lends itself to "a recognition by reason that there are limits to reason," fulfilling reason on a happy occasion called "faith," a gift of God (157).

The third topic of the author regarding Kierkegaard's portrait of Christianity pertains to *how* a person becomes a Christian. Essentially, the explanation about it is not complex: "...no amount of historical evidence is sufficient to produce faith in an individual"—"Nor is any amount of historical evidence necessary for faith" (161). Only faith itself is required, that is, "a passion produced in the individual by God when the individual encounters God in time." Most crucial here is that the faith is "produced...by God": human striving is useless. We "can do nothing to achieve salvation" (162). Only God can teach us the consciousness of our sinfulness and cure us.

The terms "pseudonymity" and "indirect communication," indigenous to any discussion of Kierkegaard's authorship, are unquestionably linked with another term which, in my view, should be front and center. Unfortunately, the term "education" is not even to be found in the detailed Index of subjects at the end of *Kierkegaard: An introduction* despite the fact that discussions of Kierkegaard as teacher/communicator pervade the book, with explicit references on numerous pages. While all philosophers who publish intend to teach through their publications no less than any classroom teacher, Kierkegaard the philosopher might be proposed as an educator in a highly unique manner. For example, his pseudonyms suggest a very serious focus on his purpose of conveying meaning to his readers. According to the author, they are "designed to encourage readers to think for themselves." These pseudonymous authors and "characters" present "various views as to how human life should be *lived*.... They do not merely tell us about their views of life, but *show* us what it is like to live in a certain way" [emphasis added]. "The reader is thus encouraged to make an application to his or her own life from the start" (37). Distinct from pseudonymity, but used in conjunction with it for a similar purpose is "indirect communication." As a teaching tool, it is aligned with subjective understanding and can be contrasted with direct communication and objective understanding in accord with the following schema:

Objective understanding	*Subjective understanding*
(Direct communication)	(Indirect communication)
Concerns results	Concerns a "way"—"how life should be lived" (30)
Is abstract, involving abstract, concepts	Is concrete, involving particular persons, places, and things
Is first reflection—can lead only to a "purely verbal knowledge" (31)	Is second reflection—pertains to "a kind of active involvement and appropriation" (31)

Concerns what should be *said*	Concerns what should be *done*
Concerns *thought*	Concerns *action*
Involves knowing propositions	Involves developing suitable passions

In the context of pseudonymity and indirect communication with the use of irony, humor, parables, and stories, we also find Kierkegaard utilizing "thought experiments" as a means of "involving" his readers in a vicarious experience. The philosophical thought experiment (as distinct from a scientific experiment) is "an attempt to imaginatively present a character or situation that will clarify and test our conceptual intuitions" (41). This kind of educative effort on the part of Kierkegaard, based on his view that "human beings *exist* in the sense that they form themselves through a process in which their own choices play an important role," led many to acclaim him the "father of existentialism." The author of *Kierkegaard: An introduction*, however, says that "he likely would have declined" (32) the appellation.

Before offering a few critical comments and a brief conclusion, I would like to pause here to re-emphasize the centrality of Kierkegaard as an educator and (less directly at this point) a philosopher of education. First of all, John Haldane reminds us that "philosophy is a discipline that depends for the most part on patronage" ("Metaphysical [im]mortality and philosophical transcendence," *Conceptions of philosophy*, Cambridge, 2009, 38). Philosophy can be used, but only if it is presented in a usable form addressing real questions of real human beings. One of these real questions that addresses people where they live is one that underlies Kierkegaard's entire authorship: What does it mean to live rightly? "Living rightly" for Kierkegaard involves fundamental goals that were religious from very early in the development of his authorship (initiated in 1840 with the publication of *Either/or*).

While it appears to me extremely unfortunate that the pedagogical dimension of Kierkegaard's philosophy is not more widely recognized *within* the analyses of his philosophical principles, there has been attention given to him as an educator. In addition to numerous dissertations and journal articles, there are a few pertinent books, one entitled *Kierkegaard as educator* (University of California, 1977) by Ronald J. Manheimer, who clarifies the Danish philosopher's serious intent to *teach* his readers: "Kierkegaard's authorship embodies a multiplicity of voices aimed to reach the concrete reality of the reader as existing in the midst of a way of life" (xi). Again, "...the value of Kierkegaard's many sided authorship...is precisely that it brings into question fundamental assumptions about a range of *educative* intentions" (xiii) [emphasis added].

In another book, attention to Kierkegaard as teacher is relatively prominent. The book is *The tuth is the Way: Kierkegaard's* "Theologia viatorum" (Cascade Books, 2011) by Ben Simpson. The Latin phrase he says refers to a wayfarer's theology, theology for a traveler. Not insignificantly, the Latin root for "curriculum" (*curr re*) means "to run," and the term *curriculum* itself refers to a path to be traversed by a student for the sake of the student's fulfillment as a human person.

One might wonder how a philosopher-educator in this mold could avoid engaging in philosophy of education in the classical sense of the analysis and application of philosophical principles in addressing fundamental pedagogical issues. However, there

is no space here to consider the question of whether or not Kierkegaard actually proposes a philosophy of education. Nevertheless, even a cursory glance at the author's *Kierkegaard: An introduction* would suggest that a full-scale investigation into this topic is long overdue and would prove highly beneficial to Kierkegaardian scholarship for many reasons.

At the outset of this review, I recommended C. Stephen Evans's *Kierkegaard, An introduction* very highly for various levels of interested readers. While his references to and comparisons of Kierkegaard with more than a dozen prominent ancient, medieval, and modern philosophers are helpful, the reader should be cautioned about a few comments involving Thomas Aquinas and John Locke. First of all, there is a similarity posited between Aquinas and Locke concerning the position "that faith is a matter of believing what God has revealed because it is God who has revealed it" (142). Not mentioned is the fact that Aquinas accepts certain truths as revealed in view of Scripture, Church tradition, and the teaching magisterium of the Church; Locke, on the other hand, recognizes truths as revealed on the basis of reason alone. Secondly, the author tends to identify Kierkegaard and Aquinas in holding that one criterion of a revelation from God is the fact that it cannot be known by human reason (146). Aquinas rejects this position; for example, the existence of God, for him, can be known by reason.

In conclusion to this review-essay, I would like to point out a pair of interrelated principles in Kierkegaard's thought examined by the author of this introduction which seems to me would benefit humankind by their widespread acceptance, and then offer a final comment. First, there is the "no-neutrality principle," meaning that "Kierkegaard simply does not see human reason as capable of neutrality with respect to religious issues" (158). This appears to me to mean, for example, that the question of the existence of God is an unavoidable question, a "forced option," as William James called it. You either accept the existence of God or you do not; if you are unsure or say that the question is unanswerable, your negative response is clear.

Secondly, Kierkegaard means something further, which entails another principle, "a recognition by reason itself that there are limits to reason" (157). Only by such recognition can one acquire divine faith—and then only with the help of God, of course. This limitation of reason, making way for (natural and supernatural) faith, enables us to appreciate further his denial of the possibility of neutrality. That is, according to Kierkegaard, we must respond to the Incarnation with either "faith" or "offense." The former is "a humble stance in which reason recognizes its own limits; offense is the arrogant stance of the reason that refuses to admit the reality of anything beyond its capacity. The one thing that is not possible is indifference" (158). This is why the "supposed neutrality of a religion-free public world is a myth" (195)—which also is why a religion-free school, public or private, at any level is impossible (a prime example of philosophy of education in a Kierkegaardian spirit). Finally, regardless of how one evaluates Kierkegaard's philosophical principles or judges his authorship in relationship to rationalistic/empiricist modes of philosophy, analytic patterns, or postmodernism, even a casual observer can notice that he addresses human life where it is *lived*—a factor which suggests that philosophy in academe ought to be more than merely "academic" (another example of his philosophy of education).

Finally, in appreciating Kierkegaard's famous phase, "Truth is subjectivity," it must be recalled that, in his view, "reality is a system for God and *there is thus a way things*

truly are—regardless of whether I can attain the right view of things" [emphasis added]. In a sense, therefore, *objectivity* rules. On the other hand,"Although Kierkegaard has faith that humans can discover what they need to know to live truly, he thinks that the process God has designed to make this possible is one that goes through *subjectivity*" (66) [emphasis added].

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Φιλοσοφια
Volume 15, 2:2014

BOOK NOTE

Matthew Altman and Cynthia Coe. *The fractured self in Freud and German philosophy*

Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave-Macmillan 2013, 247 pp.

From the title, the book betrays its Freudian interest. It actually serves a double purpose or aims at a double goal. The authors intend to offer an account of Sigmund Freud as a philosopher, in line of the modern German philosophical current that begins with Immanuel Kant and is often thought to end with Friedrich Nietzsche. The assumption which the authors try to demonstrate is that this current does not actually stop there, but continues and culminates in Freud, himself a disciple of Franz Brentano. Recent studies of psychoanalysis have paid attention to its philosophical implications, rather than to protract the exhausting debate on whether psychoanalysis can be considered as a science or not.

In the second place, the book also offers a theory of subjectivity as "fractured self," which as embodied is historically and linguistically conditioned. Related to this fact, the impact of the said conditions is assessed on personal freedom and identity, as well as on knowledge.

The book—which offers a mixed index of proper names and concepts at the end, as well as a bibliography—is composed of nine chapters that could be read more or less independently from each other. The sequence of articles is organized according to a more or less chronological pattern. In each article, a certain philosopher or theme is analyzed and compared with Freud and his position. Most of the time, there are striking analogies, but also particularities that turn Freud into a "special case." This is related to Freud's strong empirical orientation, given his background in medicine.

The first three articles focus on the issue of consciousness versus unconsciousness. The critical philosophy of Kant and its effects on the traditional *subject*, tagged "inscrutable," appears as first in the row. Kant's thoughts are echoed in those of Freud when he defines reality as constructed by the knowing subject and its capacity of judgment and fantasy. Likewise, the self is not transparent to itself. However, while Kant takes a transcendental stand in his analysis, Freud attaches more importance to empirically retrieved data. While Kant supports the idea that knowledge is not possible without perception and its distorting interpretation or judgment, Freud focuses on the repressed but not inaccessible content of the Unconscious.

The second article is entitled "The self as creator and creature," featuring the philosophy of Johann Gottlieb Fichte. This German ideologist attempts to make sense of the relation between sense impressions (= a posteriori), the subject (and its a priori-thinking or judging) and the objective world. While the world puts a retraining limit to the subject, this one has posited the world as the "non-I," after receiving a "check" by

what is neither the world nor the "I," but a "feeling" that is simply "given." This position is considered as an attempt to reconcile autonomy and heteronomy, while Freud opts for a radically materialist position.

The third philosopher in the row is Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling. He is presented under the somewhat enigmatic subtitle, "Methodologies of the unconscious." Anticipating Freud, and unlike Georg Hegel, Schelling believes the conscious "I" to be a product of something beyond consciousness: the Absolute. As a creative force, the Absolute produces both thought and nature. It can be approached through negative philosophy—which focuses on the gradual dialectic coinciding of subject and object—and through positive philosophy, that immediately zooms in on being before reason. Unlike Freud, Schelling identifies the Absolute with God as unconditioned freedom. Still unlike Freud— who would rather use hypnotherapy to uncover unconscious powers—Schelling believes that revelation can make up for the shortcomings of reason. The nonreflexive, intellectual intuition of the divinity of nature can also do so. However, Schelling is widely believed to have failed as a philosopher in placing the unity of God and being beyond the realm of reason.

The framework of German idealism in the strict sense is abandoned with the inclusion of Arthur Schopenhauer as fourth in the row of philosophers. The theme that will also orient the two following chapters is shifted to "the possibility of self-transformation." Schopenhauer emphasizes the fundamental role played by drives. The Kantian "thing-in-itself" is nothing else than the will. The world is the embodied appearance of the will, or the will in otherness. Knowledge is not an abstraction, but an instrument of the will to live, which is somewhat comparable to Freud's *id*. Schopenhauer turns pessimistic when he puts that the will is purposeless and that whenever a desire is satisfied, a new one rises, so longing or suffering remains. This is the case for all beings in the natural world. The only escape from this "vanity of existence" occurs through having compassion on other beings, when one refuses to prioritize one's own wishes over those of others. In this way, the will is turned against itself, in an act of denial or renunciation. Freud is not as negative as Schopenhauer about desire in the life of a person. Social reality definitely makes a lot of wishes unfit for fulfillment, as expressed in the internal conflict between the *ego*, the *id*, and the *superego*, but those desires can be redirected in socially acceptable ways, for instance, through sublimation.

Friedrich Daniel Ernst Schleiermacher is introduced under the subtitle, "The psychological significance of translation." The point of comparison with Freud is in the role played by interpretation or transference. Experience is always conditioned by a horizon. Likewise, every textual expression reflects the horizon of the author. In the hermeneutic process, the text moves from one horizon to another through translation that can be either too faithful to the author's background or too accommodating to the reader's context and conceptual system. As translation is always doomed to fail somehow, new experiences are inevitably colored by the receiver's interpretative horizon. The attempt to do completely away with dogmatism in, for instance, the history of philosophy, is itself based upon the dogma of the possibility of absolute objectivity and transparency!

In the heading "Freeing ourselves from ourselves," the authors attempt to confront Freud with Karl Marx. This is not a difficult comparison, one would think. Indeed, both are keen to identify and address internal obstacles to freedom, and propose remedies. The role played by material conditions of life in Marx is somewhat comparable to that of

the unconscious drives in Freud. In both cases, conscious life is determined by what occurs "below the surface." However, the authors claim that Marx neglects the psychological implications of materialism, and that he underestimates unconscious attachments to authority that prevent the masses from throwing off the yoke of repression. Commodity fetishism is hard to overcome, precisely because of its psychological foundation, in spite of an ideology critique. The cynical, rationalizing subject clings to its irrational prejudices, protects its ideological source of alienation. While Marx could benefit from psychoanalysis, Freud appears to forget that the mind functions in a material, social, and economic context. The authors conclude that both perspectives could complement each other.

Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel appears as the seventh in the philosophers' parade, much later than Fichte and Schelling, whom the authors try to correct or complete. While this may seem a bit surprising, much less surprising is the presentation of Friedrich Nietzsche in the next or second-to-the-last chapter. Historicity is at the center of the comparison between Hegel, Nietzsche, and Freud. For the first, history is what is being consciously reflected upon by the subject. Through interpretation, history is gradually transformed into a process of self-fulfillment of the spirit (*Geist*) and expressed in a rational narrative. The genesis of consciousness can only occur through its detachment from what is nonconscious or natural, as the human is opposed to the animal. In his zeal to distinguish both, Hegel defends the cultural superiority of the West over other cultures, even showing support for imperialism and slavery. Freud associates history and the past with the unconscious, which tends to resist conscious representation, and emerges in the form of traces or symptoms instead. Rather than to focus on the historical self-realization of consciousness, Freud investigates the non- or prehistorical founding moments of civilization, like the killing of the primal father. The recurrence of past patterns and structures illustrates how a progressive and rational society remains illusory according to Freud.

This point already prepares the way for a reflection on Nietzsche. The parallelism between his thought and that of Freud has been widely recognized, even by Freud himself. Nietzsche has emphasized his opposition to the autonomy of the subject as no other, while making this subject dependent on historical contingency. The difference with Freud lies in the relative lack of precision in Nietzsche's account of this dependency, as the authors argue. It is centered around concepts like "genealogy" and "will to power." The former tends to demonstrate how present values and practices are rooted in the past. The latter provides the explanation why certain transformations in the value system have happened. Nietzsche points in particular to the so-called "slave revolt in morals," when the natural, aristocratic value-system was overthrown in favor of a new one, mainly inspired by Judeo-Christian ideology, "turning the will against life." This "ascetic" value system dumps the natural tendency to forget and introduces remembrance of the past as basis for responsibility and guilt, two of its highly efficient "weapons." Notwithstanding his critical analysis, Nietzsche does not recommend an effective, reparatory return to the "aristocratic" morals, recommending instead to appreciate the meaning of "eternal recurrence." Freud somewhat completes Nietzsche in his approach to deal with repressed psychic traumas. Once symptoms have been identified and properly connected to their cause, the healing process requires a "working through" that has reminiscences of Nietzsche's genealogy.

The last of nine chapters is dedicated to the themes on the "death of God," "mourning," and the link between both. Drawing on Kant, Schopenhauer, and Nietzsche, the authors deal with Freud's account of melancholy and mourning, emphasizing the therapeutic role of the latter, as it allows the wounded subject to make sense of the ongoing transformation of the present into the past. Transcendental idealism has turned the classical worldview upside down, as it did away with the thing-in-itself, and with God as object of theoretical knowledge. However, Kant reaffirmed God as founder of the moral order. The loss of God in the theoretical level was compensated or repaired by his reintroduction in another level. This process comes near to what was called "melancholy" by Freud, as well as by Judith Butler. Basically, it could be considered as a defense mechanism of the "ego" against the loss. If melancholy led to optimism in Kant, in Schopenhauer it was rather the opposite. This is partly the result of his implicit assumption that the world should be rationally understandable or that being and knowing should be one for life to be happy. Against both, Nietzsche denies the correspondence between being and knowing, believing in such would not only mean forcing one's rational prejudices on the dynamic reality, but also forming a severe inconsistency with Kant's epistemological position. He instead recommends a new faith in the eternal recurrence, affirming the will to power, against or beyond asceticism.

The authors conclude with some considerations on contemporary culture that could benefit from the thoughts discussed above. As Western culture still appears to be struggling with the aftermath of Nietzsche's proclamation of the death of God and often feels uncomfortable in dealing with suffering and death, a proper understanding and integration of Nietzschean and Freudian strategies to deal with a world "whose gods have fled" appears worthwhile. Before the presentation of a Freudian "after-education," the ambitious objective of the book to confront Freud with modern German philosophers is given a challenging conclusion, as it implies to "mend" fractures between them and today's subject.

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BOOK NOTICES

Stephen Asma. 2012. Against fairness. *Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 224pp. $22.50.*

Among the characteristics of contemporary, democratic Western culture, "fairness" or "equality" definitely figures at the top. This quality is contradicted by "bias" or "favoritism," that is deemed to be product of a pre-civilized past, or of some alien culture. Stephen Asma profoundly challenges this view, in a book that excels in readability and vividness of style, as well as in the richness of its documentation. Indeed, Asma uses many registers to defend his case. Drawing on examples of contemporary American culture and politics, and blending them with experiences of oriental cultures and philosophies, he manages to show how unnatural "egalitarianism" is, and how it differs from "morality." Using also discoveries by neuroscience in support of the "natural" disposition of mammals to mother-child bonding, and of the "hierarchical" programming of the emotional part of the human brain, the author identifies "egalitarianism" as a product of modern culture. Standardization in modern group painting, as well as increased wealth and tolerance, form the background of the enlightened emphasis on rationality and universality, that culminates in Immanuel Kant's categorical imperative and in Jeremy Bentham's (and Peter Singer's) utilitarianism. The latter requires, indeed, a sort of mathematical operation to identify the greatest good for the greatest number, and make a proper moral choice. Through his challenging and captivating approach, Asma tries to reclaim "tribe," "nepotism," and "preferentialism" from moral suspicion and give them a new and respectful place within modern, liberal culture. (W. M. A.V.)

Francesca Pasquali. 2012. Virtuous imbalance. *Farnham (UK)-Burlington (USA): Ashgate. 224pp. £55 (Hard Cover).*

Theoretical treatises on the nature and mission of political philosophy are rarely appealing to most readers. Yet the work by Francesca Pasquali is truly captivating, as it attempts to define a framework for the practice of political philosophy. Since this discipline combines two fields, one being that of theoretical philosophy, the other that of political practice, it risks acquiring a somewhat hybrid identity, since both have different aims and methods. However, the author manages to produce a fruitful encounter between two opposed methodological criteria, which are desirability and feasibility originating from utopianism and realism, respectively. While the former is mainly interested in the study of normative criteria and evaluative standards, the latter is more concerned with the adequate reflection of observable political reality, or with practical political regulations. While Plato is widely presented as an epigone of the former line, the latter is associated by the author with Niccolo Machiavelli. A critique is also offered of John Rawls's so-called "realistic utopianism," which basically fails to achieve its objectives, being closer to realism, as Rawls rejects to mix political philosophy with metaphysical speculation. Drawing on Gerald Cohen, the author suggests that political philosophy should be primarily philosophical, meaning that it is called to reflect on norms before considering their eventual (in)feasibility. A reformulated

version of realistic utopianism should be able to truly bridge the perennial gap between the world of concepts and that of facts. There is no doubt that this book will readily enrich the shelves of scholars in political science, political philosophy, and ethics. (W. M. A. V.)

Bruckner, Pascal. 2013. The fanaticism of the Apocalypse: Save the earth, punish human beings. *Cambridge (UK)-Malden (USA): Polity Press. 224p. $25.*

Environmental concerns have become a familiar ingredient of personal and collective life today. Every individual or family is confronted with a set of rules and laws ranging from restrictions on the use of plastic bags to the proliferation of wind turbines and solar panels that are intended to protect the environment. While many are adjusting to these restrictions with an air of indifference, most people are somewhat convinced that not doing so is more than just committing a traffic offense. Pascal Bruckner uses the term "catastrophism" when he refers to the widespread conviction that the planet is heading for huge disaster as an effect of practices that were brought about by modern science and progress. Clearly inspired by psychoanalysis, Bruckner compares the current atmosphere to that of prevalent practices in traditional catholic circles, that aimed at promoting faith and spiritual growth at the expense of scrupulous self-observation and excessive guilt. The author also believes that the emphasis on imminent calamity is rooted in a hidden, passionate attraction to disaster, which started to dominate political attention in the aftermath of the collapse of the former Soviet Union and its power block. Supported by a wealth of examples, the author brilliantly deconstructs the rhetoric of catastrophe, from either side of the political spectrum, pointing at its inconsistencies and its prejudices. He also identifies injustices in the global political and economic order that may be produced or maintained by such rhetoric. In the end, catastrophism is also a sign of the collective ageing of Western society, that has become unable to focus on a positive project, and limits itself to criticizing and dismantling what was once the pride of modernity. The author recommends in an epilogue to turn the alleged disease into a remedy: only by a renewed—but not fanatic—belief in the power of human intellectual creativity can life on earth remain sustainable. Bruckner has delivered a dynamic and definitely provoking work that will appeal to critical minds of various interest. (W. M. A. V.)

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Φιλοσοφια
Volume 15, 2:2014

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The Philippine National Philosophical Research Society expresses its sincerest gratitude to the following:

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Institute for the History of Philosophy and Pedagogy
Rockville, Maryland

MELBIN AND RUBY MANALO
Insular Milling and Agro Industrial Technologies, Inc.
Metro Manila

RHODERICK V. AND ELIZABETH MORALES NUNCIO
Metro Manila

JULIETO AND SYLVIA PILAPIL
Regina, Saskatchewan
Canada

Φιλοσοφια

Volume 15, No. 2: May

2014

Φιλοσοφια (Philosophia: International Journal of Philosophy) is published every January and May of each year. *Φιλοσοφια* is international in that authors come from different countries, but the medium is English—British or American. Manuscripts submitted for publication in the journal must be sent to the Editor, *Philosophia*, via email attachment (drgrips@yahoo.com or drgrips@gmail.com) in Microsoft Word format, font twelve, Times New Roman. Manuscripts are blind refereed. To view samples of the journal, please visit http://ejournals.ph/index.php?journal=PIJP and http://www.pnprs.org.

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Φιλοσοφια is abstracted in *The Philosopher's Index*, Bowling Green, Ohio; in *Thomson Reuters* (formerly ISI) *Web of Knowledge*, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; and in *Scopus*, Amsterdam, the Netherlands. It is also listed in *Ulrich's International Periodicals Directory*. The Philippine Commission on Higher Education has certified the journal as Category A-1. The new ISSN numbers of the journal are 2244-1875 (print) and 2244-1883 (online).