A FOUCAULDIAN REEXAMINATION OF THE ARISTOTELIAN, AQUINIAN, AND CONTEMPORARY ROMAN CATHOLIC THEORIES OF HOMINIZATION

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Hominization theory speculates on the process and chronology of a human embryo’s ensoulment. Aristotle, a key ancient Greek thinker, presented his own hominization theory based on his hylemorphic metaphysics and pioneering researches in embryology. Thomas Aquinas, a medieval philosopher and theologian, built his Christian and Catholic hominization theory on the foundations laid down by Aristotle. The contemporary Roman Catholic Church, with its own prolife, anti-abortion and anticontraception agenda, modified the Aristotelian and Thomistic hominization theories by allegedly benchmarking on recent developments in human embryology. This paper uses the archeological and genealogical methods, as developed by the French poststructuralist and postmodernist philosopher Michel Foucault, in reexamining these three hominization theories as discourses, in comparing and contrasting their epistemic contexts, and in peering into their respective genealogies. Contrary to common assumptions, these three hominization theories have very few elements in common and are actually divergent. The underpinning intention of this paper is to demonstrate the strengths and weaknesses of the contemporary Roman Catholic Church’s hominization theory.

INTRODUCTION

Hominization theory is the philosophical/theological discourse on the process and chronology of the ensoulment of human beings. It is generally believed that the current Roman Catholic doctrine on hominization evolved from Thomas Aquinas [1225-1274], which in turn evolved from Aristotle [384-322 BCE]. Instead of assuming this smooth developmental narrative from the Greek period to the present times, this paper attempts to look at the same series of theories under the interpretive and critical frameworks of Michel Foucault’s [1926-84] archeology and genealogy. The overall intention is to glean a deeper understanding of the philosophical strengths and weaknesses of the contemporary Roman Catholic Church’s hominization doctrine by discursively comparing and contrasting it with the analogous
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ARISTOTLE’S HOMINIZATION THEORY

Being a son of a court physician who was a member of the guild of Asclepius, Aristotle was most probably reared in the practice of keenly observing patients and the natural world even before he joined Plato’s [428-348 BCE] Academy in Athens (Anagnostopoulos 2009, 5). When Plato died Aristotle went to Assos, in Asia Minor, under the protection of its despot and fellow Academician Hermias, and ventured into a more systematic research in biology. After the death of Hermias, he proceeded to the island of Lesbos where he collaborated with a young intellectual named Theophrastus [371-287 BCE]. These two thinkers are now honored as the founders of biology, with Aristotle identified with zoology and Theophrastus with botany. Aristotle returned to Athens to finally establish his own school, the Lyceum, which explored such fields as astronomy, biology, cosmology, ethics, logic, metaphysics, music, physics, political theory, psychology, and rhetoric. His more specific investigations on the development of the embryo also gave him the honor of being considered as the founder of embryology.

Aristotle’s hominization theory was formed at the juncture point of his hylemorphic metaphysics and his pioneering investigations on the human and animal embryos. The hylemorphic theory, from the Greek roots \textit{hyle} (matter) and \textit{morphe} (form), is basically a reaction against Plato’s idealistic and dualistic metaphysics. Hence, instead of talking about concrete beings as imperfect reproductions of heavenly forms as Plato would, Aristotle insisted that concrete beings are composed of tightly fitted matter and form. As a realist, Aristotle taught that the forms are woven into the very fabric of concrete beings and, as a moderate dualist, he taught that matter and form cannot exist apart from each other. In hylemorphism, substantial change is explained as matter’s loss of its old form and its subsequent acquisition of a new one. Aristotle (1931, 3–4) argued that the forms of living things are their \textit{psyche} (life principle or soul). He classified souls into three: the nutritive or plant soul; the sentient or animal soul; and the rational or human soul. The nutritive soul is the simplest kind of soul; the sentient soul subsumes the powers of the nutritive soul; and the rational soul subsumes the powers of both the nutritive and the sentient soul. Since souls are the forms of living things, souls, including human souls, cannot exist apart from their respective bodies.

Aristotle’s embryology, on the other hand, detailed the development of the human fetus through some meticulous studies of aborted embryos and fetuses in comparison with his dissections of animal wombs and bird eggs. For Aristotle (1943, 159–63, and 171–75), the embryo originated from the male \textit{sperma} (semen) and the female \textit{katamenia} (menstrual fluid). The semen contains \textit{dynamis} (active component) made of \textit{pneuma} (quintessence or the material that makes up the stars) which upon contact causes the female menstrual fluid...
to solidify, just as rennet curdles milk in the process of making cheese. After the initial
curdling of the menstrual fluid, the semen acts further in forming the *kuema* (embryo or fetus). The female, according to Aristotle (1943, 201-205), provides the materials and the nutritive soul of the early embryo. Like a *sporos* (seed), this early embryo is then planted on
the womb. The male imparts the sentient soul to the embryo, causing its animal heart to beat.
From that moment on, the semen—having done its job—evaporates, leaving the embryo to
get its sustenance from the female bloodstream. In an undetermined moment, when the fetus
is already complex enough to receive the highest kind of soul, it sheds off its sentient soul and
acquires its rational soul. Aristotle’s embryology is said to be epigenetic in the sense
that it details the gradual formation and development of the embryo/fetus, in contrast to
preformative theories that argue that a tiny human being is already present in the semen or
in the menstrual material.

The often mentioned Aristotelian assertion that hominization occurs at the vicinity of
the fortieth day for the male fetus and at the vicinity of the ninetieth day for the female fetus
does not have a clear textual basis. The pertinent part of Aristotle’s (1883, 182) *History of
animals* only mentions these days in relation to early movements of the fetus. Based on the
logic of Aristotle’s metaphysics and embryology, fetal movement does not necessarily
indicate the presence of the rational soul, as movement could be the effect of the sentient
soul.

The delayed hominization theory and embryology of Aristotle influenced not only the
writers of the *Book of Job* and the *Wisdom of Solomon* of the Old Testament but also early
Christian thinkers like Augustine of Hippo [354-430 CE] and Anselm of Canterbury [1033-
1109], as well as the Prophet Muhammad [570-632 CE] (Needham 1959, 64). Aristotle’s
(Maienschein 2008, 328) embryology in particular retained its dominance on philosophers
and scientists up to the eighteenth century.

**AQUINAS’S HOMINIZATION THEORY**

Living fifteen centuries after the death of Aristotle, Aquinas first encountered the
former’s works as a student at the University of Naples. After Aquinas joined the newly-
formed mendicant order of Saint Dominic, he was sent to Paris and then to Cologne to
further study under the guidance of Albert the Great [1200-80], an expert on Aristotle and an
early advocate of the stance that this Greek philosopher can be used to expound Christian
theology. Aquinas returned to Paris to earn his degree. The rest of his life was spent
teaching, doing administrative tasks for his order, and writing in France and Italy. He plunged
himself into the raging controversy of his day on how Christian theology can come to terms
with Aristotle. Although he referred to Aristotle as “the Philosopher,” Platonic elements are
also present in Aquinas’s thought, imbibed through the writings of Augustine of Hippo,
Proclus of Athens [412-85 CE], Anicius Manlius Severinus Boethius [480-524 CE], and the
Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite [500 CE]. Despite having been trained by Albert the
Great, who dabbled in alchemy and natural science, Aquinas is more known today for his
theology and philosophy.

Aquinas appropriated both Aristotle’s hylemorphic metaphysics and embryology,
although not without some subtle alterations. In Aquinas’s hylemorphism, Aristotle’s *hyle*
became *materia* and *morpheme* became *forma*. Aquinas followed Aristotle in asserting that
concrete beings are composed of tightly woven matter and form, that for living things their forms are their psyche or anima (soul), and that there are three classes of anima: the nutritive, the sentient, and the rational souls. Although Aquinas agreed with Aristotle that as a rule matter and forms cannot exist apart from each other, the former’s Catholic Christian point of view goaded him to seek an exception for the rational soul. In other words, Aquinas (1923, 220-24) diverged from Aristotelian hylemorphism by arguing that the rational soul can exist after being separated from the body during the moment of death.

Aquinas’s teacher, Albert the Great, did not only comment on the Aristotelian corpus but also undertook his own researches in embryology, consequently reawakening the discipline during the medieval ages (Needham 1959, 86). Hence, Albert the Great’s embryology, although recognizably Aristotelian, varied from that of Aristotle in some aspects, particularly in expounding that Epicurean doctrine that both the male and the female contribute seeds during conception, and that the menstrual fluid is only analogous to the yolk of an egg (Needham 1959, 86-87). However, Aquinas followed Aristotle more closely than his own teacher. Thus, for Aquinas (1947), only the male contributes seeds, because the female merely gives the fetal material. Aquinas called the Aristotelian dynamis (virtus formativa or active component) and referred to pneuma as some “heat derived from the power of the heavenly bodies.” Although in not as detailed a manner as Aristotle, Aquinas also hinted that the female provides the nutritive soul of the early embryo, while the male imparts the sentient soul. Implanted on the womb and possessing a sentient soul, the embryo can now take care of its own growth and development. Again, in an undetermined moment, when the fetus is already complex enough to receive the highest kind of soul, it sheds off its sentient soul and acquires its rational soul. At this point, Aquinas (1923, 257-59) diverged again from Aristotle by stressing that the newly acquired rational soul must have been freshly created by God. Albert the Great (Needham 1959, 91) also diverges from Aristotle in this respect. Like Aristotle’s delayed hominization theory, Aquinas’s theory is epigenetic.

The often mentioned Aquinian assertion that hominization occurs at the vicinity of the fortieth day for the male fetus and at the vicinity of the ninetieth day for the female fetus again does not have a clear textual basis. The pertinent part of Aquinas’s Commentary on the sentences [of Peter Lombard] (n.d.) merely quotes Aristotle’s aforementioned text from the History of animals, which, as already explained, only discusses the early movements of the fetus.

Aquinas’s delayed hominization theory eventually seeped into mainstream Catholic theology. About four decades after his death, his Aristotelian hylemorphic construct of human nature was endorsed by the Council of Vienne [1311-12]; and about three centuries after his death, his teaching on ensoulment was presumed true by the Council of Trent [1545-63]. The Roman Catholic Church’s adherence to the Aquinian delayed hominization theory, however, was very briefly revoked by Pope Sixtus V [1521-90], who issued the bull Effraenatum in 1588. The latter set aside the traditional distinction between abortion of the un-ensouled and ensouled fetuses, promulgating the penalty of excommunication for all sorts of procured abortion and the use of contraception. Pope Sixtus V was succeeded by Urban VII [1521-90], who reigned only for thirteen days, and was consequently succeeded by Pope Gregory XIV [1535-91]. With the publication of Sedes apostolica in 1591, Pope Gregory XIV overturned Sixtus V’s rather harsh penalty for all sorts of procured abortion and contraception and herded the Church back to the lucid philosophy of Aquinas’s delayed
hominization theory. Hence, as late as the second decade of the twentieth century, elements of Aquinas’s theory were still part of a list of theses proffered by the Vatican’s Sacred Congregation of Studies as pointers for philosophical instruction in Catholic seminaries, colleges, and universities (Donceel 1970, 90-91).

ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH HOMINIZATION THEORY

The sustained revocation of the Roman Catholic Church’s centuries-old acceptance of Aquinas’s delayed hominization theory started with Pope Pius IX [1792-1878], whose Apostolicae sedis moderationi of 1869 again set aside the distinction between the abortion of the un-ensouled and ensouled fetuses, promulgating the penalty of excommunication for all sorts of procured abortion. The said document, however, did not touch the issue of contraception, which Pope Sixtus V’s Effraenatam equated with abortion and homicide. The Apostolicae sedis moderationi itself is cryptic about the underlying reasons for the revocation of the Roman Catholic Church’s subscription to the delayed hominization theory (Maienschein 2008, 332). About five decades after the publication of the said document, Pope Pius IX’s elimination of the distinction between un-ensouled and ensouled, as well as between the unformed and formed, fetuses was incorporated into the Code of Canon Law of 1917.

Pope Pius XI [1857-1939], in his encyclical Casti connubii (1930, 67) reiterated Pope Pius IX’s implicit rejection of the Aquinian delayed theory of ensoulment and consequent subscription to the immediate theory of ensoulment by criminalizing as homicide abortion of all sorts. Hence, the document forbids therapeutic abortion even at the point of risking the mother’s life (Pius XI 1930, 64). Pope John XXIII [1881-1963] (1961, 194) explicitly subscribed to the idea of immediate ensoulment in his encyclical Mater et magistra, where he stated, “Human life is sacred.... From its very inception it reveals the creating hand of God.” Like the Apostolicae sedis moderationi, both Casti connubii and Mater et magistra are cryptic about their underlying reasons for subscribing to the immediate ensoulment theory.

The earliest official document that philosophically argues for this rather new stand of the Roman Catholic Church on ensoulment is the “Declaration on procured abortion,” which was issued by the Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith. This document (1974, 12) categorically says:

...from the time that the ovum is fertilized, a life is begun which is neither that of the father nor of the mother, it is rather the life of a new human being with his own growth. It would never be made human if it were not human already.

Yet the same document (1974, 13) comes with the comment that “even if a doubt existed concerning whether the fruit of conception is already a human person, it is objectively a grave sin to dare to risk murder.” Since the publication of this official document the Roman Catholic Church has been mired in the vague theorization on ensoulment. On one hand, it wants to assert that the embryo is a human being from the start, while on the other hand, it does not commit itself as to when the infusion of the human soul happens. Two decades after the issuance of the “Declaration on procured abortion,” Pope John Paul II [1920-2005]
affirmed the Church’s vague stance on hominization in his *Evangelium vitae* of 1995. John Paul II (1995, 60) explains:

...over and above all scientific debates and those philosophical affirmations to which the Magisterium has not expressly committed itself, the Church has always taught and continues to teach that the result of human procreation, from the first moment of its existence, must be guaranteed that unconditional respect which is morally due to the human being in his or her totality and unity as body and spirit.

The idea that the developments in scientific embryology are what prompted the Roman Catholic Church to revise its stand on hominization could be true with reference to Pius IX’s *Apostolicae sedis moderationi*, but not with reference to the “Declaration on procured abortion” and Pope John Paul II’s *Evangelium vitae*. Between these two documents, from 1869 and 1974, more developments happened in scientific embryology that actually constrained the Roman Catholic Church in fully pursuing the immediate ensoulment leaning of *Apostolicae sedis moderationi*. In the early years, scientists, with their crude microscopes, pushed for preformative embryology, some claiming that tiny human beings are present in sperm cells, others claiming that these are on the contrary present in egg cells. In the twentieth century, epigenetic embryology has become an undisputed discourse. Preformative embryology could have lent support to immediate hominization. Furthermore, twentieth century scientific embryology has established that a given human embryo could be separated into two or more viable embryos, and that two or more previously separated human embryos could recombine into a single viable embryo (Maienschein 2008, 341). Hence, if the Roman Catholic Church would stubbornly insist that ensoulment happens immediately during conception, it would be embroiled in a metaphysical absurdity, that is, of stating that the soul of a given human embryo could also be divided into two or more souls, and that the souls of those previously separated human embryos could be again combined into a single soul. Cloning would be another metaphysical problem because a human being could theoretically be generated not from the process of conception but through a nuclear transplant from a mature cell to an enucleated egg. Thus, whereas the contemporary Roman Catholic Church is rather emphatic in labelling abortion at any stage as homicide, it could not proffer a lucid philosophical discourse for its immediate hominization preference.

**FOUCAULDIAN ARCHEOLOGY AND GENEALOGY**

Foucault was a French historian of ideas, structuralist/poststructuralist philosopher, and political activist who was trained at the prestigious Ecole Normale Superieure. He studied under such eminent thinkers as the structuralist Marxist Louis Althusser [1918-90], the phenomenologist Maurice Merleau-Ponty [1908-61], the Hegelian Jean Hyppolite [1907-68], and the philosopher of science Georges Canguilhem [1904-95]. After working in several countries as an academic and cultural diplomat, Foucault became a professor of systems of thought at the College de France. His writings influenced so many disciplines, ranging from the traditional fields of history, literature, sociology, philosophy, economics, architecture,
art, and education; to the more recent fields of cultural studies, gender studies, postcolonialism, media, journalism; as well as to the applied fields of medicine, public health, social work, law, business management, government, criminology, penology, computing, public relations, and ecology. He developed two powerful and complementary historical methods: archeology of knowledge and genealogy of knowledge.

**Archeology of Knowledge**

What Foucault called the “archeology of knowledge” is a method that he developed through his researches that resulted to his dissertation *The history of madness* of 1961, as well as in the publications *The birth of the clinic* of 1963 and *The order of things* of 1966. He (1972, 14-15) explicated, articulated, and systematized this method in his work *The archeology of knowledge*. If there are two thinkers who crucially influenced Foucault’s formulation of his archeology of knowledge, these would be the leading theorist of the Annales School, Fernand Braudel [1902-85], and the former’s own dissertation sponsor, Canguilhem. Braudel (1949) introduced an influential kind of historiography that treated actors, action, and events as mere surface disturbances. What mattered for him were the deeper and slow-moving geographic and social structures that have determined such surface disturbances. Canguilhem (1970), on the other hand, critiqued the idea of “precursor” in the realm of the history of scientific ideas. He argued that the concept or theory under consideration and its supposed precursor are divided by a chasm that is delineated by the distinct contexts and particularities of the same concept or theory and its precursor.

Traditional history of ideas, or history of concepts, or intellectual histories, usually explore the theorizing of selected individual or thinker by talking about the earlier theories that influenced such an individual or thinker, then the theory *per se* of such individual or thinker, and finally the succeeding individuals and thinkers who were influenced by the theory under investigation. In Foucault’s (1972, 137) own words, such investigations had focused on “interferences...descriptions of the concentric circles that surround works, underlie them, relate them to one another, and insert them into whatever they are not.” Following Canguilhem, Foucault’s archeology of knowledge deviates from this concern with precursors and derivatives, although it does not totally brush aside the importance of such personalized method. Following Braudel, Foucault’s archeology aims to probe deeper into the intellectual collective subconscious of the culture and society that produced the theory under consideration. Foucault (1972, 138) writes: “archaeology tries to define not the thoughts, representations, images, themes, preoccupations that are concealed or revealed in discourses; but those discourses themselves, those discourses as practices obeying certain rules.” Hence, if traditional history of ideas or knowledge is anthropocentrically concerned with precursors and derivatives, Foucault’s archeology of knowledge is structure-oriented and systems-oriented as it analyzes the intellectual landscape of a given individual or thinker. It asks the question, “What has made the theory of this individual or thinker meaningful and possible in the first place?”

Foucault (1972, 191) calls this intellectual collective subconscious, or the structures and systems that make the new theory meaningful and possible, the “*episteme.*” The
episteme is like a worldview that contextualizes the individual or thinker and provides him with a range of ideas, concepts, methodologies, and theoretical frameworks, all of which can make his theory both possible and meaningful. Foucault (1972, 191) clarifies:

...by episteme, we mean, in fact, the total set of relations that unite, at a given period, the discursive practices that give rise to epistemological figures, sciences, and possibly formalized systems; the way in which, in each of these discursive formations, the transitions to epistemologization, scientificity, and formalization are situated and operate; the distribution of these thresholds, which may coincide, be subordinated to one another, or be separated by shifts in time; the lateral relations that may exist between epistemological figures or sciences in so far as they belong to neighboring, but distinct, discursive practices.

An episteme bounds together an epoch, or at least a group of individuals or thinkers, discourses, and practices (Foucault 1970, 168). Epistemes consolidate and crumble in accordance to the rise and fall of their respective epochs, or their respective groups of individuals or thinkers, discourses, and practices (Foucault 1972,192). However, the question of how these epistemes actually consolidate and crumble is beyond the scope of archeology of knowledge, as it is only intent in grasping the characteristics of such epistemes. In order for the archeology of knowledge to adequately grasp the characteristics of a given episteme, it has to engage in a comparative study of two or more epochs, or groups of individuals or thinkers, discourses, and practices. Traditional history of ideas or knowledge might have done similar comparative studies, but archeology of knowledge does not follow their tendency of plotting such epochs and groups into narratives of progression, development, and evolution. On the contrary, the archeology of knowledge is more interested in highlighting the radical differences between such epochs and groups.

**Genealogy of Knowledge**

Foucault’s archeology of knowledge proved to be a very incisive method in understanding individuals or thinkers, discourses, and practices by making them relative to the epistemes of their respective epochs or groups. However, as already mentioned, the archeology of knowledge does not pursue the reasons why epistemes consolidate and crumble and, consequently, why epochs change and why groups of individuals or thinkers, discourses, and practices change. In his work *Discipline and punish: The birth of the prison*, Foucault (1975) deploys a new method, which he calls “genealogy of knowledge.” It supplemented the power of his earlier archeology of knowledge. If there is one thinker who crucially influenced Foucault’s formulation of his genealogy of knowledge, it would be Friedrich Nietzsche [1844-1900], one of the great masters of suspicion who helped shape the thoughts of many French poststructuralist thinkers. Nietzsche’s *On the genealogy of morals* (1967) has laid down the template on how to historically analyze a lofty discourse, such as Christian morality, by plumbing its mundane and often embarrassing foundations that show the interconnections among knowledge, values, and power. Foucault (1984) wrote the essay “Nietzsche, genealogy, history,” which sketched the broad outline of his own genealogical method.

It is important to note at the outset that Foucault did not intend to replace the archeology
of knowledge with the genealogy of knowledge. Rather, he intended the latter to subsume the former (Best and Kellner 1991, 49). With two or more epochs or groups of individuals or thinkers, discourses, and practices at hand, archeology of knowledge can only compare and contrast such epochs and groups, but genealogy of knowledge can delve into the causes and factors as to why such epochs and groups change. Following Nietzsche’s method, Foucault’s genealogy of knowledge also examines epochal changes, as well as changes among groups of individuals or thinkers, discourses, and practices, by delving into their mundane and often embarrassing foundations. Foucault (1984, 81) writes:

...to follow the complex course of descent is to maintain passing events in their proper dispersion; it is to identify the accidents, the minute deviations—or conversely, the complete reversals—the errors, the false appraisals, and the faulty calculations that gave birth to those things that continue to exist and have value for us; it is to discover that truth or being does not lie at the root of what we know and what we are, but the exteriority of accidents.

Following Nietzsche, Foucault’s genealogy of knowledge also reached down on the interconnections among knowledge, values, and power. Foucault (1984, 82) states:

...descent attaches itself to the body. It inscribes itself in the nervous system, in temperament, in the digestive apparatus; it appears in faulty respiration, in improper diets, in the debilitated and prostate bodies of whose ancestors committed errors.

The style of analysis that links epochal changes, as well as changes among groups of individuals or thinkers, discourses, and practices, to changes in power relations and dynamics in a given societal context were already hinted at Foucault’s *The history of madness*. In this book, Foucault (1961) argues that the modern practice of dealing with the insane was motivated by the desire of bourgeois society to tuck everything under its blanketing notion of normalcy and rationality. Hence, the praxiological change in dealing with the insane—from the relatively free premodern mode to the physically- and spiritually-controlling modern mode—was connected to the changes on the general mode of how the larger society exercises its power and control over individuals. Although this strategy may appear analogous to the Marxist ideological critique, Foucault was careful in veering away from the shadow of Marx by avoiding the macroscopic and mechanical reduction of all matter under investigation to the economic infrastructural determinism. Foucault made it a point to focus genealogy of knowledge on the micro aspects and the individualities of the practices and technologies of power.

FOUCAULDIAN REEXAMINATION OF ARISTOTLE’S AND AQUINAS’S HOMINIZATION THEORIES

As mentioned in the early part of the introductory section of this paper, the present section will examine the hominization theories of Aristotle and Aquinas using the archeological and genealogical methods of Foucault. Thus, the first task is to highlight the radical
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differences between the two hominization theories and to explore their respective structures and systems with the hope of grasping their respective underlying logics and epistemes. This first task corresponds with Foucault’s archeology of knowledge. The second task of the section is to pursue the reasons that occasioned the discursive and epistemic shift between the Aristotelian and Aquinian hominization theories. This second task corresponds with Foucault’s genealogy of knowledge.

Archeological Analysis

The preceding section had already alluded to the two basic differences between Aristotle and Aquinas’s hominization theories: Aquinas specifies that (1) the rational soul is infused by God, freshly created, into the fetus at the appropriate moment when such fetus is ready to receive the highest kind of soul; and (2) this rational soul can continue to exist even after the death of the body. Scholars who are stricken by the remarkable parallelism between the Aristotelian and Aquinian hominization theories would often take these two differences as mere surface or minor differences. This archeological analysis, however, would treat these allegedly surface or minor differences as the tips of icebergs that underneath would represent more profound discursive differences between the two theories at hand. These underlying profound discursive differences may be clustered under three headings: (a) differences in the theories’ discursive genre, (b) differences in the theories’ concern, and (c) differences between the Aristotelian psyche and the Aquinian anima.

Differences in Discursive Genre

The differences in discursive genre between Aristotle’s and Aquinas’s hominization theories can be detected by comparing the disciplinal scope of their pertinent texts, the methods used in the formulation of such texts, and their audiences. Aristotle’s hominization theory is contained in The history of animals and The generation of animals. Although infused with philosophy and metaphysics, these books are predominantly works in the field of natural science, specifically in the disciplines of biology and zoology which Aristotle himself pioneered. It is estimated that twenty-five percent of the extant texts of Aristotle are devoted to biology and zoology (Lennox 2011). Aquinas’s hominization theory, on the other hand, is contained in the Commentary on the sentences [of Peter Lombard], Summa contra gentiles, and Summa theologica. In contrast to Aristotle’s biological and zoological books, Aquinas’s three books are theological writings that make use of philosophy in their elaborations.

The methods used by Aristotle and Aquinas in constructing their pertinent texts are also very different. Aristotle had to perform painstaking collection of specimens, observation, and even dissections in order to reason from the nature of the perceptible to its causes. Aquinas had to use textual research in order to address a philosophical or theological question in a manner that his preferred answers or their implications would not run contrary to the doctrines of the Roman Catholic Church.

The intended audiences of Aristotle’s and Aquinas’s pertinent texts are also divergent. Aristotle’s texts were written for his students, the masters of his Lyceum, and for any other intellectuals who may be interested with philosophy in its yet undifferentiated form. Aquinas’s
texts, on the other hand, were written for his academic degree as well as for his students, his fellow masters, and any other intellectual who may be interested in philosophy and theology. During the time of Aquinas, knowledge—which during the time of Aristotle was yet undifferentiated—had already been partitioned by the universities into at least four disciplines: arts, medicine, law, and theology. Thus, whereas Aristotle’s intended audience include, among others, individuals who are interested with the natural sciences, Aquinas’s intended audience are almost exclusively individuals who are interested in theology and philosophy.

Differences in Theoretical Concern

Aristotle’s hominization theory is originally contextualized in his effort to answer the question on the reproduction of life in animals in general and in human beings in particular. In The history of animals, Aristotle’s discussion on ensoulment is embedded in the seventh book that tackled human reproduction and is preceded by the fifth book that tackled spontaneous reproduction, an erroneous belief, and sexual reproduction among nonvertebrates, and by the sixth book that tackled reproduction among birds, fish, and quadrupeds; while in the The generation of animals this same discussion is embedded in the second book that tackled sexual reproduction in general and reproduction among blooded viviparous animals.

Aquinas’s hominization theory, on the other hand, is originally contextualized in his effort to make sense out of the Jewish and Christian teaching about creation. In the Commentary on the sentences [of Peter Lombard], Aquinas’s discussion of ensoulment is embedded in the second book, which tackled the creation of the world, angels, devils, and human beings, as well as the thorny issue on the original sin; while in the Summa contra gentiles this same discussion is embedded in the second book, which also tackled creation, focusing this time on the creative power of God, the temporality of the world and creatures, and the immortality of the soul. Finally, in the Summa theologica, this same discussion is embedded in the treatise on divine conservation and governance of the world, which tackled the continued concern of God over his creation as well as the issue on procreation.

Aristotle would not be able to make sense of Aquinas’s concern for creation and procreation as the former’s cosmology presupposed an eternal world with no beginning and end and his metaphysics is not dominated by a God who cares for the world and humanity. Aquinas saw the shortcomings of Aristotle and Christianized his ensoulment theory, not by inserting into the Aristotelian text the former’s bias for a temporal world and a caring paternal God, but by salvaging the Aristotelian language as materials for his lofty theological discourse.

Differences between the Aristotelian Psyche and the Aquinian Anima

Like many Latin writers ahead of him, Aquinas used the word “anima” to mean “soul,” and he naturally used the same Latin word in dealing with Aristotle’s psyche without much concern over the subtle differences between these Latin and Greek terms. These differences may be foregrounded by exploring the provenances of the said terms. The Aristotelian psyche emerged from at least three streams of discourses: the Homeric and prephilosophical
stream, the materialist and pre-Socratic stream, and the dualistic and Platonic stream. The Homeric and prephilosophical discourse conceptualized the psyche as that hazy something that leaves the body at the time of death and persists in some sort of a shady existence in the underworld (Lorenz 2009). This stream stood as the distant backdrop of Aristotle’s own conceptualization of his psyche. The materialist and pre-Socratic discourse conceptualized psyche as something that is made up of fine matter, such as fire or the quintessence or pneuma. This material soul animates the body but could not persist after the death of the body. The dualistic and Platonic discourse conceptualized psyche as a spiritual and often divine thing that animates the body and could persist even after the death of the body. Christopher Shields (2009, 292-93), in his essay “The Aristotelian psuche,” suggests that the materialist and pre-Socratic discourse, on one hand. and the dualistic and Platonic discourse, on the other hand, constituted the Hydra and the Charybdis through which Aristotle charted a middle path that avoided both materialism and dualism. As a nonmaterialist, Aristotle considered psyche to be immaterial, and as a nondualist, he considered it to be intimately woven to the body such that both the body and the soul could not exist apart from each other.

The Aquinian anima also emerged from at least three streams of discourses: the Jewish stream that is embedded in the Old Testament, the biblical Christian stream that is embedded in the New Testament, and the early Christian elaborations. The Jewish discourse revolved around the Hebrew word nephesh that meant life principle and the seat of emotions, appetites, and thoughts. In some parts of the Old Testament nephesh is conceptualized as incapable of persisting after the death of the body, while in other parts it is conceptualized as similar to the Homeric and prephilosophical Greek soul that leaves the body at the time of death and persists in some sort of shady existence in an underworld named sheol. The biblical Christian discourse that is embedded in the New Testament made use of the Greek word psyche in talking about nephesh and introduced another term pneuma to refer to that spiritual principle that persists even after death. For the pre-Socratic materialists, pneuma was one of the fine materials that could constitute the soul, while in Aristotle’s embryology pneuma was just the constituent material of the semen’s dynamis. Hence, in the biblical Christian discourse pneuma had evolved into a spiritual soul in a tripartite and problematic schema consisting of body, soul, and spirit. The early Christian elaborations skirted the problematic tripartite schema of biblical Christianity by using the Latin word anima in talking about the Old Testament nephesh and New Testament psyche. The allusions to the immortality of the soul carried by the term “pneuma” was elaborated by the early Christian thinkers, such as Augustine, Proclus, Boethius, and Pseudo-Dionysius, by using the philosophical framework provided by the dualistic and Platonic psyche.

Hence, the anima that Aquinas inherited as his starting point was both Christian and Platonic. It was Christian in the sense that it was a key concept in talking about immortality, morality, and divine justice; and it was Platonic in the sense that in relation to the body, the emerging schema would be dualistic. When this anima came to Aquina’s hand, he maintained its Christian dimension that stipulated immortality but suppressed its Platonic dimension, which tended towards a body/soul dualism. This Aquinian suppression of the anima’s Platonic undertone can be discerned in the vicinities of the actual texts where Aquinas talked about his hominization theory. In the Summa contra gentiles (1975, 2.57, 2.64 and 2.85), for example, we can see how he invested so much time negating such Platonic themes
as the dualistic relationship between body and soul, that the soul is not some sort of Pythagorean harmony, and that the soul is not made up of the divine element. But no matter how Aquinas evaded Platonic dualism by adapting Aristotle’s hylemorphism, the former’s preference for an immortal anima pulled him towards the proximity of dualism.

Genealogical Analysis

The archeological analysis undertaken in the preceding subsection had revealed that contrary to the common perception about the similarities between the Aristotelian and Aquinian hominization theories, the same theories are in fact profoundly different. This present subsection would undertake a genealogical analysis that would pursue the reasons for this dramatic shift from a scientific discourse that is concerned with the mundane question on how animals reproduce, and that uses a hylemorphic conception of the soul, on the one hand, to a theological and philosophical discourse that is concerned with the lofty question of creation and procreation, which revolves around a dualist conception of an immortal soul, on the other hand.

The shift from a scientific discourse that is concerned with the reproduction of animals and human beings to a philosophical and theological discourse that is concerned with creation and procreation could be brushed aside by mentioning that Aristotle and Aquinas were simply two different thinkers. One happened to be at home with natural science while the other happened to be at home with theology. But it would have been impossible for Aquinas to pursue the same scientific discourse pursued by Aristotle. Because of the depth and width of Aristotle’s work in natural science and because of the magnitude of his reputation, between him and the Renaissance natural science was practically content with the textual study of his scientific works. Conversely, it would have been impossible also for Aristotle to pursue the same theological and philosophical discourse pursued by Aquinas. The Catholic flair for abstruse philosophical explanations and justifications of religious doctrines was something that was started only by Paul of Tarsus [5-67 CE] as he explained Christianity to his Greco-Roman audiences and was followed and established as an important aspect of Catholic Christianity by the Church Fathers, such as Clement of Rome (30-99 CE), Ignatius of Antioch [35-110 CE], Polycarp of Smyrna [69-155 CE].

Foucauldian genealogy would be more interested in the shift from the Aristotelian hylemorphic conception of the soul to the Aquinian conception of the soul that carried undertones of Platonic dualism, as traces of power are more legible in this particular shift. Aristotle enjoyed enormous intellectual freedom both in Athens and in his Lyceum, as compared to Aquinas as a theologian of the Catholic Church. Aristotle established the Lyceum; hence, there was no way for the school’s teachers and students to dictate on their founder and director on what to write and what not to write. Although Athens had a fresh history of executing the intellectual Socrates [469-399 BCE], it did not have a clear and coherent set of doctrines that would act as parameters in determining which are legitimate and which are not. Aquinas, on the other hand, worked under the shadow of a religious organization that had already become very powerful and was intent on keeping doctrinal unity and coherence. This flair for doctrinal unity can be traced back almost ten centuries before Aquinas’s time, when Emperor Constantine the Great [272-337 CE] started to use Christianity as the unifying religion of his empire. Constantine ensured that doctrinal
differences were settled so as to eliminate their divisive threats to Christianity and to the empire. In Aquinas’s medieval period, organizational and doctrinal unity became even more important because as the Catholic Church outlived Constantine’s Roman Empire, it became a spiritual and temporal force that hovered over the Germanic Holy Roman Empire as well as over the Christian Kingdoms of Europe. The flair for coherence, as already alluded to, can be traced back even earlier to the times of Paul of Tarsus and the Church Fathers who sowed the practice of philosophically clarifying and justifying the abstruse elements of the Christian doctrine.

Burdened with the colossal power of the Catholic Church, Aquinas grappled with Aristotle in such a way that the former would not end up transgressing the Catholic Church’s much valued doctrinal unity and coherence. The fact was that when Aquinas decided to work with Aristotle’s texts, he was in an intellectual milieu where Western Christendom was threatened with a version of Aristotelianism expounded by Ibn Rushd [1126-1198], or Averroes, which leaned towards rationalism and pantheism (Maritain 2014). Aquinas confronted the problematic tradition of Aristotle not by attacking both Aristotle and Ibn Rushd, but by skirting Ibn Rushd’s interpretation of Aristotle and by going back to Aristotle himself (Maritain 2014). Aquinas was convinced of the superiority of Aristotle over Ibn Rushd’s version of him. Aquinas was resolved that any deviation of Aristotle from the unity and coherence of Christian doctrine shall be rectified in favor of Christian doctrine. The soul happened to be a key concept in Christianity that not be exchanged for the Aristotelian psyche.

FOUCAULDIAN REEXAMINATION OF AQUINAS’S AND THE CONTEMPORARY ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH’S HOMINIZATION THEORIES

As mentioned in the early part of the introductory section of this paper, the present section will now examine the hominization theories of Aquinas and the contemporary Roman Catholic Church using Foucault’s archeological and genealogical methods. Thus, the first task of this section is to highlight the radical differences between the two hominization theories and to explore their structures and systems with the hope of grasping their respective underlying logics and epistemes. This first task again corresponds with Foucault’s archeology of knowledge. The second task of this section will pursue the reasons that occasioned the discursive and epistemic shift between the Aquinian and the contemporary Roman Catholic hominization theories. The second task corresponds with Foucault’s genealogy of knowledge.

Archeological Analysis

In the introductory section of this paper we alluded to the basic difference between Aquinas’s and the contemporary Catholic Church’s hominization theories, that is, the difference between delayed and immediate ensoulment of the embryo/fetus. Many people would assume that except for this mere surface and minor difference the Aquinian and the contemporary Roman Catholic theories of hominization are essentially the same. In fact many of these people would think that the contemporary Roman Catholic Church actually rectified an aspect of Aquinas’s hominization theory and kept it abreast with the recent
developments in human embryology. This archeological analysis, however, would again treat this supposedly surface and minor difference as the tip of an iceberg, which underneath would represent more profound discursive differences between the theories at hand. These underlying profound discursive differences may again be examined under three headings: (1) differences in the theories’ discursive genre, (2) differences in the theories’ concern, and (3) differences between the Aquinian anima and the contemporary Roman Catholic Church’s anima.

Differences in Discursive Genre

The differences in discursive genre between Aquinas’s and the contemporary Roman Catholic Church’s hominization theories can be detected by comparing the disciplinal scope of their pertinent texts, the methods used in the formulation of such texts, and the intended audiences of those texts. As already mentioned, Aquinas’s hominization theory is contained in the Commentary on the sentences [of Peter Lombard], Summa contra gentiles, and Summa theologica, all of which are theological writings that made use of philosophy in their elaborations. The contemporary Roman Catholic Church’s hominization theory, on the other hand, is contained in the Apostolicae sedis moderationi of Pope Pius IX, the Casti connubii of Pope Pius XI, the Mater et magistra of Pope John XXIII, the “Declaration on procured abortion” of the Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, and the Evangelium vitae of Pope John Paul II, which have subtle differences in their disciplinal scope. The Apostolicae sedis moderationi, which talks about canonical sanctions is clearly a juridical and penal discourse. The Casti connubii and the Mater et magistra are doctrinal discourses that left so much theologizing behind the scene and merely proffered magisterial guidance to the hierarchy. Only the “Declaration on procured abortion” and Evangelium vitae can be said to have the same disciplinal scope as the Aquinian texts. Hence, whereas Aquinas’s texts are truly theological discourses, the majority of the contemporary Catholic texts are either canonical or doctrinal pronouncements. Furthermore, if these contemporary Roman Catholic texts are chronologically arranged, one will have the impression that the minority theological discourses are just belated justifications for the canonical and doctrinal pronouncements that were made much earlier.

A closer look at the Aquinian and the Roman Catholic hominization theory as contained in the two aforementioned theological texts would, however, reveal a profound difference in the way these two theories are considered theological. Whereas Aquinas struggled to come up with a complete and coherent hominization theory, the contemporary Roman Catholic Church settled with an incomplete theory that nestled a contradiction between its claims that human life begins at conception and that the institution is not actually certain when human ensoulment occurs. Hence, in terms of disciplinal scope, if the Aquinian hominization theory is a theological discourse, the contemporary Roman Catholic hominization theory can be called, for lack of proper terminology, a pseudotheological or a paratheological, discourse.

As already mentioned in the preceding section, the method used by Aquinas in constructing his pertinent texts was textual research directed towards addressing a philosophical or theological question. However, he did this in a manner that the preferred answers or implications would not run contrary to the doctrines of the Roman Catholic
Church. In particular, he made use of Aristotle’s embryology. As for the two theological texts of the contemporary Roman Catholic Church, their underlying methods were very similar to that of Aquinas, and in particular they were using 20th century embryology as their main textual source.

The intended audiences of Aquinas and the contemporary Roman Catholic Church’s pertinent texts are more divergent than their methods. Whereas Aquinas’s intended audience were individuals who are interested in theology and philosophy, the contemporary Roman Catholic Church’s incomplete theory can be sensible only to individuals who are sympathetic to Catholic doctrines.

**Differences in Theoretical Concern**

Aquinas’s hominization theory is originally contextualized in his effort to make sense out of the Jewish and Christian teaching on creation and procreation. The contemporary Roman Catholic theory of hominization, on the other hand, is contextualized in the said institution’s efforts to combat abortion. This is true to all of the five documents that were mentioned, and even to Pope Sixtus V’s *Effraenatam* (1588). The contemporary Roman Catholic Church hoped that by emphasizing immediate hominization the Catholics will be dissuaded from getting involved with the spreading practice of abortion as it would become conceptually equivalent with homicide. In terms of Aquinas’s delayed hominization, abortion during the early stages could not be considered homicide. But Aquinas was never amiss in condemning such type of abortion as a grievous sin against marriage.

**Differences between the Aquinian and the Contemporary Roman Catholic Anima**

If the Aquinian *anima* emerged from at least three streams of discourses—the Jewish *nephesh*, the biblical Christian *psyche* and *pneuma*, and the early Christian *psyche* and *anima*; the contemporary Roman Catholic *anima* emerged also from more or less the same streams of discourses, with the addition, of course, of Aquinas’s *anima* that had become a significant part of the Roman Catholic tradition. Thus, if the Aquinian *anima* had that tinge of Platonic dualism, which it inherited from the early Christian *psyche* and *anima*, the contemporary Roman Catholic *anima* also carries this tinge of Platonic dualism. Robert Pasnau (2001, 115), in his book, *Thomas Aquinas on human nature: A philosophical study of the Summa theologiae*, argues that contemporary Roman Catholic Church has been influenced also by the dualistic conception of the body and soul proposed by the French philosopher Rene Descartes [1596-1650]. Hence, the contemporary Roman Catholic *anima* could even be more dualistic than the Aquinian *anima*.

**Genealogical Analysis**

The archeological analysis undertaken in the preceding subsection had revealed that contrary to the common perception about the similarities between the Aquinian and the contemporary Roman Catholic hominization theories, the same theories are in fact profoundly different. Just like what was done in the preceding subsection, the present subsection will undertake a genealogical analysis. It will pursue the reasons for this dramatic shift from a
theological discourse that is concerned with the lofty questions of creation and procreation, which revolves around a dualist conception of an immortal soul, to a canonical, doctrinal, and pseudotheological or paratheological discourse, which is concerned about combating abortion, and which revolves around an even more dualistic conception of an immortal soul.

The primary reason for this shift is the transformation of the context and practice of abortion as it entered into the modern world, as well as the transformation of the Roman Catholic Church’s strategy in combating such practice. The transformation of the context of abortion pertains to the changes brought about by the industrial revolution and its attendant rapid urbanizations, that specifically exposed a huge number of women to the public sphere. Prior to the industrial revolution, these women were presumably sexually safe in the confines of the private sphere. With more and more women present in the public sphere, the occasion for illicit sexual affairs definitely became more rampant. Consequently, the occurrence of unwanted pregnancies and the recourse for procured abortion also became more rampant.

The transformation of the practice of abortion pertains to the emergence of safer procedures brought about by progress in science and medicine. If prior to the modern period, persons contemplating on procuring an abortion might be deterred by the thought of imminent death or serious medical complications, the modern period’s much safer medical procedures have cancelled such deterrent.

With the rising demand and occurrence of procured abortion and the availability of safe medical procedures, it is but expected that the Roman Catholic Church will also intensify its fight against such practice. But at a point in history when the political power of the Roman Catholic Church over the nations and states had been greatly diminished by the impact of the Protestant Revolution and secularization, the institution had to modify its strategy in combating such practice. The American philosopher Ronald Dworkin (1993, 44) argued that by equating abortion in all stages with homicide the 19th and 20th century Catholics attained a rhetorical advantage in as far as bringing their anti-abortion agenda to their respective state legislatures. In an era when modern democratic legislatures would no longer entertain theological and religious reasoning, the traditional Roman Catholic idea of abortion in the early stages as a sin against marriage would have no chance of being entertained. Whereas, the strategy initiated by Pope Pius IX of calling abortion in all stages as homicide can be admitted as legitimate in modern democratic legislatures. Furthermore, it is more convenient for the Roman Catholic Church in shepherding its faithful against the practice of abortion in all stages if it were labelled as homicide than if it were just labelled as a sin against marriage.

A secondary reason for this shift from Aquinian hominization theory to the contemporary Roman Catholic theory could be the lingering effect of the Platonic undertone of the Christian anima, which, as already shown, was affirmed by the Aquinian anima, and enhanced by Cartesian dualism. If Christian thought established that the soul can exist after the death of the body, then the contemporary Roman Catholic Church would have little qualm in insisting that it can also exist in a premature body, such as that of an embryo or an early stage fetus. It becomes obvious at this point how Aristotle’s psyche is subtly different from Aquinas’s anima and tremendously different from the contemporary Roman Catholic Church’s anima. If Aquinas’s struggled to fit his anima into Aristotle’s hylemorphic framework, the contemporary Roman Catholic Church never bothered at all to attempt fitting its anima into such a hylemorphic framework, as it would not fit anyway. One of the reasons
why the contemporary Roman Catholic Church was not able to construct a complete theory of hominization is that after abandoning Aristotelian hylemorphism, it did not bother to find a substitute philosophical framework that could justify its option for immediate ensoulment.

The tertiary reason for this shift could be the Mariology of Pope Pius IX. In 1854, fifteen years prior to the publication of his *Apostolicae sedis moderationi*, he published the bull *Ineffabilis Deus* that declared the doctrine of the immaculate conception of Mary of Nazareth. Since this doctrine alludes to the immediate ensoulment of the embryo that would eventually become Mary of Nazareth, and since she was a human being, Pope Pius IX was drawn towards the implication that all human beings were also immediately ensouled at the moment of conception. A similar story happened during the Council of Trent when Jesus of Nazareth was much earlier declared as immediately ensouled at the moment of conception. But the same Council took his immediate ensoulment as an exception rather than the rule: “...that this was the astonishing and admirable work of the Holy Ghost cannot be doubted; for according to the order of nature, nobody, unless after a certain period of time, can be animated with a human soul” (*The catechism of the Council of Trent* 1829, 39). It was the divinity of Jesus of Nazareth that justified this exemption. Thus, with regard to Mary of Nazareth, who was not divine, Pope Pius IX was constrained in claiming another exemption for her. This could have prompted him to lean towards the idea of immediate ensoulment for all human beings.
CONCLUSION: INSIGHTS AND LESSONS FROM THE ARCHEOLOGICAL AND GENEALOGICAL ANALYSES

The above Venn diagram represents the archeological analyses undertaken by this paper. It tries to establish how Aristotle’s, Aquinas’s, and the contemporary Roman Catholic Church’s hominization theories are profoundly different. It depicts the discursive differences, as well as their undeniable similarities.

The Venn diagram shows the only common features that feebly hold these three theories together: (1) their affirmation of the distinction between body and soul and (2) their adherence to an epigenetic embryology. Beyond these bare commonalities what we have at hand are actually three distinct discourses: (a) the Aristotelian hominization theory as a scientific discourse that is concerned with the question on the generation of animals and human beings, (b) the Aquinian hominization theory as a theological discourse that is concerned with questions of creation and procreation, and (c) the contemporary Roman Catholic hominization theory as a canonical, doctrinal, and pseudotheological discourse that is concerned with combatting the spreading practice of procured abortion.

The same Venn diagram, however, shows the strong affinity between the Aristotelian and the Aquinian hominization theories, in the sense that (i) both them subscribed to hylemorphism, (ii) argued that there are three kinds of souls, (iii) supported the idea of delayed ensoulment, and (iv) presupposed the Aristotelian embryology. The genealogical studies undertaken by this paper pointed out that the wedge that divided these two hominization theories was the Christian anima that was backed by the Constantinian quest for ecclesial and dogmatic unity, as well as by the Pauline ideal of theological coherence.

The same Venn diagram, furthermore, shows the strong affinity between the Aquinian and the contemporary Roman Catholic hominization theories, in the sense that both of them insisted on a created and immortal soul, carried dualistic undertones, and were shackled by the same Constantinian quest for ecclesial and dogmatic unity, as well as by the Pauline ideal of theological coherence. The genealogical studies undertaken by this paper pointed out that the wedge that divided these two hominization theories was the change in the way the Roman Catholic Church addressed the spreading practice of procured abortion.

The same Venn diagram, lastly, shows that there is very little affinity between the Aristotelian and the contemporary Roman Catholic hominization theories. The contemporary Roman Catholic Church’s sharp divergence from Aristotle, particularly with reference to the hylemorphic framework, and its failure to adapt a substitute theoretical framework, amounted to a major hindrance for its inability to come up with a complete hominization theory.

Finally, let us go back to the main concern of this paper, which is to glean a deeper understanding of the philosophical strengths and weaknesses of the contemporary Roman Catholic Church’s hominization theory. The archeological and genealogical analyses revealed that although the institution achieved a rhetorical strength in combating the spread of procured abortion both in the legislative spheres and in the hearts and minds of the faithful, the incompleteness of the institution’s hominization theory would in the long run erode this same rhetorical strength. There is, therefore, an urgent need for the contemporary Roman Catholic Church to revisit and rethink its hominization theory.
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